Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

226. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Singapore⁰

Washington, February 10, 1962, 8:08 p.m.

239. Attorney General visit.¹ Singapore for Attorney General. Subject your consultation with Embassy Djakarta, we recommend that in WNG discussions with GOI you take following line:

1. US remains genuinely objective toward issue. Our basic motivation is help Dutch and Indos find peaceful and mutually agreeable settlement. We have not taken Dutch side as illustrated by our attitude re Dutch overflights² and by our continued cooperation with Indonesia regarding arms shipments.

2. We believe necessary ingredients for peaceful adjustment WNG problem present and resort to violence would be tragic development serving no beneficial purpose. Dutch clearly wish leave territory as soon as possible with some face-saving in fulfillment obligation toward Papuans. Indonesians not only willing grant measure internal autonomy but also, if we understand position correctly, prepared permit Papuans complete freedom of choice after appropriate period still to be defined; both sides have demonstrated gratifying restraint publicly and it clearly evident both sides striving for peaceful solution. It appears to us only remaining obstacle is find framework for beginning substantive negotiations.

3. In these circumstances US wishes strongly counsel Indonesians agree to negotiate with Dutch under aegis SYG with no pre-conditions. We recognize that GOI agreement to do this may, because of Indo public position, necessarily result in secret negotiations. While we cannot guarantee that successful agreement will emerge and are convinced it will require hard and perhaps protracted bargaining, we believe prospects for settlement are good and that in any event GOI would not wish leave

At the request of Dungan at the White House, the Central Intelligence Agency provided a short-range appraisal of the internal security situation in Indonesia that concluded that Indonesian security would be capable of protecting the Attorney General. (CIA/OCI telegram 092157Z to the White House, February 9; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Indonesia, Vol. II, 1 /62–3/62) any stone unturned in search for peaceful solution. If it does not make corresponding efforts, it will deny itself essential international support. You urged impress on Indonesians that world opinion cannot understand GOI demand that Dutch in effect surrender their position in advance and we believe it essential to peaceful settlement and Indonesian international position that GOI re-examine its position and make every effort agree come to negotiating table without prior conditions. FYL Although substantive positions both sides very close, issue of “preconditions” could be obstacle preventing settlement. We believe your visit to Indonesia provides fortuitous and possibly last opportunity to impress on Sukarno US view that cooperation, good faith and recognition political realities necessary if hostilities to be avoided.

Apparent impasse which has prevailed recently continues, at least on surface. Basically, Dutch prepared negotiate in presence third party (preferably SYG or member his staff) but insist that no advance conditions be imposed. Indos on other hand continue insist that advance understanding be reached that purpose of talks will be discuss inter alia modalities transfer WNG administration to them. We agree with Dutch that this is in fact a pre-condition. Dutch at times, however, have implied that discussion administrative transfer expected to be item to be taken up in negotiations and that they would be prepared deal with question constructively. In fact Van Roijen expressed to Dept Feb 8 on return from Hague his personal opinion is that if negotiations are started through U Thant, an agreement can be reached.³ At other times, Dutch (For Min Luns) have insisted that transfer administration directly to Indonesia never will be undertaken by GON.

Indonesians, partially at US urging, have moved encouragingly on issue self-determination. You may be faced with Indo argument to effect that since they have substantially met Dutch demands on self-determination, they unable comprehend why Dutch continuing hold back on transfer administration. Indos may cite Dutch attitude this point as “proof that Dutch fundamentally unwilling transfer WNG to Indos, that demand self-determination only smokescreen.

Recent contact in London between Dutch and Indonesians may have resulted slight advance toward better understanding between two parties. Details this meeting, however, unclear and Embassy Djakarta will have all currently available information.

To best our knowledge, U Thant has not pressed this matter for past two weeks since Dutch Ambassador Van Roijen just returned Feb 7 from week’s consultation Netherlands and Indo special representative from Djakarta has been out of New York for about two weeks. End FYI.

With return DC-8 to Amsterdam and substitution normally used DC-7’s on regular KLM commercial schedule via Tokyo, troop airlift issue appears have subsided somewhat, at least for present. However, it can be anticipated that you may be questioned this subject during visit Indonesia. Believe your response can best be in terms our public pronouncement, i.e., that US not permitting special military charters as hope for negotiated settlement WNG issue now great with Acting UNSYGU Thant making earnest efforts in New York find basis for negotiations. With respect first flight, you may wish take line that plane’s departure Holland based Dutch interpretation of Chicago Convention that only normal technical clearances required. Although we consider such military charters to be “state aircraft” and therefore requiring permission in addition to routine technical clearances, we were unable resolve this legal question prior first plane’s departure.

Our public statement said military charters not being permitted “for time being” while attempts for peaceful solution in progress:⁴ If Indonesian interrogators take line that this phrase implies that breakdown of talks would result US assistance to Dutch with respect troop movements and, therefore, means Indonesians negotiating under duress, you might say that US intent in this issue is just the opposite, in sense that we wish our actions contribute to peaceful settlement. However, it obvious that change in situation would force US re-evaluate situation. Nevertheless our basic policy goal would in any event continue unchanged: You may wish advise Indonesians that our refusal permit chartered troop flights and our continued shipment military equipment to Indonesia have resulted bitter charges in Netherlands that we in fact not neutral. This reaction also shared by other NATO allies.

Remind importance attached high levels Pope case especially in view Washington conversations with Sukarno and Indo Foreign Minister.

Excellent press here on your trip thus far.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/2–1062. Secret; Niact, Drafted by Lindquist; cleared by Bell and Dungan, in draft by Stone, Harriman, Czyzak, and Bundy, and in substance by Sisco; and approved by Rice. Repeated priority to Djakarta and to The Hague, Canberra, London, and USUN.
1. Robert Kennedy and his wife were visiting Indonesia at the invitation of Indonesian Attorney General Dr. Gunawan, who extended the invitation during his visit to Washington in April 1961, The Kennedys stayed in Indonesia February 12–18 during an extended tour of world capitals.
2. See footnote 2, Document 242.
3. As reported in memorandum of conversation, February 8, (Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/2–862)
4. Not found.