Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

469. Summary of Discussion⁰

Document #2

Washington, October 11, 1962.

SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONS AT HONOLULU CONFERENCE

October 8–9, 1962

I. T-A Comprehensive Internal Security Plan for Thailand

A. Ambassador’s Review of Situation

Ambassador Young set the stage with the following comments:

1. Thailand is an essential US operational base in Southeast Asia.

2. Our efforts must be subordinate to and in support of those of the RTG.

3. Despite uncertainties in current US-Thai relations, the basic relationship is sound and will probably remain so if Thailand respects our power and needs our resources.

4. It is extremely important to develop programs which will get the Thai Government out to the villagers. We have a maximum of 24 months to accomplish this. (This is based on a projection of two dry seasons. The Ambassador said by 1965 the threat will be such that it will be too late if our projects are not complete.)

B. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Political Situation

Although the Communist Party is outlawed it is nonetheless organizing. The Northeast and the North are the most vulnerable. Since the Kong Le coup in Laos in August of 1960 six subversive groups have been detected in the Northeast and some 380 persons have been arrested. The Thai Exiles Association in Laos backstops the efforts of subversives within Thailand. This Association aspires to take over the Northeast, oust foreign troops from Thailand, get Thailand to leave SEATO, and replace the Sarit government.

Other vulnerabilities are as follows:

1. The Chinese are a likely target for communist penetration due to the economic influence.

2. Some 35 to 40,000 Vietnamese remain in the Northeast. This group is solidly pro-Hanoi. DRV reluctance to conclude a new repatriation agreement may be due in large part to the fact that the communists wish to keep these people in Thailand.

3. The KMT Irregulars are a source of instability.

4. The Shans which operate against the GUB embarrass the Thai Govt.

5. [2 lines of source text not declassified]

On the positive side, there is no evidence of significant communist inroads among the Buddhist clergy. There is also no evidence of serious disaffection among students.

[1 paragraph (3-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

The communists are now making some propaganda efforts against US troops in Thailand. Leaflets have been issued criticizing these troops. There have been no known efforts to conduct sabotage against them.

Prospects: For the foreseeable future the communists will continue their organizational phase. No militant action is likely. Sarit and his government are aware of the problem and are starting to do something about it. Thailand is not an easy target for the communists. The Sarit government is stable and the Prime Minister is highly respected. The popular monarchy is also a force for stability. There could however be an insurgent situation in three to five years if remedial action is not taken now. The real danger is Thailand’s wavering confidence in US determination to beat the communists in SEA.

[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] no group is now in a position to oust the Prime Minister. His future depends on his health. [1 line of source text not declassified] If he died or were incapacitated, he would probably be succeeded by Defense Minister Thanom with Praphat exercising a strong role in the background. Chitti and Krit are potential successors, but it is likely that Thanom would be the immediate replacement for Sarit.

C. The Internal Security Plan

The Ambassador briefly outlined the LAS, Master Force Plan and priority list, all of which were submitted to Washington in September.¹ He said the Country Team has developed a triangular approach (by including (1) political development to win the allegiance of the people in remote areas; (2) socio-economic development to improve living conditions; and (3) preventive security through para-military and military forces).

Mr. Ewer² surveyed the AID portion of the Plan. He said there are now 800 kilometers of feeder roads in the program at about $30,000 per kilometer. This program will be submitted to Washington in detail later this month. Mr. Ewer said the SEATELCOM contract had not yet been signed, but that completion of SEATELCOM was still set at 11 months from date of signature.

Mr. McNamara said if the contract were not signed by a reasonable date SEATELCOM should be funded under MAP. Admiral Felt demurred on the grounds that alternative facilities are already under way by the military. Following a general discussion Mr. McNamara said the matter should be left as follows: If the contract is not signed by October 19 (expiration date for the current bids) the Country Team should bring the matter to the attention of State and DOD with recommendations on what should be done to expedite action.

Gen. Conway³ said the Master Force Plan was re-examined in light of DOD comments. The force maintenance and force improvement sections are the same as in the FY 1963 program. The para-military elements and certain equipment items are additive. [1 line of source text not declassified] a maximum of 7500. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Thailand could recruit and absorb that many if the money were available. [less that 1 line of source text not declassified] the limit on the build-up was money rather than other factors. SecDef said the USG would supply the money if Thailand can recruit the people.

[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] we should not provide troop support for the BPP if this is not provided for the army. Preferential treatment for the BPP could have adverse political implications.

Mr. McNamara suggested the following:

1. We include in the AID program for FY 1963 enough money for equipping a 7,000-man BPP.

2. We leave to Country Team discretion the authority to make this proposal to Sarit or hold it depending on their assessment of his political views.

3. We leave to Country Team the problem of finding a solution to the army-BPP matter.

We believe this increase in the BPP is important. We should give the Country Team maximum flexibility in negotiating with the RTG. The Country Team should first try to induce the RTG to pay troop support. If the RTG cannot do this, we could perhaps raise baht by provision through MAP of some military equipment desired by the RTG. AID would reimburse MAP for this equipment.

Gen. Conway said we aspire for a well-trained and well-equipped provincial police of 28,000. SecDef said that if weapons were needed DOD would transfer these to AID at low cost. He said DOD could give 28,000 M-1s at a cost of about $14 each. If the M-1 is not satisfactory, the DOD should be informed what is needed. We want 28,000 well-equipped provincial policemen.

Gen. Conway recommended MAP funding for the Volunteer Defense Corps. Sec Def said this organization has third priority on total AID and MAP resources and we should proceed as rapidly as politically feasible in improving the VDC.

