Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

448. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State⁰

Bangkok, May 24, 1962, noon.

1844. Saigon pass COMUSMACTHAI. Now that deployment US forces substantially completed in Thailand and Thais inviting SEATO forces, I feel I must raise four policy questions on which contingency planning and guidance may be necessary.

(1) The right bank problem. The area between the Mekong River and the Thai-Lao international boundary in northwest Laos (Sayabouri) is extremely sensitive and matter of deep concern for Thai officials. If PL/VM regular forces move across Mekong into this area or take up positions on Mekong across from it, Thai reaction time will be quick and Thai response will probably be movement of Thai military forces across Thai-Lao boundary into that area. [3 lines of source text not declassified] Thanat described same Thai concern at breakfast with Secy McNamara. PriMin Sarit described problem Tuesday¹ to me with maps. And yesterday Phya Srivisan, who is member of Privy Council and will become Sarit’s special assistant, also pointed to this dangerous wide-open flank west of Mekong in northwest Laos. He also expressed concern over similar area in southwest corner Laos across Mekong from Pakse. [4 lines of source text and footnote not declassified]

It is our estimate here that Thais would move their military forces into Sayabouri area even if PL/VM units in strength took positions on left bank or, in Thai view, threatened to infiltrate or move across river. Thais would undertake preventive occupation and/or request RLG to do this by mutual agreement. I feel certain Thais will do everything possible to prevent PL/VM from getting any semblance of toehold or foothold on west bank Mekong.

I don’t know if there is any specific instruction the Dept needs send me in immediate future but some contingency guidance should be considered in case Commies do infiltrate in large numbers or move overtly towards or into these sensitive areas.

(2) Additional Communist cease-fire breaches. While presence American forces appears to have stabilized situation SEA, there is always possibility they might again undertake something on order of Nam Tha action such as rumored over past weekend east of Thakhek. My question is what contingency guidance should Gen Harkins and I have as to use in Laos of US combat forces now in Thailand. If Communists do make another military seizure and breach cease-fire, Thai Govt and public will press for some sort of US combat employment across Mekong at least for pre-emptive occupation.

I realize this extremely tricky and difficult question but even if it is not feasible at this stage to issue any instructions or guidance, I feel higher authorities should have this contingency well in mind for immediate action during next few months if necessary.²

(3) Withdrawal US forces. Question is put every day by correspondents as well as people in general here, as to how long US forces will stay in Thailand and what will be the circumstances permitting the departure. Have been answering this in general noncommitting terms. But for political and military planning purposes it would be helpful to work initially on time span of ninety days as a confidential working assumption.

When situation in Laos and SEA stabilized enough to permit some withdrawals, I would recommend USG revert to a plan of cycle rotational training for US combat units. Those now here could be replaced at least in part by similar or other units, particularly in dry season beginning next fall. Question of withdrawal will have to be worked out carefully with Thais, who may be, pulled in two directions, having some qualms about permanent presence forces but at same time wanting to keep some US combat forces deployed in Thailand and perhaps also envisioning permanent stationing foreign troops for SEATO role.³

Young

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 792.00/5–2462. Top Secret. Passed to William Bundy and repeated to Vientiane, Saigon, and CINCPAC.
1. May 22.

2. In telegram 1849 to Bangkok, May 25, the Department of State instructed Young: “Highest authority directs that there should be no bilateral US-Thai contingency planning re operations which would contemplate movement Thai forces into Laos, especially Sayaboury area as described reftel. We must avoid any implied obligation to support Thai occupation Lap territory.

   “For present, all contingency planning against deterioration military situation Laos will be exclusively US. Adm. Felt, Generals Harkins and Tucker will be so instructed by JCS.” (Ibid., 792.00/5–2562)

3. In telegram 1855 to Bangkok, the Department of State informed Young: “US position re withdrawal forces from Thailand must remain characterized by maximum flexibility. For public purposes, draw on President’s comments May 23 press conference.

   “For your confidential planning, we would expect at least some of these forces remain in Thailand until satisfactory progress made in Laos or establishment government national union, withdrawal foreign military forces, and integration-demobilization process Lao forces.

   “This process may take at least six months and is indication for your guidance.” (Ibid.)

   In his comments to the press on May 23, President Kennedy refused to predict when U.S. troops would leave Thailand, but stated that the United States would make a judgment based on the situation in Laos and Thailand. The transcript of the press conference is in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962, pp. 431–437.