Office of the Historian

288. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara0

JCSM-692–62
Washington, September 5, 1962.

SUBJECT

  • US Policy Toward Indonesia (NSAM 179) (U)
1.
Reference is made to:
a.
National Security Action Memorandum No. 179, dated 16 August 1962, subject as above.1
b.
JCSM-725–61, dated 13 October 1961, subject: “US Strategic Interest in Indonesia (U).”2
2.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed, from a military standpoint, the US objectives and programs for Indonesia with the view of participating in a coordinated military, political, and economic program designed to achieve the revival of an Indonesian society oriented to the West. In this regard the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that an expanded military civic action program has potential for long-term and short-term benefits to both US and Indonesian interests. Specifically, following the peaceful settlement of the West Irian issue, Indonesia must face the reality of the problems involved in achieving economic recovery, along with the problem of maintaining internal tranquility in the face of efforts of communist forces to exploit the existing conditions of widespread poverty. Military civic actions, aimed simultaneously at improving rural economic conditions and at developing an enlightened pro-Western attitude among the soldiery, can contribute to solution of both problems. Each of the US Military Services is alert to these opportunities, and each is prepared to provide optimum support to the program envisaged in reference la.
3.
US military assistance programs and plans for Indonesia have been designed mainly to offset Communist Bloc influence and to meet internal security needs. It is the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, although the general orientation of those programs is sound, much can be done to give them a more direct relationship with military civic action. Similarly, any reorientation of US military assistance efforts must be directed, wherever possible, to diminishing Indonesia’s reliance on Soviet support.
4.
Early correlation of plans for available funds to Indonesia is an essential element to the formulation of a realistic program for that country. This requirement is particularly applicable to US military assistance planning to carry out an expanded military civic action program while still meeting essential needs of Indonesia to maintain a strong internal security posture.
5.
In regard to the matter of aid for Indonesia, the Joint Chiefs of Staff confirm their views on this subject as expressed in reference lb. Specifically, decisions taken should reflect a consideration of the effect of an Indonesian aid program on other areas such as the Philippines and Thailand. Conversely, programs pertinent to other areas should, in the future, be considered in light of their effect on Indonesia.
6.
An additional and equally important consideration is the delicate balance which exists between the Indonesia Communist Party (PKI) on the one hand the anti-Communist Indonesian Armed Forces on the other, together with President Sukarno’s proclivity for balancing these forces against each other. Care must be taken to avoid any action which would reduce the stature of the key anti-Communist leaders upon whose influence the future alignment of Indonesia on the side of the Free World will largely depend. These individuals are a strong anti-Communist asset, but their influence in the Indonesian Government could be jeopardized by an overidentification with the US program.
7.
The situation in Indonesia is considerably different from that in most of the countries to which US assistance is being given in that there are vast quantities of Soviet equipment presently available in that country—far more than the Indonesians have been able to absorb. It would appear in the best interests of the United States to guide such assistance as may be given into paths leading to the attainment of the US objective to reduce Communist presence and stature. Therefore, the normal pattern of training the military in the use of new equipment must be varied to avoid the improvement of proficiency in the use of Soviet-supplied equipment. The peculiarities of the power factors extant in Indonesia may well prove to be the governing consideration in determining the propriety of any action which may be proposed.
8.
The details of what the United States can do in Indonesia will be contained, in part, in the various agency and departmental reports developed in response to the President’s memorandum (reference 1a). Of even greater impact will be the report of the interagency Civic Action Survey Team, which is due after mid-October.3 In the meantime the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that all of the agencies concerned should initiate [Page 630] the desirable preliminary actions in order to save time, acknowledging that modifications will be required when the specific recommendations of the Survey Team are received. Specifically, the following actions should be considered:
a.
Initiate diplomatic arrangements to augment the current level of US economic and military specialists in Indonesia, initially without respect to specific numbers.
b.
Achieve a general determination of funds which will be available to carry out the program envisaged by the President (reference 1a).
c.
Review current military assistance plans and programs with a view to reorienting them more directly toward support of civic action and to diminish, wherever possible, Indonesia’s reliance on Soviet support.
d.
Anticipate the requirement for a follow-on military Civic Action Survey Team composed of representatives from each of the Military Services. The purpose of this team would be to refine military aspects of the program developed by the interagency team.
e.
Identify and earmark skilled military personnel which may be needed for civic action mobile training teams to train and advise Indonesian units.
f.
Establish general requirements for, and initiate language training of, US personnel who may be selected for duty in Indonesia.
g.
Develop a native language troop information and education program for the Indonesian Armed Forces aimed at portraying the superiority of democracy over communism.
h.
Anticipate and plan for an Indonesian Armed Forces military education and training system aimed at developing skills with longterm civilian utility, and prepare model curricula proposals for presentation to the Indonesian Armed Forces.
i.
Initiate planning for an expanded program of continental US training for the Indonesian Armed Forces designed primarily to influence and train younger officers and enlisted personnel.
j.
Re-examine the content of counterinsurgency instruction in the Foreign Service Institute Interdepartmental Seminar and in the Joint and Service Colleges to ensure an adequate treatment of Indonesia.
k.
As an expression of US good faith, expedite implementation of those portions of the FY 62 and FY 63 Military Assistance programs which have civic action dividends. This would include those elements applicable to communications, construction equipment, vehicles, light aircraft, and sealift for inter-island support.
l.
Develop a program for mutual exchange visits of ranking diplomatic and military representatives.
m.
Alert US intelligence agencies to the priority requirement for the essential elements of counterinsurgency information pertaining to Indonesia.
n.
Consult with Australia and New Zealand on the political, military, economic, and sociological measures to be taken in Indonesia, giving due consideration to the advantages which might be obtained from the establishment of an ANZUS position and a coordinated program.
o.
When politically feasible, initiate arrangements for visits of selected elements of the US Armed Forces to Indonesia.
9.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that:
a.
The actions listed in paragraph 8, above, be forwarded to the Department of State for inclusion in the plan of action to be submitted to the President. Meanwhile, those coming under the cognizance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Military Services will be initiated without delay.
b.
The Indonesia program be placed under the cognizance of the Special Group (CI), in order to ensure rapid achievement of the objectives outlined in reference la.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
G.H. Decker

Acting Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff
  1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542, 091 Indonesia. Secret.↩
  2. Document 287.↩
  3. Document 198.↩
  4. The report of the interagency civic action team, not printed, was attached to the enclosure to Document 291.↩