Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

421. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State⁰

Bangkok, November 7, 1961, 4 p.m.

693. Deptel 619,¹Embtel 681.² Progress joint planning, Sarit’s line on “Washington decisions”, his health and Thanat’s inaction explain where we stand today:

1. Sarit has been waiting for announcement increased US military and economic assistance program since Vice President left Bangkok. Considers “$50 million” military aid US commitment made during that visit subject only to congressional authorization, notwithstanding my oral and written explanations to him that we first need agreements on joint planning. Absence Sarit and others Bangkok slows up our pushing program jointly.

2. However, RTG has taken several positive steps (Embtel 681) in response Deptel 28³ and my memorandum of July 28,⁴ which RTG had endorsed officially. Discussions in subcommittee meetings on economic and military subjects have moved considerable distance in joint planning and specific understandings. We have reached stage of Thai undertakings to discuss total FY 62 assistance packages, now if we get Washington and CINCPAC go ahead, this would give more leverage to get specific support from RTG. However, size of local currency needs for mil and economic program still not determined although we are advised RTG seeking arrive at this figure. Have written Sarit to underscore joint discussions on this point.

3. Local currency is critical weakness our whole program in Thailand. Unless we find ways remove this Achilles heel, new program will flounder and joint efforts will not be able shore up Thailand’s overall defensibility during FY 62 and FY 63. There is not much more time left in light situation Laos, Vietnam and now Cambodia.

4. Thanat Khoman has taken no initiative with me regarding Washington talks or aid programs since his return despite my suggestions and promptings for follow-up talks. He said he and I have nothing discuss since Washington talks satisfactory and no disagreement between USG and RTG. He talks only about SEATO reorganization or surgery every time we meet with categoric “or else” attitude. He believes US Govt has officially concurred in changing unanimity rule. Otherwise, he had not himself raised (a) rotational training by SEATO or US; (b) US construction battalion and by-pass road; (c) Bangkok-trade Export-Import loan; or (d) Spiracha harbor loan. Nor has he suggested reconvening Thai-US committee which he chairs for Thais. He has been down with cold and fatigue, appears in dispirited mood and is preoccupied with Cambodia. Now he is preparing for Colombo Plan meeting, leaving Nov 10, Kuala Lumpur for week or so. Since Dept telegrams and memo of conversation Johnson–Thanat talks put initiative on Thanat for these subjects I have not yet prodded him on them. In view above circumstances doubt anything will come from him until after Colombo, unless Sarit or Cabinet steps in.

5. Main problem is Sarit. I will have increasing difficulty seeing him on our business as well as getting coordinated govt views out of RTG. Sarit has slowed down from fatigue and other factors and is resting at seaside for several weeks at his initiative. Besides Thanom and top military have been in Burma. Aid matters, Laos, etc., will need the return Sarit and principal colleagues back together in operation and then I must deal with him directly.

6. Regarding 4a and 4b, RTG apparently uncoordinated and we seeking clarification. Sarit and military approve both, but Thanat argued strongly against SEATO rotational training with General Taylor and myself and has never mentioned battalion or by-pass to me. Resolution awaits return General Thanom and Sarit in Bangkok.

7. Does Dept want written answer from RTG to my memo of July 28 as I have been urging from Thai? A reply in draft by Luang Vichit exists but we have not seen. I do not wish deal directly with him on US aid if it can be avoided, so must follow-up with Thanat as soon as feasible. Also, does Dept want us take initiative press RTG on specifics para 4 and other aspects Deptel 28? Recommend we continue leave balls in their court, since Dept and Embassy have made repeatedly clear our willingness expand aid programs subject various understanding and our interest in specific projects. I don’t like to press RTG in what is in their interest and from our pocketbook.⁵

Young

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 792.5–MSP/11–761. Secret. Repeated to CINCPACPOLAD.
1. In telegram 619 to Bangkok, October 31, the Department expressed concern about Sarit’s repeated comments that he was waiting for the United States to act in the field of military assistance, since it was waiting for the Thais to act. Young was instructed to make it clear to Sarit, if he had not already done so, that the United States was prepared to provide assistance to improve Thai forces but, without Thai decisions, the United States had no basis on which to provide the necessary funds and equipment. (Ibid., 792.5–MSP/10–3161)
2. In telegram 681 from Bangkok, November 4, the Embassy reported on progress made with the Thais on military assistance, but noted that it was difficult to arrive at clear-cut agreements over the short term. (Ibid., 792.5/11–61)
3. Document 414.
4. See footnote 1, Document 414.

5. In telegram 783 to Bangkok, November 28, the Department suggested that it “may have been asking too much of Thais in expecting to be able to work out with them a complicated arrangement involving increases of some forces and decreases in others and eventual development of a basis for cost sharing.” The Department asked for the Embassy’s view of the idea of the Country Team presenting a unilateral package proposal explaining what Thailand and the United States would do. As for the specific questions asked in this last paragraph, the Department was prepared to leave the tactical handling of the Thais to Young and the Country Team. (Department of State, Central Files, 792.5–MSP/11–2861)

   In telegram 999 from Bangkok, January 13, 1962, the Embassy stated that after full consideration of the idea of a package proposal, it was convinced it would be a mistake and would jeopardize work already done with the Thais. (Ibid., 792, 5/1–1362)