Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

326. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, December 18, 1963, 12:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Call on the President by Ambassador Jones

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• Governor Harriman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
• The Honorable Howard P. Jones, United States Ambassador to Indonesia
• Mr. Michael Forrestal, The White House

The President opened the conversation by stating that he had signed the letter to President Sukarno, a draft of which had been submitted to him, and handed Ambassador Jones the letter. The President observed that he remembered President Sukarno very well and his famous phrase regarding keeping the free free. Sometimes he wondered whether the closer we get to Sukarno the more difficult he becomes.

Ambassador Jones said that in his opinion the extent of our influence in Indonesia was likely to be measured by the rapport to be established between President Johnson and President Sukarno. He referred to President Sukarno’s frequent reference to “international relations being personal relations” and urged that President Johnson arrange to meet President Sukarno as soon as possible.

President Johnson said that although he, of course, could not visit Indonesia in 1964 and thus follow up the plan which the late President Kennedy had under consideration, he was hoping to visit Indonesia in 1965.

Ambassador Jones pointed out that the Malaysia situation had reached an impasse and that he felt we should take some action to resolve the deadlock, recognizing, however, that Malaysia was primarily a British responsibility and our initiative should be limited to bringing the representatives of the three countries together. The Ambassador suggested that he be authorized to say something to Sukarno orally along the lines incorporated in the attached paper. The President read the memorandum and said he would like to consider it and might wish to make some revisions. He said he would ask Mr. Forrestal to follow up this matter and communicate with Ambassador Jones through the Department of State.

Ambassador Jones said there was one other question with which we might be faced sometime within the next few months. That was the prospect of Sukarno making another world tour and the certainty that he would wish to come to Washington for at least a day or two to confer with President Johnson. The Ambassador urged that the President receive Sukarno, at least for a working visit.

The President said that, subject to the recommendations of Governor Harriman, he would be willing to receive Sukarno.

Summary of Actions:

1. Ambassador Jones to carry signed letter from the President to be delivered to Sukarno.¹

2. FE to follow up with Mr. Forrestal the President’s reaction to FE memorandum (copy attached) and communicate with Ambassador Jones.

Attachment²

U.S.-Indonesian Relations

Ambassador Jones to make following points to Sukarno:

1. President Johnson wants to visit Indonesia, but cannot do so in 1964, both as it is an election year and as there is no Vice President. He hopes to, make a visit to Indonesia and Southeast Asia in 1965.

2. The current situation in Southeast Asia has become extremely serious, and President Johnson believes that we and Indonesia must work together to settle it. We both are interested in containing the southward expansion of Communist China which would be facilitated by a split in Southeast Asia.

3. If a political settlement is to be worked out, it is essential that Indonesia end at least the political and military elements of confrontation, and especially that Indonesia stop its support for the guerrillas in Borneo.

4. If Indonesia cooperates as step one by taking demonstrable action to stop the raiding and subversion in Borneo, we will be willing to assist in bringing the three parties together to work out a political solution acceptable to all, and can specifically help Indonesia with:

a) an additional 65 to 100 thousand tons of rice in 1964 depending on availability, and

b) renewed consideration of American support for Indonesian stabilization.

5. If present tensions continue, and if Indonesia-supported military and paramilitary activity in Borneo continue, it will be virtually impossible for us to provide significant assistance to the GOI. Indeed, as I have already pointed out, a military explosion in the area would call into play our obligations under the ANZUS Treaty.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL INDON-US. Confidential. Drafted by Jones and cleared in the White House on December 31. The meeting was held at the White House.
1. See footnote 2, Document 325.
2. Confidential. Prepared in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs.