98. Memorandum of Conversation0

SUBJECT

  • Cambodian Neutrality Proposals

PARTICIPANTS

  • The Secretary
  • H.E. Herve Alphand, Ambassador of France
  • Mr. Marcel Barthelemy, First Secretary, French Embassy
  • Mr. Henry L.T. Koren, Director, Office of Southeast Asian Affairs

The Secretary (at the request of FE) called in Ambassador Alphand in order to emphasize the importance we attach to close consultation and maximum coordination with the French in our responses to Prince Sihanouk’s proposal for international recognition and guarantee of Cambodia’s independence, neutrality and territorial integrity.

The Secretary said that Sihanouk’s effort posed a major problem. His attempt to adapt the Geneva Agreements on Laos to Cambodia was awkward and created a very difficult situation. He stressed three specific US objections to the proposals:

(1)
The fact that the proposals would amount to a guarantee by the signatories of Cambodian neutrality and so on, even though the word “guarantee” did not actually appear in the texts. The Secretary said we had gone as far in this direction as we could under SEATO and there would be no prospect of Senate agreement to any form of US guarantees specifically for Cambodia. At this point Ambassador Alphand remarked that there was no such guarantee inherent in the Laos Agreements. The Secretary assented, and went on to say that if guarantees of this nature were given to Cambodia the idea might be picked up by all the 60-odd non-aligned nations and we would be faced with a chain reaction resulting in each seeking similar big power guarantees, and this we could not countenance. Ambassador Alphand expressed agreement.
(2)
The Secretary noted that the Sihanouk proposals were actually aimed at the Thai and South Vietnamese. This made it even more difficult for us since we were allied with the former under SEATO and heavily engaged with the latter in their struggle for survival. Sihanouk’s tantrums with regard to these two countries, particularly over border incidents, had not made our job any easier.
(3)
The question of the boundaries between these three neighbors was of central importance. The frontiers are not now clearly demarcated [Page 223] and a lot of work would be required to achieve exact delimitations. Yet in Sihanouk’s proposals we were being asked to make precise commitments of very imprecise border situations, and this was not attractive to us.

The Secretary continued that Sihanouk’s threat of calling in the Chicoms was an outrageous pressure tactic. If Sihanouk was really after means to ensure his independence and neutrality, this would be the last thing for him to do. If independence and neutrality were not indeed his goal, he had the wrong objective in his proposals.

Ambassador Alphand replied that the French shared many of the same difficulties with the proposals. He said that they had been working quietly with the Cambodians to achieve more manageable proposals, and recounted unsuccessful attempts that Roux had made with Cambodian Ambassador to the US Nong Kimny, when they met at the UN, to have the matter of guarantees removed and the categorical reference to the frontiers suitably amended. Ambassador Alphand said he would report immediately the strong US views and our desire to coordinate closely on the responses. He suggested that possibly the initial replies might be delayed until December 12 when the Secretary would have an opportunity to talk directly with Foreign Minister Couve de Murville in Paris.” At this point the Secretary handed Ambassador Alphand a copy of our proposed reply,1 noting that it was interim in nature.

It was not clear whether Ambassador Alphand in suggesting the possible delay until December 12 was referring to the interim replies or to the more definitive responses.

The Secretary closed the discussion on Cambodia by noting how unpredictable Sihanouk was and indicating we could not go further in this connection than we have already, since the US had no intention of becoming the “gendarmes of the universe.”

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751H.00/11–3062. Drafted by Koren on December 7 and approved in S on December 12.
  2. See Document 99.