445. Memorandum From President Kennedy to Secretary of State Rusk0
As I said this afternoon,1 I think this matter of SEATO consultation is of great importance, and I am glad you are seeing the French and British Ambassadors. I hope you or Averell—presumably the latter—will see all the other SEATO Ambassadors before noon tomorrow.2 It seems to me very important for their Governments to know that we are increasing our forces in Thailand before they read it in the papers.
My suggestions for the message that we might convey are these: 1. That the breach of the cease-fire in Laos creates a question both about further intentions of the Communists and about our own resolution. We think it is important to improve our tactical position and to give substantial reassurance to the Thais.
2. We are continuing to work for a restoration of a cease-fire and for a resumption of Laotian negotiations for a unified government.
3. We are undertaking this action on our own responsibility, but we hope our SEATO partners will understand that it is a part of our common concern for the Southeast Asia areas. Australian and New Zealand Ambassadors should be reminded that the greatest present need for support; advice, and assistance is in South Vietnam, and that the more SEATO cooperation we get there the better for all of us. It should be emphasized to the ambassadors of other nations that their help is most needed in Thailand.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790.5/5–1462. Top Secret; Eyes Only.↩
- See Document 444.↩
- In circular telegram 1945, May 15, 5:05 p.m., the Department reported that each SEATO Ambassador had been briefed and asked to make a contribution of a small military unit as a demonstration of SEATO solidarity. The addressee SEATO posts were instructed to emphasize, as the Department did to SEATO Ambassadors, that sending troops to Thailand was not an implied or direct commitment to do anything in Laos. (Department of State, Central Files, 792.00/5–1562)↩