Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

405. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara⁰

JCSM–311–61

Washington, May 9, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Thailand (U)

1. This memorandum is in response to your memorandum, subject as above, dated 5 May 1961.¹

2. It is the consensus of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that if US forces are stationed in Thailand prior to achieving a political settlement on Laos, they should be the same as the US element for SEATO Plan 5 (Modified).² This force is composed of two Battalion Landing Teams, one Marine Air Group, one Air Force Mobile Strike Force, SEATO Field Forces Headquarters plus necessary command and logistic support units. An Army Airborne Battle Group will be held at Clark Air Base in reserve. The mission for this force should be to contribute to a visible SEATO or multinational effort to stabilize the defenses of Southeast Asia against Communist encroachment, demonstrate US intentions to fulfill our commitments to countries in the area and the further development of facilities to support any subsequent combat actions in the area.

3. This force should not be used for counter-infiltration purposes as this is within Thai capabilities, but should remain combat ready for possible use within the concept of SEATO Plan 5, further deployment to South Vietnam or the defense of Thailand.

4. It is preferred that any deployment be part of a SEATO action but if this does not materialize we should place our forces in Thailand as part of a multinational or bilateral (US-Thailand) action.

5. US forces should be drawn from PACOM components, augmented as necessary from CONUS. These elements are formed, alerted and presently prepositioned in forward areas. They contain sufficient engineer units and civil affairs personnel to meet initial requirements. The major portion of these components would arrive in Thailand within a seven-day period from receipt of the order to deploy.

6. Subsequent to achieving a political settlement on Laos, the US or SEATO force stationed in Thailand should have a two-fold mission. First, they should serve as a visible symbol of our intention to fight if necessary to preserve the freedom of Southeast Asia; secondly, they should begin the development of the necessary base facilities to support any subsequent major SEATO or US combat operations in Southeast Asia. As stated in paragraph 3, this US force should not participate actively in combating guerrilla operations at this time, but should remain in the best possible combat-ready state for the defense of Thailand. It should aid in training Thai forces to the maximum extent possible consistent with its mission.

7. The composition envisaged for the US element of such a force would be a reinforced Brigade Task Force on the order of 5,000 to 6,000 men. The Task Force should have all the capabilities necessary to enhance its value as a cold war instrument in furthering US interests in Southeast Asia as well as to accomplish the missions enumerated above. These capabilities could include Special Forces, civic action teams, Psychological Warfare units, engineer units, and such other units as CINCPAC may deem desirable.

8. Any discussion with the Royal Thai Government in regard to the stationing of US forces in Thailand should include their possible use in Laos or South Vietnam as well as a bolster to the defense of Thailand.³

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Arleigh Burke
Chief of Naval Operations

0. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/A Miscellaneous Sensitive Files: FRC 71 A 6489, Laos 381 (Sensitive), April-May 1961. Top Secret.
1. Not found.
2. The basic concept of SEATO Plan 5/61, prepared by SEATO military advisers and updated and revised periodically, was that 25,000 SEATO troops (with a potential troop ceiling of 40,000) would cross the Mekong and hold the major towns of Laos adjacent to the Mekong River. This would free the FAL to engage the Pathet Lao in counter-insurgency operations. SEATO Plan 5/61, entitled “A Plan To Assist the Royal Laotian Government to Counter Communist Insurgency in Laos” (MS/623/1/61), April 20, is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 333, SEATO Registry Microfilm, Reel S–3–61.
3. On May 10, Lansdale sent McNamara and Gilpatric memoranda on his “personal views” on the merits of placing U.S. troops in Thailand and South Vietnam. Lansdale stressed Thailand’s and Vietnam’s geographic significance, trained military manpower resources, food surplus, and the psychological importance of keeping them pro-American. As for the shape of U.S. forces, Lansdale stressed the need for a “hard core” of combat troops accompanied by engineer battalions and other U.S. forces capable of civic action. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, Lansdale Files: FRC 63 A 1804, Thailand)