Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

39. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Embassies⁰

Washington, March 28, 1963, 1:13 p.m.

1659. SEATO. Herewith summary US views regarding SEATO and forthcoming SEATO Council Meeting which addressees may in their discretion tailor to individual needs in discussions with host governments.

1. We do not expect major developments, significant initiatives or dramatic results. Main benefits will be demonstration that members continue regard SEATO as significant instrument of policy. At same time, we believe it affords opportunity: (a) make clear to Communists and non-Communists alike there no weakening U.S. security commitments Southeast Asia; (b) impress on members our conviction that SEATO valuable for important but limited set of defense purposes—chiefly deter overt aggression or meet it if necessary; (c) encourage Asian members accept SEATO on this basis and discourage unrealistic expectations; (d) assure Thailand we intend meet defense commitments for which Manila Pact is essential instrument, and (e) encourage Australia’s growing role in Southeast Asia.

2. Speedy deployment of forces to Thailand in May 1962, Rusk–Thanat communiqué, new voting procedures, and new program to improve logistics base in Thailand are among recent developments which have demonstrated SEATO value as vehicle for collective actions and improved its ability to act.

3. SEATO remains important to US as essential legal instrument for security commitments Southeast Asia and vehicle for collective action if military intervention necessary. It has deterred overt Communist aggression in treaty area. It provides valuable mechanism for coordination of military planning for defense of area and is especially important for our relationship with Thailand, our only ally in continental Southeast Asia.

4. We believe any weakening in area security relationships in treaty area contrary to our interests in light continuing Communist threat and instability.

5. We expect greatest area problems in minds participants will be Laos and Malaysia.

a. Laos. We will stress importance serious and earnest efforts to make Geneva Agreements work noting 1) number measures and courses of action open to us before question military action need arise; 2) that action to be taken in unlikely event Communists make militant move to take over in near future is question to be considered in light circumstances at the time.

b. Malaysia. We will not initiate discussion this subject but recognize it may come up anyway. We assume British and Phil statements if any will not go beyond presentation their views, and that others will confine remarks to general expression of concern. We intend remain in background restricting comment to statement our well-known position on this problem and North Borneo dispute plus observation we do not believe there any immediate Communist threat to Borneo.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 SEATO. Secret. Drafted by Krause and Peters; cleared in draft with Bell and with Hannah, John N. Gatch, Officer in Charge of Pakistan–Afghanistan Affairs, and Rice; and approved by Rusk. Sent to all seven SEATO posts and CINCPAC for POLAD.