Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

31. Memorandum From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)⁰

Washington, May 15, 1962.

SEATO REACTIONS UNDER CERTAIN CONTINGENCIES IN LAOS

Conclusions

1. SEATO would not act effectively on an RLG request for assistance under any circumstances that now seem likely.

2. A majority of SEATO members would, however, individually support and some might participate in US/Thai three-stage plan of deterrent action. (Briefly, it is assumed that in Stage I, US forces deploy to the Gulf of Siam; in Stage II, US and Thai forces deploy to the Thai border; in Stage III, US and Thai forces occupy RLG-held territory of Laos.)

3. To implement such a three-stage plan without reference to SEATO, even though justified in terms of the Manila Pact, would make SEATO appear even more feckless as a collective security organization than ever before.

4. To seek SEATO action in keeping with the three-stage plan, or even SEATO endorsement of it, would probably fail. The chief possibility of SEATO endorsement would appear to be in the event that, when US/Thai forces entered Laos, the UK went along and France either acquiesced or withdrew from the organization.

Discussion

I. General Considerations

A. Members’ Views on Military Action: In SEATO Council debates over Laos in 1961, France and UK adamantly opposed the use of military force in Laos, New Zealand supported the UK position. Australia, Thailand and the Philippines were amenable to following the US lead favoring use of force if necessary. Pakistan also sided with the US after President Ayub overrode Foreign Office objections. These main divisions of opinion probably still obtain.

France and UK are profoundly influenced by what they consider more vital issues closer to home (especially Algeria and Berlin), fear of diverting US strength from the NATO to the SEATO area, a long-term historical trend downgrading their national interests in the Far East, and a deep reluctance to engage in hostilities in a country which they do not consider vital to free world security. In addition they appear to be more concerned than the US about the risk of escalation in the area. French experience in Indochina and the price the UK paid to defeat communist guerrillas in Malaya also influence their views on intervention in Laos. They find SEATO membership useful as a matter not only of prestige and presence, but even more important leverage to restrain what they may consider rash or unwise US actions in the area.

B. The Rule of Unanimity: Under the Manila Pact, there are two possibilities for bringing SEATO into action in Laos. Article IV (1) concerns overt armed attack against the treaty area, including the protocol states, and requires unanimous agreement for action in the name of SEATO. In this case each member is bound to “act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.”¹ The US has recently interpreted this provision to involve an individual as well as a collective obligation and considers that each member could act pursuant to the treaty commitment without awaiting the unanimous concurrence of all SEATO members. Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and the UKhave substantially agreed, publicly or privately, with this US interpretation.

Under Article IV (2), which concerns indirect aggression, member nations are committed to “consult immediately in order to agree on measures which should be taken for the common defense.” There is no doubt about the unanimity requirement under Article IV (2).

C. Plan Five: The SEATO military plan covering Laos² applies both to direct and indirect aggression. Under this plan the main burden of the early commitment would fall on the US and Thailand, and to a lesser extent on Australia, New Zealand, and Pakistan. The major contribution contemplated by the two European members in the first two phases is one UK battalion. Thus the French or UK decisions are not predicated so much upon having to commit military forces as upon more basic political considerations.

II. Reactions if RLG Requested SEATO Intervention

Laos is covered in the Manila Pact only in the Protocol: SEATO action in Laos would have to be at the request or with the consent of the RLG.

If the RLG requested SEATO intervention, France and the UK would probably continue to oppose the use of armed force in Laos despite the communist breach of the cease-fire. They would attempt to head off an RLG request for SEATO intervention, and if it came before the SEATO Council would probably refuse to entertain it under Article IV (1) and would probably veto it under Article IV (2), which has no provisions for abstention.

Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand would vote to entertain the RLG request, with the position of New Zealand and Pakistan somewhat less certain. These same countries, though unable to secure formal SEATO action in response to an RLG request, would probably favor SEATO endorsement of independent but coordinated action by themselves and by the US. France and the UK would probably prevent such endorsement. At least Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand would then be willing to take independent action while Pakistan and New Zealand might follow the US lead, depending upon the circumstances.

III. Reactions to Certain Assumed US/Thai Moves Made Without Reference to SEATO

In the following sections of this paper it is assumed that the US and Thailand adopt and implement, as required, measures designed to deter the communists from further military action in Laos in order to reestablish the cease-fire and permit further negotiation for a government of national union. These measures are assumed to be in three stages, along the following lines:

• Stage I. Movement of US forces into the Gulf of Siam together with appropriate US and Thai contingency alert measures.
• Stage II. Introduction of US appropriate combat forces into Thailand; deployment of US and Thai ground forces to strategic locations along the Thai border with Laos so positioned and in such strength as to enable them to occupy and hold relevant RLG territory in Laos if necessary.
• Stage III. Movement of US and Thai ground forces, supported by air elements as necessary into the area of Laos held by the RLG for the purpose of preventing further communist advances and enforcing a de facto partition of the country.