Gen. Taylor questioned whether a VDC was needed for Thailand. He said we established a proliferation of preventive organizations in Viet-Nam and asked whether we needed to duplicate this in Thailand. He expressed the belief that we need a clear idea of the mission for this organization and suggested it might duplicate the provincial police. SecDef said this is nonetheless priority #3; our program should include such manning increase and equipment as the Sarit government will accept.

In a discussion of the military force levels under the MFP, SecDef questioned why we should press the Thai to raise the manning level to 80%. He said additional conventional forces are not needed for GI work. What we need is improved training and equipment for the existing forces. He said we would supply the equipment for an airborne battalion, a psywar battalion, and an engineer unit, but the Thai must provide the personnel. They can establish new units or convert existing ones.

Carrying this further, SecDef said that unless the RTG is willing to provide troop pay we will not support additional recruitment with equipment. As a matter of principle, we should not give troop support nor does Thailand require $81 million (from the MFP) in troop support over the next six years.

SecDef said in the earlier executive session it had been agreed that there was no “Johnson commitment.” He said the Ambassador will clarify with the RTG the fact that this was a misunderstanding and not a commitment. SecDef said we would give the Ambassador some “sweetener.”

Referring to the $10 million CI Fund, Gen. Conway said we could get the Thai army into the field six months per year for $1 million. SecDef said we absolutely would not pay for this.

Referring to earlier SecDef criticism of the MFP, Gen. Conway said we need to bear in mind the political factors. The RT Army is reluctant to create competing para-military units. This is the reason why para-military forces were not given a greater role in the MFP. Gen. Conway added that he did not believe the RTA was over strength in view of the size, long border, lack of roads, and other factors in Thailand. Regarding SecDef criticism that the para-military build-up was too slow, Gen. Conway said the CT and the RTG had believed that growth acceleration depended on US troop support.

II. T-B Improvement of National Intelligence Effort

[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] the most effective intelligence collecting organizations “are: (1) the police, (2) the DCI, and (3) the military, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] these sources are now beginning to pool their information. However, Sarit still deals directly with them and coordination leaves much to be desired. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

Sarit recently permitted JUSMAG to send advisers to Thai Army intelligence organizations; 17 US personnel are now out with Thai divisions.

SecDef said we should take a given province and put down all we know about it. This should include the local security apparatus and attitudes of the people. We should try to develop a set of techniques and programs to meet these vulnerabilities. Adm. Felt suggested that Sakorn Nakorn province be used as an example.

III. T-C US Troop Presence

SecDef said retention of the US combat, troops in Thailand was a political matter on which he would abide by State’s decision. Following a discussion with Gov. Harriman he said we should plan on leaving the Battle Group in Thailand until the status of the Viet-Minh in Laos is more apparent. On October 15 or shortly thereafter Ambassador Young will be authorized to discuss this matter with Sarit. When the Battle Group is withdrawn we will then consider whether to leave the air unit behind. SecDef said his personal preference would be to pull both out together, but that he would like the views of State and the RTG.

SecDef said some 200 members of a Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, now attached to the Battle Group, are due for rotation October 11. He suggested we proceed with removal of this unit. SecDef expressed the view that the Battle Group might be in Thailand for a long time if we intend to maintain it for leverage against Laos.

SecDef suggested that the equipment for the CR Squadron be left behind in Thailand. Subject to confirmation on his return to Washington, SecDef said new equipment would be sent to Honolulu for this unit after its withdrawal from Thailand.

IV. T-D SLAT Program

Adm. Felt said JTF-116 had reached agreement with Dawee on October 5 on a new site for the Nakorn Phanom airfield. This location is some eight miles from the river and is located on higher ground than the earlier position. Dawee agreed also to provide the necessary real estate.

Adm. Felt said the cost of the SLAT Program had been reduced somewhat. He outlined the revised program as follows:

1. Rolling stock	$4,325,000
2. Floating crane	330,000
3. Nakorn Phanom airfield	2,334,000
4. Permanent pipeline	5,950,000*
5. Preposition pipeline	6,500,000
6. Preposition Battle Group equipment, PSP, etc.	(9,500,000)**
Transportation	898,000
7. Construction of storage depots Approximate total MAP cost	669.000
Total US troops—1422	$21,000,000

*—Includes $1.95 million for material and $4 million for the US Engineer Battalion.

**—Service funding.

V. L-A Various Contingency Plans for US and/or SEATO Action in Laos

SecDef said we should consider how we might best lay the basis for Thai participation in a bilateral effort with the US in Laos. Whenever the political situation is appropriate, US military authorities are prepared to talk on a contingency basis with the Thais. It might also be possible to include an Australian, New Zealand, and UK contribution. State should advise DOD what action, if any, is appropriate to brief the Thai on our plans.

0. Source: Department of State, FE/SEA/Thai Files: Lot 66 S 298, 1.B.3 Personnel. Secret. Drafted by Masters. The participants at the conference also discussed Vietnam; see vol. II, pp. 688–691.
1. In telegram 613 from Bangkok, September 29, Young commented on the Master Force Plan prepared by JUSMAG. The theme of Young’s detailed comments was to encourage the counterinsurgency capability in Thailand. (Department of State, Central Files, 795.2/9–2962) For a summary of the plan, see Document 472. In telegram 586 from Bangkok, September 26, the Country Team provided a priority list of military assistance programs to meet U.S. objectives in Thailand. (Department of State, Central Files, 792, 5/9–2662) The Long-Range Assistance Strategy has not been found, but a memorandum from Hilsman to Bell, August 10, 1963, summarizes it. (Ibid., EA/Thai Files: Lot 66 D 500, Thailand, July-December)
2. John C. Ewer, Director of the AID Mission, Bangkok, since April 30, 1962.
3. Major General Theodore J. Conway, Chief, Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group, Thailand; also Deputy Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand.