Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

398. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Thailand⁰

Washington, March 21, 1961, 11:09 p.m.

1442. Depcirtel 1436.¹

A. Request you again approach Sarit in effort obtain his agreement:

1. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and

2. To raise number of Marine maintenance and base support personnel beyond 300 to magnitude demanded by circumstances but for present not to exceed 500.

B. In this approach you authorized:

1. Disclose to Sarit concept and planned use of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] B–26’s (if PL offensive is not terminated and de facto cessation of hostilities not achieved per reftel) drawing on information available to you direct and through JUSMAG. You may note precise mission of B–26’s to be determined as situation develops. They have broad range of capabilities and can be used as deemed best to fit given set circumstances. B–26’s would operate from Takli but they will not be used without prior notification of RTG.

C. You may inform Sarit you specifically authorized by President to endorse in his name private assurances of US support of Thailand contained in President Eisenhower’s letter of last November² and in your letter to Thanat (your 795).³ You may add US understands Sarit’s concern for air defense of Thailand which under present conditions provided for in current deployment of US forces in Asia. On this point you may wish comment that Communist reaction against Thailand in form air strikes at Udorn or Takli would require direct military response by US, as we believe Communists cannot fail to recognize. Posture and capability US forces in Far East, including ability of Seventh Fleet to retaliate swiftly against North Viet-Nam, constitute more effective deterrent to Communist action against Thailand than any increase in RTAF air defense capabilities realizable within immediate future. In event US forces move into Laos, plans include further provision for direct air defense Thailand by positioning suitable US fighter elements in Thailand.

D. In addition to excellent presentation already made your 1647⁴ you may draw on following if deemed useful in relating actions to overall framework our position on Laos:

1. US has concluded that unless PL offensive stopped an improvement in Lao military situation would be essential precondition to political settlement consonant with US objective of neutral but independent Laos with a government capable of maintaining internal security in the face of Communist subversion and infiltration.

2. US preparing to give further military support to Laos through use of aircraft and helicopters, and is considering additional measures.

Intention is also to make clear to Moscow US prepared take further action defend Laos against Communist takeover in event political settlement not forthcoming.

3. US and Thai joint interest in Laos requires continued cooperation in taking of such additional measures as may be necessary to prevent domination of Laos by Communists.

4. The additional measures now being prepared obviously raise level of US-Thai commitment in support of Laos, emphasize importance of Thailand to Free World interests in area and automatically imply our obligation to protect Thailand. Thai can count on full military support of US pursuant our obligation in event Thai-US cooperation involves Communist attack on Thailand. President wishes Prime Minister know this is a complete commitment.

E. If in your judgment absolutely necessary in order retain Sarit’s confidence with reference para C above, you may indicate to Sarit US willingness explore at technical level practicable means providing reasonable anti-aircraft defense at Udorn and Takli.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3–2161. Top Secret; Niact. Drafted by Parsons and Askew; cleared in draft by OSD and JCS and Usher, Bohlen, and Czyak of L/FE; and approved by Rusk. Repeated priority to CINCPAC for POLAD and Vientiane.
1. Circular telegram 1436, March 21, contained an account of Rusk’s discussions with the British and French Ambassadors that day. (Ibid.) Rusk was briefing the Ambassadors on the decisions taken at a White House meeting of March 21 on Laos. For accounts of that meeting, see vol. XXIV, pp. 95–96 and 98–99.
2. See footnote 1, Document 396.
3. On October 28, 1960, Ambassador Johnson proposed sending a secret letter to Thanat, assuring the Thai Government that if the situation in Laos should result in identifiable external Communist aggression against Laos or Thailand, the United States would take the gravest view of the situation and “without delay” take appropriate measures. (Telegram 768 from Bangkok, October 28; Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10–2860) In telegram 624 to Bangkok, November 3, 1960, the Department authorized sending the letter with the deletion of the phrase “without delay.” Telegram 795 from Bangkok, November 3, 1960, reported delivery of the letter. (Ibid., 792.00/11–360) See Foreign Relations, 1958–1960, vol. XV, pp. 1149–1150.
4. Telegram 1647, March 16, contained an account of Johnson’s discussion that day with Sarit, Thanat, and Air Marshal Boonchoo about potential U.S. and Thai military assistance to the Royal Government of Laos. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3–1661)