257. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)0

McGB

Future WNG Gambits

A confrontation with the Dutch was in the cards at some point if we stuck to our basic decision that Indo administration with “face-saving” for Dutch was the only reasonable solution. Better to face it now than later, after we’d lost Indos too.

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If anything, our tactical error was that we pussy-footed around so much (until AG gave a prod) as to leave Dutch in at least some legitimate doubt as to where we stood. Even so, Luns and Van Roijen must have seen clearly from all the hints where we were heading—unless they were deliberately blind. Note Rice’s recent talks with Luns, for example.1 We as well as Indos made clear that very basis for Bunker talks was willingness to discuss Indo administration.

At any rate, now that we have given formula to both parties, there is no turning back. Indos have bought it, so to renege now will just propel them into armed action with Bloc support. So problem is how to bring Dutch around:

1.
Luns flatly told Rice and UK Ambassador that Dutch would never let Indos take over before a plebiscite so long as he was FonMin.
2.
So less than 50–50 chance Dutch will buy our formula, though we should give them full chance for reflection.
3.
Thus Dutch cabinet change may have to occur before negotiations can be resumed (Luns said government would fall if it bought our formula).
4.
When Sukarno finds out Dutch won’t buy, he is almost certain to leak our formula as evidence of US support, and then step up infiltration, etc. arguing it now proven that Dutch won’t buy peaceful settlement.
5.
Hopefully another step toward escalation might force Dutch to face up to facts of life. On other hand, it might harden Dutch stand (reason simply take a back seat in these decolonization exercises).
6.
SYG Dutch FonOff says Dutch might take WNG to SC as threat to peace, then to GA after Soviet SC veto.2 Aim would be to force us to come out on Dutch side against resort to force. But UN will almost certainly have to include in any such resolution a mediatory effort; if our formula becomes public knowledge Dutch will be hard put to avoid a landslide vote in favor. This may deter them.

My thought would be that if Dutch reply leaves any room for it, we make one more effort to sell them, even if it is largely speaking for the record. Options would be: (1) send Bunker to Hague; (2) send Acheson if Bunker persona non grata, or regarded as too weak. We could back him up with another letter from Secretary or President or both, rehearsing our arguments.

Themes would be: (1) we made a real effort (consciously paying price of getting ourselves in middle) to devise a way for Dutch to get out with honor, while avoiding a major crisis; (2) we can’t accept Dutch view we’ve suddenly switched sides; we made very clear where we thought [Page 573] road to solution lay—we only put out formula ourselves when it clear Dutch wouldn’t; (3) indeed, we thought we had every reason to believe Dutch would accept Indo administration; (4) we see no other peaceful outcome to dispute which will serve Dutch interests—where else do they expect to come out? (5) if Dutch reject our formula we have no choice but to withdraw from mediatory effort and let situation deteriorate; (6) however, Dutch cannot expect us to support them in what we regard as a futile effort to ignore logical consequences of their own decolonizing action.

We could also get UK to weigh in more heavily, possibly a Macmillan letter (doesn’t he owe us one?).

R.W.K.
  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memos, Komer, 4/62. Secret. Copies were sent to Kaysen and Forrestal.
  2. See Document 256 and footnote 1 thereto.
  3. Reported in telegram 754 from The Hague, April 4. (Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/4–462)