Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

463. Paper by the President’s Military Representative (Taylor)⁰

September 21, 1962.

IMPRESSIONS OF THAILAND

1. Sarit

(For interview with Sarit, see attached cable.)¹ For his press reaction to interview, see attached clipping.²

Sarit is undoubtedly fed up with Sihanouk and all his works and he is being egged on by Thanat in his threats to go it alone without the U.S. However, he is a wise, old pro who is unlikely to do anything extreme from emotion or loss of temper. My present hunch would be that Sarit will not leave our side unless we should lose in SVN. However, he may be expected to pursue a more independent policy as time goes on with less heed to U.S. wishes.

2. National Security Organization

The Thais have moved ahead in organizing a National Security Organization to cope with the potential insurgency problem in the north-east. It provides a useful device for receiving and channeling U.S. assistance earmarked for counter-insurgency purposes. The present plan calls for setting up four Joint Development Centers in the area by September 1963 which will be regional centers for civic action kinds of activities. One has already been established at Ban Na Ko which is expected to cost $60,882.

3. The Military Aid Program

The objectives of the Military Aid Program, contained in CINCPAC letter serial 0307, dated June 2, 1962,³ are as follows:

• “The primary mission of the JUSMAG is to support COMUSMACTHAI in assisting the RTG forces and paramilitary forces to attain the capability to:

  a. Maintain internal security against Communist-inspired external aggression.

  b. Provide maximum feasible initial resistance to Communist-inspired external aggression.

  c. Make a modest contribution to the collective defense of the SEATO area.”

In attempting to find what force level was being used as the goal to meet the requirements of b. and c. above, I found that the yardstick was the requirement of approved SEATO war plans. If certain Thai forces are included in any of these plans we undertake to provide the military aid to support them. This fact emphasizes the need to look carefully at SEATO and bilateral planning to see how realistic they are since they generate MAP expenditures. In most cases, it is the planning requirement to be ready for massive Chicom attack which runs up the cost of the MAP program.

4. The 5-Year Internal Security Program With Included Master Defense Plan

Ambassador Young has had great difficulty in producing the above plan in a form satisfactory to Washington. The Master Defense Plan, drawn up by Major General Briard P. Johnson, was submitted separately on August 15, 1962 to meet a DOD deadline. There was not time to reflect in it the Secretary of Defense’s guidance given at Honolulu on 23 July 1962 to the effect that we should plan Thai forces without regard to the requirements of a large scale war with the Chicoms. Hence, the cost of the MAP is high—1/2 billion dollars for 6 years—with the largest hardware costs allocated to modernizing the Air Force. The orientation of effort away from conventional forces towards internal security is slight because of the fundamental assumption that the Thai force must be tailored to support the requirements of approved war plans. The Ambassador has not commented on the plan.

A moot point in the Master Defense Plan is the inclusion of about $60 million for troop support, a change from the past policy of refusing to pick up these costs. Ambassador Young is opposed to this change except for the so-called LBJ commitment of $12.6 million which Young would spread over three years.

The military construction program within the MDP contains about $60 million for the improvement of airfields (items beyond the SLAT program) to permit jet operations against Red China.

Young has had great difficulty in getting from AID a satisfactory socio-economic program to go with the MDP One sticking point has been AID resistance to putting up any local currency since they told Congress they would not but now it is planned to propose that local costs may be shared 50–50. To the unhappiness of the AID officials, Young has included in the MDP funds to be provided by AID for the border and provincial police. AID people complain that they were not consulted about these sub-programs.

The present status of the Internal Defense Plan is as follows:

Master Defense Plan: Has been submitted to Washington. Young is about to send forward his comments.⁴ He has had no Washington reaction except word that no comment there is feasible until the socio-economic plan is received.⁵

Socio-Economic Plan: Submitted to Washington in form of long-range plan not approved by the Ambassador; a specific program for FY 63 will follow during the week of 17 September. The State request for additional information on priorities and currency requirements will be met by the Embassy within a week.

5. Future MA Programs

We are at the crossroads of decision with regard to further military aid for Thailand. The MFP [MDP?], if approved, will be a heavy load to carry and will generate fixed charges in maintenance at around $20 million a year. Any effort to streamline the program, even if justified militarily, will compound our growing difficulties with Sarit and his Government.

