242. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy0
Meetings with Luns
We have laid on a session for 6 p.m. Thursday afternoon to concert a common strategy for the key meetings with Luns on Friday.1 We are also arranging to give Luns an appointment with you for 10:15 on Friday, before he sees the Secretary and others at State, so that you can set the tone for these subsequent discussions.
Subject to the first-hand views of the Attorney General, I would argue that Luns’ visit is perhaps the crucial moment in our effort to prevent an otherwise almost certain march of the WNG issue toward full-blown crisis.
The Attorney General’s probe in The Hague has clearly rocked the Dutch, witness Luns going to Paris to reassure him on Dutch willingness to negotiate. However, the only real concession Luns has apparently made is that the Dutch would talk bilaterally with the Indos (which the latter have sought for some time). This may be merely another tactical maneuver, designed to show Dutch willingness to negotiate. We still don’t know the answer to the key question—will the Dutch accept some form of Indo administration, which is Sukarno’s rock-bottom price?
New urgency is added by the recent Dutch démarche alleging they have reliable intelligence of a planned Indo attack around 1st April, and notifying us that Dutch may soon ask permission to fly out two companies of reinforcements via US. We have no such data, but the Dutch could be right. In either event, the Dutch “request” is probably (like KLM incident)2 [Page 546] an attempt to force our hand. Two companies would add almost nothing to Dutch capabilities to resist whatever Indos could launch by 1 April, but our letting them through would cause a violent Indo reaction, and might actually precipitate a military incident.
In any case, with the WNG situation sliding toward a crisis, we have to make the most of Luns’ visit. At a minimum we must get talks going, to give us more time to bring the two sides together.
The nub of the matter is to get the Dutch to agree to discuss some form of transfer of WNG administration to Indonesia (recognizing that Dutch agreement even to talk about this would in fact mean that they are prepared to accede). The chief question which you must decide at this point is how far the US should go in pressing Luns in this direction.
I am convinced that the only way to get Luns to buy is if we make unmistakably clear that the US regards this solution as the only sensible one. Both you and the Secretary in effect bought this solution in authorizing the Attorney General to offer US “good offices” to help bring the two parties together on an agenda if the Dutch would agree to including “transfer.” The cables indicate, however, that he decided not to make the offer because the Dutch attitude seemed so stiff.
The Dutch Government will almost certainly go along with whatever Luns will accept. Therefore, our problem is how to convince him that such a compromise is in the best interests of The Netherlands as well as the entire West.
It will do no good to argue the merits of the Dutch vs. Indonesian cases with Luns. He is absolutely immovable on this issue (indeed, Dutch have an excellent case).
Instead we must make him see the larger stakes for which we are playing. Our starting point should be that the Dutch have already agreed to give up WNG; the issue is how to handle its disposal. This issue turns on whether avoiding what otherwise seems likely to be an inevitable Dutch/Indo clash and preventing a further drift of Indonesia toward the Bloc are not more important than denying Indonesian title to WNG.
If the debate with Luns can be conducted on these terms, rather than on those Luns prefers, we have a good chance of moving him. We must [Page 547] get the Dutch to face up to the consequences of their present policy, which we doubt they have thought through. Do they really believe that a military clash can be avoided unless they change their present policy? Even so, do they really contemplate that WNG could ever be viable as an independent state? Would Indonesia give up if WNG became independent? In sum, is there any satisfactory outcome possible other than transfer of administration to Indonesia, with guarantee of later self-determination?
We have two powerful arguments to use with Luns: (1) the importance to our whole Far East position of not letting Indonesia move yet closer to the Bloc, which is skillfully exploiting the WNG issue to this end—the US, fighting to hold on to mainland SEA, cannot permit it to be outflanked in this manner; (2) the resultant necessity of avoiding a full-blown crisis over WNG, with high risk of military escalation, which will convert the issue into an East/West confrontation of benefit only to the Bloc (these arguments are spelled out more fully in State to Bonn 2343 attached).3
There is yet a third argument I would urge using if necessary. The Dutch may still hope that if the Indonesians start shooting, we and the UK will be forced to support our NATO ally. We could knock this prop out from under them by making clear that, if the Dutch pursue their present course, they cannot count on us. One means of underlining this would be to tell Luns regretfully that we can’t let any Dutch reinforcements transit the US, on grounds that it would slam the door on peaceful settlement. We’d reconsider only on clear, unequivocal evidence of an imminent attack beyond Dutch capabilities to handle.
There is a good chance that we could get the UK to make a similar démarche refusing logistic support to the Dutch (who would badly need Singapore).
The above are strong words to use on a close ally. What justifies them, nonetheless, is that the resultant strain on US-Dutch relations seems likely to be minor compared to what might happen if we fail to settle this affair before it blows up. We still have a good chance for preventive diplomacy, if we push hard now. And there is really no way in which we can avoid being put in the middle on WNG; the only question is whether to be dragged in later, or take the plunge now.
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memos, Komer, 2/62. Secret. In a covering note to Bundy, Komer suggested that, in setting up the meeting at the White House at 6 p.m. on March 1, it was “best to let Rusk talk to AG and others at lunch first, because Rusk won’t be ready to make up his mind until after he has heard from Bobby.” Robert Kennedy had lunch at the Department of State with Rusk and others on February 28. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book) Komer also stated that he thought “it important President talk to AG and concert strategy before the latter sees Rusk.” Komer asked if Bundy would give the President this memorandum that evening. There is no indication whether Bundy did so.↩
- The meeting, which was held at the White House from 6:15 to 7:30 p.m., on Thursday, March 1, was attended by the President, Robert Kennedy, Rusk, Ball, Harriman, McGhee, Cleveland, Tyler, Ambassador John S. Rice, and Komer. The meeting was described as “off the record,” and no other record of it has been found. (Kennedy Library, President’s Appointment Book)↩
- On February 1, the Netherlands Government requested permission for two chartered KLM flights of 100 military personnel each to cross U.S. territory to Biak, West New Guinea. By the time the request was made, the first aircraft was on its way. Although these soldiers were replacements and not reinforcements, the U.S. officials worried that the flight, which was already known to the press, would upset negotiations for a settlement of the West New Guinea issue. They reluctantly agreed to allow the first flight to continue, stopping at U.S. territory to refuel, but insisted that the second flight not take place. Replacements could travel by regular KLM flights. (Memoranda of conversation, February 2, and telegram 662 to The Hague, February 3; Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/2–262 and 656.9813/2–3623)↩
- Document 239.↩