Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

471. Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs⁰

Washington, November 7, 1962.

THAILAND

Summary Statement

Thailand is an essential US operational base in Southeast Asia. Its continued cooperation is vital to success in Laos and to achievement of many of our other objectives in the area. Despite friction on specific issues, the basic US-Thai relationship is sound and will probably remain so for the foreseeable future as long as Thailand is convinced of our determination to meet our obligations in Southeast Asia. The success of our efforts in South Viet-Nam and Laos will contribute significantly to conditioning Thai attitudes. During the past two years there has been a major increase in the size and tempo of US assistance to Thailand. We now have a significant investment in maintaining Thailand’s internal security and improving socio-economic conditions.

Major Foreign Policy Issues

Relations between the US and Thailand have improved during the past month or so. Prime Minister Sarit has been more cooperative in discussions with US officials than previously, and he extended full and prompt support for the US during the Cuban crisis. Nonetheless a number of problems remain.

1. Confidence. The Rusk–Thanat communiqué of March 1962¹ and introduction of US combat forces in May went far toward reassuring the Thai of our determination to stand by them. However, doubts still persist that over the long run the US might pull out of Southeast Asia, leaving Thailand in what it regards as an increasingly exposed position following the recent Laos Agreement. Statements by some Members of Congress and prominent US journalists aggravate these fears. To meet this concern we have stressed the following among others:

(a) The general size and scope of our efforts in Thailand and South Viet-Nam.

(b) The ability and willingness of US forces to move into Thailand rapidly in the event of need, as shown by the introduction of US troops in May.

(c) Our program to improve Thailand’s logistic capabilities and the eventual presence under this program of more than 1,000 US military construction personnel.

(d) The Rusk-Thanat communiqué regarding SEATO and our willingness to agree to some type of abstention arrangement in SEATO voting.

2. Laos. Thailand continues to have serious doubts about the ability of the present Laos government to resist communist efforts. Recent events, such as the failure of the Viet-Minh to withdraw, have aggravated these doubts. The Thai fear that Laos may well provide the communists additional channels for subversive activity against Thailand. Nonetheless, Thailand has taken a constructive attitude toward the new Laos government, and the recent visit by Souvanna Phouma to Bangkok appears to have been successful. We have taken every opportunity to impress on the Thai our determination to do everything possible to help the new government succeed. We have also stressed the essential fact that, Thailand itself must support the Souvanna government to strengthen his hand against the communists.

3. Cambodia. Recent Thai dissatisfaction with the United States has centered primarily on our policy toward Cambodia. To get to the root cause of difficulty between Thailand and Cambodia we have supported the establishment of a UN presence in the area. In response to a Thai overture which was supported by Cambodia, the UN Secretary General recently sent Nils Gussing as his personal representative to consider the Thai-Cambodian situation. We are extending all possible support to Mr. Gussing consistent with his UN role and hope his presence will develop into a more or less permanent UN involvement in Thai-Cambodian problems which could serve as a buffer between the disputants.

4. US Consultation. The Thai have recently become seriously concerned by what they regarded as inadequate advance consultation by the US on issues affecting their interests. Cambodia and withdrawal of the US Marines from Thailand were cited as particular examples of the United States treating Thailand as a “second-class ally.” As a result we have taken steps to improve our consulting arrangements. Ambassador Young has discussed with Sarit the future US military presence in Thailand. He has also outlined to the RTG the nature and general size of our anticipated assistance this fiscal year. Consultation will be held on other issues wherever possible.

5. US Troop Presence. Prime Minister Sarit has recently taken the position that US ground forces should be withdrawn from Thailand since their presence has served its purpose. Sarit would like, however, to retain the 250-man Tactical Air Squadron. On November 5 our Ambassador informed the Thai Foreign Minister that, barring unforeseen developments, we would be prepared to withdraw the Battle. Group by December 1. The Fighter Squadron was excluded from this arrangement and the future status of this unit will be reviewed by the US in late November.²

Retaining the air unit in Thailand for an additional period beyond December 1 offers several advantages. Presence of this unit in Thailand would indicate our continued interest in developments in Laos. It would also be responsive to Sarit’s wishes and would provide a basis for maintaining the presence of Australian and possibly New Zealand units in Thailand. The Australians in particular have indicated their willingness to remain in Thailand as long as US forces stay.

We have also discussed with Prime Minister Sarit the possibility of future rotational training in Thailand by US forces. Following withdrawal of the Battle Group we hope to agree on an arrangement whereby US units can be brought in for short bilateral training exercises.

US Support Programs: MAP—$76 million, AID—$32 million

Thailand does not now face a serious internal or external security threat. However, it has a number of serious internal vulnerabilities and its future security will depend significantly on events in Laos. We have adopted a three-fold assistance program designed to backstop Thailand’s own efforts to meet this security threat. Our support includes (1) political development projects to win for the Thai Government the allegiance of people in remote areas, (2) accelerated socio-economic assistance to reduce economic vulnerabilities, and (3) preventive security measures to improve paramilitary and military forces.

Our FY 1963 assistance to Thailand has not been finally approved, but will probably total about $108 million. The $76 million proposed under MAP emphasizes mobility and communications, the movement of Thai forces into remote areas, and the creation of new types of units useful for counter-insurgency as well as conventional operations. It includes new types of equipment and construction of military facilities intended to encourage the movement of additional Thai troops from central Thailand to remote areas.

The FY 1962 and 63 MAP also include the special logistics programs intended to increase the speed and effectiveness with which US and other SEATO forces might be deployed. Detailed discussions on this program are underway with the Thai Government.

The FY 1963 AID includes programs to improve communications into remote areas, improve the functioning of local officials especially those in vulnerable areas, raise economic standards, and improve the size and quality of the Thai police force. It is hoped in the current fiscal year to raise the strength of the Thai Border Patrol Police from the present 4800 men to 7000.

Our FY 1963 military and socio-economic assistance programs are geared to meeting the objectives in the Internal Security Plan for Thailand prepared by the Country Team at Bangkok. Ambassador Young outlined the FY 1963 program to Prime Minister Sarit on October 29. The Prime Minister indicated his general concurrence and suggested detailed discussions through the joint Thai-US committees to ensure effective integration of our support into the over-all Thai effort.³

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Thailand, Vol. IV, 11/62–12/62. Secret. According to the Department of State copy, this paper was drafted by Masters and cleared by Koren and Harriman. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.92/11–762) It was transmitted to the White House under cover of a November 7 memorandum from Brubeck to McGeorge Bundy in preparation for a meeting with the President. The meeting was held from 4 to 4:30 p.m. on November 8 and was attended by McNamara, Heinz, and William Bundy for Defense; Harriman, Koren, and Sullivan for State; Janow and Hamilton for AID, Taylor and Clay for the JCS, and Cline and Hepworth for CIA. The topic of Laos dominated the discussion. Apparently the only decision taken at the meeting concerning Thailand was that Young should emphasize to Sarit that it was crucial that he should continue to counsel Phoumi to cooperate with Souvanna Phouma. For accounts of the meeting, see vol. XXIV, pp. 911–915.
1. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, p. 1093.
2. Reported in telegrams 782 and 792 from Bangkok, November 5 and 9. (Department of State, Central Files, 792.00/11–562 and 792.00/11–962)
3. Reported in airgram A-267 from Bangkok, October 30. (Ibid., 792.5/10–3062)