The following military points should be looked at in reviewing future MA programs for Thailand:

a. The assumption with regard to the responsibility for defending Thailand against Chicom ground, air and sea attack. If the U.S. were willing to provide the necessary additional forces to defeat a Chicom attack in SEA, the local MAP could be greatly reduced in Thailand and other Asian countries.

b. The need to build up a logistic and airfield base in Thailand to support a general war against Chicoms. This question arises regardless of who may use the facilities—U.S., Thais, or SEATO.

c. The advantage of putting more stress on the use of missiles rather than of manned aircraft for air defense to offset the Chicom superiority in the air.

d. The need for the Thai Navy to be able to conduct ASW patrols in the Gulf of Thailand without U.S. assistance.

e. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

f. The relative weight being accorded conventional weapons versus paramilitary forces.⁴

6. Withdrawal of the U.S. Battle Group From Thailand

The 2d BG, 35th Infantry is well installed in Khorat where it can do useful training while exercising a stabilizing effect on the Laotian situation. Its withdrawal would be very disturbing to Sarit who is unsure of U.S. long term intentions in SEA and who is already looking around for some new place to go. He will never feel that the 1500 “logistical package” is an offset to the withdrawal of the battle group—indeed the argument should not be advanced. Whatever our decision, we should inform Sarit well in advance of troop movements in and out of Thailand.

7. VOA Transmitter

Although the Thais have agreed in principle to permitting the installation of a large VOA transmitter for use against targets outside of Thailand, they are now insisting on Thai ownership, operation and manning with complete control over allocation of broadcast time. U.S. officials hope to compromise by agreeing to Thai manning but with U.S. direction. We could promise the Thais some broadcast time.

8. U.S. Command Set-Up—SVN/Thailand

There is uncertainty as to the U.S. military command set-up in SEA both for the present situation and for active military operations. Admiral Felt, anticipating the withdrawal of CJTF 116 from Thailand, would prefer to relieve Harkins of his responsibility for Thailand and pull back to Honolulu US and SEATO planning for Thailand and Laos. He would make General Conway senior US Commander, Laos, but with only coordinating authority over PACOM units rotating through Thailand.

If this arrangement is not acceptable, Admiral Felt would like Harkins in present role but would give him Conway as his Chief of Staff for Thai affairs. Harkins would exercise operational command through component commanders in Thailand and South Vietnam as appropriate.

Neither of these suggestions look good to me. Harkins should be retained as overall commander with three subordinate commanders: CG, AF, SEA; CG, US Army Thailand (also Chief of MAAG); and COMUSMACV (less air component). Harkins would remain COMUSMACV and would receive a staff augmentation to meet his responsibilities for area planning.

General O’Donnell feels that Harkins needs a senior AF officer as his advisor in air matters. I would give this task to CG, AF, SEA.

9. Ambassador Young is swamped. He wants and needs a principal assistant to man the internal defense program. Further, it is obvious in Bangkok, Phnom Penh, and Saigon that State would receive less local oriented recommendations if the three Ambassadors could meet regularly and talk over their overlapping problems.

0. Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Far East Trip, Sept. 62, T–022–69. Top Secret. Taylor presumably drafted this paper en route to Washington.
1. See footnote 1, Document 462.
2. Not attached.
3. Not found.
4. Some of Young’s comments are in telegram 601 from Bangkok, September 27. He listed positive and negative factors affecting U.S. policy and concluded that for the next 2 years the positive outweighed the negative. Over the long run, the negative factors could predominate. Young could not, therefore, recommend that the United States commit itself irrevocably to a $700-million program over the next 6 years. Since it was a U.S. policy decision to develop Thailand as “a security base in SEA,” the United States would have to continue programs in this order of magnitude, but it should emphasize local flexibility and initiative and ensure that the programs did not become “interminable and inelastic.” (Department of State, Central Files, 792.5/9–2762)
5. In telegram 294 to Bangkok, September 11. (Ibid./792.5/9–1162)
4. Some of Young’s comments are in telegram 601 from Bangkok, September 27. He listed positive and negative factors affecting U.S. policy and concluded that for the next 2 years the positive outweighed the negative. Over the long run, the negative factors could predominate. Young could not, therefore, recommend that the United States commit itself irrevocably to a $700-million program over the next 6 years. Since it was a U.S. policy decision to develop Thailand as “a security base in SEA,” the United States would have to continue programs in this order of magnitude, but it should emphasize local flexibility and initiative and ensure that the programs did not become “interminable and inelastic.” (Department of State, Central Files, 792.5/9–2762)