Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

240. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Tyler) to Secretary of State Rusk⁰

Washington, February 27, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Dutch Request for Transit West New Guinea Reinforcements Via US

Ambassador van Roijen called on me today at his request to inform us that the Netherlands Government may soon be asking permission to fly Dutch Marines to West New Guinea to reinforce the garrison there.¹ The Ambassador stated that his government has obtained reliable information from intelligence sources, that the Indonesians intend to launch a large-scale combined operation against the south coast of West New Guinea toward the first of April. The Ambassador said that his government had full confidence in the reliability of this intelligence based on past experience with the source. The Netherlands Government does not intend to withhold action pending further evaluation of the intelligence.

In response to questions, van Roijen indicated that his government had given him no instructions concerning the possibility of reconsidering this policy; however, on a personal basis he thought that his government would only be prepared to drop present plans if specific developments occurred (which could be confirmed by intelligence sources) indicating that Sukarno had called off the April 1 attack. The Ambassador said that the Dutch would, be swayed by actions and not merely by Sukarno’s words. He added that if the Indonesians moved to drop their preconditions and sit down to explore negotiating possibilities, this also might cause the Dutch to refrain from reinforcing West New Guinea.

The Ambassador denied that the timing of this request had any connection with the visit of Foreign Minister Luns on March 1 and 2. He emphasized that his call did not constitute a formal request for transit authorization, but was merely putting us on notice that we would probably receive such a request a fairly short time prior to the intended flights. The Ambassador did not state the number of troops involved but estimated that two companies of marines would be sent via the US, although he intimated that additional reinforcements would go by other means which did not involve the US. The Dutch were not specific with respect to the routes to be followed, mentioning both the polar route via Anchorage, Honolulu and Wake, as well as the continental route via New York, San Francisco and beyond.

In the course of conversation, the Ambassador mentioned invoking the transit rights “agreement” of 1958–1959 covering the emergency flight of these troops to WNG via US military bases, which is described at Tab A.² As you know, we hold that the US is no longer bound by this “agreement.” The Bureaus concerned, EUR, FE and IO, agree that the decision to be made regarding the transit of Dutch troops to WNG now is essentially a policy question. We believe that a decision on this matter should be reached within forty-eight hours, since it is possible that we may receive a formal Dutch request even before the visit of Foreign Minister Luns.

The Dutch clearly expect us to honor what they view as our commitment. Failure to do so can have serious consequences for US/Dutch relations with repercussions in NATO, the UN and other areas. To deny the Dutch request will also cause serious misgivings among our NATO partners who are already suspicious of our ability to preserve Western positions outside of Europe. The attitude of NATO on the question of withholding arms to Indonesia is clear evidence of this.

On the other hand, if the troops do move, Governor Harriman believes that it will destroy our position with Sukarno and, in all probability, cause him to withdraw his agreement for secret talks regarding an agenda for negotiation of a peaceful settlement.

This is a difficult decision on which the Bureaus concerned are unable to reach an agreed position. I would, therefore, suggest that you may wish to call a meeting with Governor Harriman, Mr. Cleveland and myself to consider the course we should adopt.³

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/2–2762. Secret. Drafted by Beau-dry and cleared by Sisco and Harriman.
1. The memorandum of conversation is dated February 26. (Ibid., 656.9813/2–2662)
2. Attached but not printed. The issue was outlined in more detail in a memorandum from Tyler to U. Alexis Johnson, February 21. (Ibid., 656.9813/2–2162)
3. The suggestion that Rusk approve or disapprove a meeting was crossed out. Harriman saw van Roijen alone on March 1 and told him that the United States was not going to give permission for military overflights to reinforce West New Guinea. Although a NATO country, the United States had a responsibility for preventing a war between the Netherlands and Indonesia. (Ibid., 656.9813/6–162)