118. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State1
254. For Under Secretary Ball from Hare. Saw Erkin nine o’clock and made presentation as instructed Dept 219.2
He was very upset, pointing out that key of Inonu provisions was for withdrawal of Greeks from Mansoura complex and restoration of status quo ante.
[Page 244]Without such agreement, SC resolution would merely guarantee gains made by Greeks and he reluctant even submit such proposal for consideration of Cabinet. He felt we had let GOT down very badly. Also there had been no mention whatsoever re expediting Geneva negotiations.
I said felt Erkin looking at situation through wrong end of telescope. Inonu had mentioned four points: 1) cessation Greek attacks; 2) withdrawal by Greeks to position before attacks; 3) general peace in Cyprus; 4) speeding up Geneva talks. Security Council resolution covered points 1 and 3 and I knew for certainty that point 4 in train. This left only point 2, which obviously important from GOT viewpoint, but I saw nothing in resolution contrary to it. Possibly full knowledge of what took place either in New York or collaterally would reveal that progress made on this point of which I unaware. But in any event I saw no reason why subject couldn’t be pursued and I would ask urgently for further guidance from Washington.
Meanwhile I gave him a copy of Cyprus “Gridiron” for Aug 83 indicating full understanding by USG on this point.
Erkin said would appreciate my doing so since pressure to continue aerial strikes very strong. TAF Commander Tansel had told Inonu last night that task could be completed in one more day and had made plea against holding up today. Inonu had refused but now would be put on spot by SC resolution giving Greeks all they want except possibly Kokkina and no info available re status there since no reports received since yesterday.
Foregoing summary of very rugged session in course of which I felt necessary draw on Deptel 2224 to reinforce but even so I would hesitate say Turks will hold line unless we can give them something quickly to assure prompt Greek evacuation of territory occupied. Erkin said absolutely essential this point be covered by some political action for which we must assume responsibility of accomplishment, or Turks should be allowed complete job themselves. Previously we had persuaded GOT in advance to stop action it felt necessary but had then been unable correct situation; now we were suggesting they stop part way through and again we are not taking steps necessary to strike balance.
Hope I can have something pass Erkin on this as soon as possible since whole affair now seems dangling on this thread. Fact that Gridiron Aug 8 would indicate no policy difference with GOT on evacuation question is hopeful indicator.
[Page 245]Foregoing covers conversation as it took place and does not take into consideration reports of renewed Kokkina attacks covered Embtel 253,5 which, if confirmed, could drastically change whole situation.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Confidential; Flash. Received at 5:53 a.m. and repeated to Athens, Nicosia, USUN, Paris for USRO, London, Geneva for Acheson, and DOD. Passed to the White House and CIA.↩
- Telegram 219 to Ankara, August 9, outlined Security Council Resolution 193 (1964) on Cyprus and instructed the Embassy to underline to Turkish officials the resolution’s evenhandedness and the need for Turkish restraint. (Ibid.) The resolution, sponsored by the United States and United Kingdom, was adopted on August 9 by vote of 9 to 0, with 2 abstentions (Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union). For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 584–585.↩
- Not further identified.↩
- Telegram 222 to Ankara, August 10, stressed the need for Turkey to adhere to the Security Council resolution for a cease-fire. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP)↩
- Telegram 253 from Ankara reported that Erkin had information on two further Greek-Cypriot attacks on Turkish-Cypriot positions. (Ibid., POL 27 CYP)↩