Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

415. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, July 25, 1961.

The current situation with respect to Southeast Asia is stated below. Summary back-up material follows. The relevant tabs are indicated in the text of the situation report.

[Here follow paragraph 1 on Laos (see volume XXIV, pages 315–316) and paragraph 2 on Vietnam.]

3. In ThailandSarit has been put under heavy pressure by Moscow to accept more aid and shift towards neutralism (Tabs S and T).¹ The Thais are worried about our resolution in the matter of Laos; and the outcome in Laos will affect strongly how stiff-backed they are about Moscow and neutralism (Tabs U and V).

4. In Cambodia, Sihanouk came back from Geneva disabused about the Communists; gloomy, as usual; and perhaps more willing than before to work with us and our friends if we have a strong policy in Southeast Asia.

.5. Organization. John Steeves has been assigned to prepare a brief paper on the key issues for decisions in Southeast Asia as a whole; and this paper should be the initial working basis for a Southeast Asia interdepartmental group which General Taylor and I have been trying to get established. A first draft of the Steeves paper will be ready at about Wednesday, July 26.²

[Here follows paragraph 6, “Issues for Decision and Action” (see volume XXIV, pages 316–317). The only issue relating directly to Thailand was the question posed by Rostow: “Pending the outcome of the Laos exercise, how can we reassure the Thais?” Rostow then noted that the issues, including reassurance of the Thais, were among the key matters for the agenda of a Southeast Asia Interdepartmental Group whose creation should not be further delayed.]

Tab S³

SOVIET PRESSURE ON THAILAND, JULY 12, 1961

Soviet government has taken sudden hard turn in Thailand possibly considerable significance. Soviet Ambassador paid two-hour farewell call on Prime Minister today. Shortly thereafter Thanat summarized conversation for me, suggesting I pass it immediately to U.S. authorities in Washington.

Soviet Ambassador’s tone and approach aggressive, menacing and even rude. He demanded Royal Thai Government accept Soviet aid of all kinds or face consequences. These were described in Khrushchev’s words to President at Vienna to effect Soviet government would not only support all “popular movements” for liberation in any country, including Thailand, but would take steps if such movements were thwarted in any way by local government or its outside supporters. Soviet Ambassador vehemently criticized Royal Thai Government, Marshal Sarit and Thanat personally for dependency on U.S., criticism of Soviet Union, and refusal permit Soviets to undertake various programs in Thailand. . . . .

Tab T⁴

YOUNG’S EVALUATION OF THAI RESPONSE, JULY 14, 1961

Believe . . . that Sarit has made no commitments to Soviets and, in fact, probably contemplates no sweeping changes in Thai-Soviet relations at this time although Thai acceptance Soviet loan of limited scope, if Nikolayev brings back such proposition, appears be possible. With U.S.-Thai consideration military and long-range socio-economic program about to begin, not to be ruled out that this development either inspired by or seized upon by Thais as means stimulating more prompt and more favorable U.S. commitments on aid and keeping open for Thais possible “second door” if they ultimately not satisfied with U.S. cooperation.

Tab U⁵

THAI THOUGHT IN GENERAL, JULY 19, 1961

FonMin Thanat Khoman made policy address before American association July 19 on “Southeast Asia: Testing Ground for World’s Freedom.”

Of two danger spots, Berlin and Laos, latter more critical. Thai not convinced that danger of armed conflict will materialize over Berlin. (He gave six reasons for this viewpoint.)

Among Laos’ many weaknesses, most important perhaps her lack of known, world-appreciated commodities such as oil, uranium, and other minerals and her lack of foreign investments from West. Therefore West has no incentive to defend Laos. West seems think Laos either indefensible or unworthy of risks a defender would have to assume.

This attitude has encouraged Commies. Western disinterestedness and unwillingness to assume direct responsibility facilitates Commie efforts to undermine Western position in this part of world. Commies’ next step is impress nations of Asia with inevitability their movement.

Following courses all that remain to us who want remain free:

• A. Look more to ourselves and less to collectivities which prove ineffective.
• B. Re-examine our exposed position as well as our obligations which have become one-sided.
• C. Outside aid to be supplemental rather than basic.
• D. We must realize it was perhaps mistake cast our glance too far away; immediate neighbors should receive greater attention and be cultivated more closely.

Young comment: Believe this exceptionally good presentation Thai point of view, and that it deserving wide dissemination in Washington. . . . .

Tab V⁶

YOUNG FROM BANGKOK ON LAOS, JULY 14, 1961

In light extremely grave military situation in Laos with Pathet Lao in control much of country and in position move quickly at any time to banks of Mekong at number strategic points, I believe it of utmost necessity we urgently review all possible contingencies in order be able react without delay and avoid disaster of serious proportions. I have had opportunity discuss Lao situation with Ambassador Brown. He agrees on danger imminent change in Laos and on need prepare ourselves move quickly. . . . .

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, Southeast Asia, Rostow Report, 2nd Try. Top Secret. This memorandum is a revised version of one that Rostow had sent the President on July 21, which the President had rejected as “too difficult to read.” (Ibid.) Portions of the July 21 version are printed in vol. XXIV, pp. 307–309.
1. Tabs A–R related to Laos and Vietnam. In the July 21 version of this memorandum, the tabs were copies of cables, which no doubt contributed to the President’s conclusion that this memorandum was “too difficult to read.” In this version, the tabs are summaries of the cables; see below
2. The final paper, July 28, is printed in vol. I, pp. 250–251.
3. Secret. Tab S is a summary of telegram 50 from Bangkok, July 12. (Department of State, Central Files, 661.92/7–1261)
4. Secret. Tab T is a summary of telegram 65 from Bangkok, July 14. (Ibid., 661.92/7–1461)
5. Official Use Only. Tab U is a summary of telegram 86 from Bangkok, July 19. (Ibid., 690.00/7–1961)
6. Secret. Tab V is a summary of telegram 57 from Bangkok, July 14. (Ibid., 751J.00/7–1461)