Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXII, Northeast Asia

347. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State⁰

Hakone, Japan, November 4, 1961, 11 a.m.

Secto 17. Eyes only for President from Secretary. Cabinet conference adjourns today, having accomplished its broader purpose of improving background of understanding among cabinet officers two sides involved in US-Japanese trade relations.¹ Suggest briefing meeting US cabinet officers with you to report impressions. No negotiations or particular points taken up at conference, although cabinet officers did discuss particular transactions with opposite numbers privately.

In a long private talk with Ikeda² I mentioned the possibility your visit. He was deeply gratified your interest but wished to think it over and be in touch with you again. It is obvious that he wants to be certain that there would be no possibility of revival anti-Eisenhower demonstrations. One troubling aspect is that he anticipates serious domestic difficulties, including violent reactions 200,000 Koreans in Japan in connection his determination establish good relations ROK.

I gave Ikeda³ full briefing on nuclear test situation happily prior to arrival your statement. Ikeda said that as Prime Minister Japan he could not officially approve US nuclear testing but that “in my heart I believe that the President must do what has to be done.” Your excellent statement was received here about as well as could be expected in Japan. Official government statement was masterpiece of combining Japanese viewpoint in low key with tactful indication Japanese understanding our problem. Ikeda told me privately that he expects to remain in office for another three years. This of some significance since at least two members his present cabinet are standing in the wings ready to succeed. Incidentally, Yoshida told me that Ikeda had been a new man since his visit to Washington and was moving in foreign affairs with a confidence and ability which had greatly enhanced his strength and position in Japan.

Ikeda is taking the Korean matter with great seriousness and will do everything possible to put relations on normal basis and find means of substantial assistance to Korea. Pak will visit Ikeda on way to Washington.

Ikeda was optimistic about prospects of bringing Burma further into free world and away from Communist China. Through close personal friends in Burmese Government, Ikeda is trying to work out Japanese aid to Burma which would divert latter from large ChiCom assistance.

In keeping his general interest in fresh Japanese initiatives throughout Asian free countries, Ikeda will try to smooth over Cambodian-Thai problem prior to and during his forthcoming visit India and Southeast Asia.

Although he may not know critical nature present situation in Vietnam, Ikeda showed great misgivings about introducing US combat forces in that country. He seems to think that economic assistance was what was required. My guess is that he needs more factual information about Vietnam and will arrange to provide this through Embassy.

I was impressed with general atmosphere here of need and opportunity for Japan to play a much more active role in Asia, a mood prompted both by political and economic considerations. It is obvious that Reischauer has gotten off to an excellent start and that he and his wife are highly regarded both in official circles and publicly.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 411.9441/11-461. Secret; No Other Distribution.
1. In an October 12 memorandum to Frederick Dutton of the White House Staff, Ball wrote that he was “persuaded that the agenda and the specific papers to be discussed are far less important than the fact that the discussions take place” and that they were to be considered talks among “political people having political responsibilities for economic questions.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Japan, 10/61)
2. The memorandum of the Secretary’s conversation with Ikeda held November 2 is not printed. (Memorandum by Osborn; Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330) During their conversation on the morning of November 4, Rusk discussed with Kosaka Korea, the work of the Ryukyu Task Force, the introduction of Mace missiles into Okinawa, and nuclear testing. (Memorandum by Osborn; ibid.)
3. Reference is to the President’s November 2 statement on possible resumption of nuclear testing; see Department of State Bulletin, November 20, 1961, p. 844.