Both France and the UK recognize that SEATO’s continued passivity has serious disadvantages, but they view these as preferable to the risks involved in military action in Laos. Pakistan continues in principle to favor a strong stand against communist military advances in the area, but is becoming more cautious because of its desire for border negotiations with Communist China. None of the SEATO members would be significantly disturbed by actions short of introducing foreign combat troops into Laos. Australia, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand would favor the actions assumed under Stage II and New Zealand would probably not be particularly alarmed. France might express disapproval and the UK would probably express a stronger degree of concern.

Introduction of Thai and US troops into Laos under assumed Stage III would arouse stronger reactions among the SEATO members, depending to a large extent on the individual member-country’s estimate of the probable communist reaction. Paris and London would be likely to be most concerned about the risks. If informed prior to initiation of Stage III, both European members would probably at first exert immediate and strenuous diplomatic efforts to dissuade us from pursuing this course of action.

Depending on circumstances, including its reading of US determination and of communist reactions, UK might subsequently decide that it could no longer exert a restraining influence and opt for token participation, albeit with grave reservations; they would feel that a modicum of cooperation would preserve at least some leverage over US and Thai action. More likely, however, the maximum UK cooperation would be to refrain from publicly opposing the US action. A parallel degree of restraint from France is possible but less probable.

If the other SEATO members were consulted prior to the initiation of US and Thai troop movements into Laos (Stage III), their reactions would range from approval with offers of at least token participation (Australia, Thailand, the Philippines, and possibly Pakistan) to New Zealand’s less positive attitude which would be strongly influenced by the UK. These countries would resent a US/Thai military action taken without prior consultation with them, would regard it as an unwarranted breach of faith among allies, and would probably further discount the value to them of SEATO membership. Non-European SEATO members are well aware of the problems of bringing the organization into the Laos crisis; they share our anxiety about communist aggression in Laos and its implications for other areas in Southeast Asia; and they would probably be willing to uphold their Manila Pact obligations even outside of the formal SEATO framework provided that they were consulted as early as possible.

IV. Possibility of SEATO Endorsement

A SEATO response to an RLG request seems out of the question; but some SEATO members would probably support and even participate in the assumed US/Thai actions. Such actions might be taken in the spirit of the Manila Pact, but not under SEATO auspices. This situation would leave SEATO as an organization in a most dubious light. What are the prospects of gaining any kind of endorsement by SEATO for action which some of its members object to?

A. Advantages of Seeking SEATO Endorsement: The principal arguments for seeking SEATO endorsement of the assumed military steps are:

1. To salvage what remains of SEATO’s deterrent power.

2. To utilize SEATO’s military planning, force availabilities, and experience derived from joint military exercises.

3. To broaden the base of intervention.

4. To strengthen our access to and use of bases in the Philippines.

B. Disadvantages:

1. The ensuing strains inside the Council might decisively fracture the organization and require major decisions as to its future.

2. Even if there were agreement to endorse the actions, it might come too late and add too many complications to the conduct of US/Thai operations to outweigh—at least in short term—the advantages listed above.

C. Member-Countries’ Attitudes Toward Endorsement: During Stage II, all SEATO members except France and the UK would probably be willing to give SEATO endorsement of the US/Thai action. France and the UK would probably refuse even tacit endorsement.

In Stage III, after US and Thai troops entered Laos, the possibility of SEATO endorsement might improve slightly. The UK might decide that it could no longer exert a restraining influence. It then might opt for token participation and for SEATO endorsement. The British would be more apt to exercise this option if they believed that Stage III would not result in further escalation.

France would still be most reluctant to acquiesce in SEATO endorsement, but (assuming the UK had come to favor it) would be under great pressure not to stand in the way. In these circumstances France might go along, although it is also possible that De Gaulle would veto SEATO endorsement. If pressed strongly, he might pull France out of SEATO.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos, General, 5/26/62–5/31/62. Top Secret. Hilsman sent this memorandum to Bundy under cover of an undated memorandum, on which he wrote the following note: “Mac: This says that the U.K. & France would oppose Seato participation in the Thailand Exercise; but might be dragged protesting into an extension of it over the border.” Deputy Director of INR Thomas Hughes sent a copy of this memorandum to Rusk on May 15 explaining that the President had requested it and suggesting that the Secretary might find it of immediate use. (Memorandum from Hughes to Rusk; Department of State, Central Files, 379/4–1562)
1. See footnote 1, Document 17.
2. SEATO Plan 5; see footnote 2, Document 405.