33. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) to President Kennedy0
SUBJECT
- The Need for a Definition of U.S. Political Objectives in Southeast Asia
In my memorandum to you of April 4th, “U.S. Policies in the Far East,”1 I urged that we clearly define and publicly state “a coherent overall political objective” for our involvement in Southeast Asia. Last Friday I again discussed this question with Mac Bundy.2
Since then, two developments have given the matter new urgency. The first is Mike Mansfield’s Michigan speech3 which has focussed public and congressional attention on our ultimate aims in Southeast Asia. The second is the apparent Laos settlement which now offers us an excellent opportunity for a positive clarification of our over-all political objectives.
The military decisions we have made thus far in Vietnam and Thailand and our contingency planning for Laos have been forced on us by events. Although the necessity for these decisions is to be regretted, the arguments for them at each juncture have been compelling.
However, our step-by-step military response has not been accompanied by a comparable effort to think through our ultimate political aims for Southeast Asia as a whole. As long as we lack a political “grand design” for Southeast Asia, the initiative will continue to rest with our adversaries and with our allies and camp followers, whose parochial views often ignore the global forces with which American policy must contend.
As matters now stand, we may find ourselves forced to choose between an escalating war or a humiliating retreat in an area where the strategic conditions are disadvantageous to us and where direct U.S. military participation would be roundly denounced by domestic critics as “another Democratic war.”
If in the meantime we have failed to go beyond Mr. Eisenhower’s famous “falling dominoes” analogy to explain our political objectives in Southeast Asia, we may find ourselves increasingly the captive of events with unpredictable results both at home and abroad.
[Page 70]The historical parallels are impressive and disturbing. Leaders of great nations have often found themselves pressed by a succession of events, each nondecisive in itself, into a position which they would not conceivably have chosen and from which there was no honorable avenue of retreat.
The Guns of August overflows with pertinent examples from World War I. In World War II, caught among the differing theories of Henry Morgenthau, Robert Taft, Henry Wallace, Stalin and Churchill, we found it impossible to agree on the kind of post-war Europe for which we were fighting. One by-product is the present ugly dilemma of Berlin.
In his discussion of the Korean War, Dick Neustadt has analyzed the process of “non-decision” which resulted in our crossing of the 38th Parallel, our march to the Yalu, and our catastrophic rout by the Chinese.
As Neustadt and others have pointed out, our inability to agree on our political objectives for Korea as a whole resulted in an unsatisfactory truce at the 38th Parallel two and one-half years—and many thousands of lives—after the Inchon landings when precisely the same settlement could have been achieved on our terms in an atmosphere of dignity and success.
During this period the French in Southeast Asia were also in the midst of a war with no clear definition of the broad political and economic aims which the fighting was designed to achieve.
For domestic political reasons, the French Government refused to spell out their willingness to grant freedom to the three nations of Indo–China once the struggle against the Communists had been won.
As a result, with nearly the entire population against them, the French Army suffered casualties that totaled more than 90,000, with money costs that exceeded all the aid we gave France under the Marshall Plan, to which we added $3 billion in U.S. equipment. Ten years later we are still paying for this debacle.
I believe that we may now stand at a comparable threshold of decision. In Southeast Asia U.S. forces are involved in operations of uncertain dimensions. This involvement is taking place in a political framework which is unclear to our allies, our adversaries, the people of Southeast Asia, the American public, and the Congress.
The greatest danger may lie in the profound confusion that exists among the 200 million Southeast Asians who are most directly concerned. Most young anti-Communist Vietnamese, Cambodians, Laos, Burmese, Malayans and Indonesians now tend to think of the U.S. in terms of the massive military supplies which we sent the French “colonialists” in the early 1950’s, of our abortive efforts to build up a Nationalist Chinese force within the borders of independent Burma, of our CIA efforts to overthrow Sukarno in 1958, and of our support for Sarit, Diem, [Page 71] Phoumi and Chiang Kai-shek, none of whom can be said to reflect the “New Frontier” in Asia.
It is essential that we present ourselves in a fresh and affirmative role. This requires a governmental decision, followed by a public statement understandable both at home and abroad, in which we spell out our objectives for Southeast Asia as a whole.
In June 1947 General Marshall dramatically outlined our economic and political aims for Europe. In 1961 you described through the Alliance for Progress what we are seeking to achieve in Latin America. In my opinion, the time is at hand for a similar statement in regard to Southeast Asia.
Here, as elsewhere in the world, what we want for the people of the region is almost precisely what the people want for themselves: guaranteed national independence, more rapid economic development, and maximum freedom of choice within their own cultures and religions.
These objectives not only coincide with our own interests; they are wholly compatible with our present undertakings. By spelling them out as American objectives in Southeast Asia, we can provide a compelling rationale for whatever future action—military, political or economic—we may be required to take in the region.
Such a clarification by you would be immediately reassuring to the politically sophisticated people in both neutral and aligned states of the region.
It would firmly identify the United States Government and people with peace, development, and the increasing regional unity which offers the most compelling alternative to Communist divisiveness and fragmentation.
It would give American military, political and economic operations in Southeast Asia the affirmative, understandable, appealing purpose which has been largely lacking since the days of Roosevelt.
It would also give us a clear initiative in dealing with our Communist adversaries, while encouraging whatever elements within the USSR may desire stabilization and neutralization of the region, and removing any valid excuse for Chinese Communist aggression based on a misunderstanding of our objectives.
I have outlined the kind of proposal that I have in mind in a rough draft of a speech, to be made by you, which I am attaching to this memorandum.4
In it I have sought to identify the United States with the forces of peaceful, democratic change throughout Southeast Asia, to picture the [Page 72] kind of future that the people there may achieve once the fighting has been ended, and to offer our assistance and support in this great effort.
It is important, of course, that the language of such a statement be sufficiently balanced to allow us room for maneuver while providing a firm commitment of U.S. support for a new start in this war-torn region, if the Communists will permit the establishment of peace.
As far as American public and Congressional opinion is concerned, I believe that such a declaration of American political objectives in Southeast Asia would be generally welcomed and applauded by members of both political parties.
I also believe that at the very least such a statement will restore confidence in the United States throughout Southeast Asia.