Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXII, Northeast Asia

346. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Hakone, Japan, November 3, 1961, 1 p.m.

SUBJECT

1)

Domestic Political Context and Impact of Hakone Meeting;

2)

Nuclear Weapons; and

3)

Japan’s Role in Foreign Affairs

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The Secretary
  • David L. Osborn, First Secretary, Embassy Tokyo
• Japan
  • Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda

1. Domestic Political Context and Impact of Hakone Meeting: The Secretary described in general terms his meeting with former Prime Minister Yoshida on November 1,¹ and said he had felt some puzzlement at Yoshida’s offer to convey his views to Prime Minister Ikeda, in view of the close personal relationship and the direct contact existing between the Secretary and the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister explained that Yoshida’s remark had been in the nature of a formal courtesy. He said he enjoyed Yoshida’s full confidence and support; after the Secretary’s meeting with Yoshida, Ikeda had had a three-hour tete-a-tete with him on the subject of the Hakone Conference and his talk with the Secretary.

The Prime Minister emphasized the unity and stability of his “strong-man cabinet.” He attributed his success in organizing this cabinet in good part to his trip to Washington. Following this trip he had had no trouble in getting the factional leaders to join the cabinet. This contrasted with the difficulties experienced by previous Prime Ministers in lining up the more powerful political figures for their cabinets. It had taken former Prime Minister Kishi two hours to persuade Ikeda to join the Kishi cabinet, for example.

When Ikeda formed his cabinet last July, the factional leaders had practically fallen over themselves in their eagerness to join.

One incident related by the Prime Minister (in response to the Secretary’s request for comment on Finance Minister Mizuta’s background) illustrated both the eagerness of the present cabinet ministers to join the cabinet and the personal relationship between Ikeda and Mizuta. Mizuta, although technically a member of the Ohno faction, had been willing to defy the dictates of his faction (which had been holding out for more representation in the cabinet) or even to leave it if necessary to join the cabinet.

The Prime Minister noted that in the greetings which he had exchanged with the Secretary at the beginning of the lunch, he had expressed the intention of sending the present cabinet members to the United States for the next meeting of the Joint Committee. This Joint Committee meeting would occur after the party elections of next July, so that the Prime Minister’s remarks were in effect serving notice on the strongmen present at the lunch that Ikeda intended to stay in power with his strongman Cabinet following the party elections. The Prime Minister said that if he did stay in after next July, then his cabinet would run for three years. He hoped within those three years to be able to reform the political character of the Japanese population, reducing the ratio of “un-Japanese” from the present roughly one-third to one-fourth or one-fifth. Ikeda said that the Hakone meeting might have advanced the target date for the completion of this transformation by a year or so.

2. Nuclear Weapons: The Prime Minister said the very fact that there is a debate in Japan on the problem of nuclear weapons for Japan reflected the fact that at least a minority considered it necessary for Japan also to have nuclear weapons. This minority, he indicated, included people in his own cabinet and party. The Secretary made it clear that the United States was opposed to the proliferation of nuclear powers, with the tremendous waste of resources and the other difficulties and dangers this would entail. He said that the United States remained as firmly committed as it had been in 1946 to the principle of effective international control over nuclear armaments. He mentioned the almost inconceivable destruction that would be caused by a nuclear war, not only on the belligerents but on all other countries of the world. It was enough to make one consider seriously the possibility of emigration to the moon, he remarked. He did not think that any rational world leader could take the responsibility of initiating a nuclear war. The Prime Minister replied that he had not been thinking so much of Japan’s going into the production of nuclear weapons, but of the argument that the presence of nuclear weapons in Japan might be necessary for its defense. He indicated that he would be interested in learning more about the broader aspects of the nuclear armaments question.

3. Japan’s Role in Foreign Affairs: The Secretary complimented the Prime Minister on Japan’s increasing willingness to take the initiative in foreign affairs, both in the United Nations and in other fields. The Prime Minister said this was perhaps attributable in part to the growth of Japan’s real power. He also said that Japan’s representative in the United Nations, Mr. Okazaki, was extremely well qualified and that Ambassador Asakai in Washington was one of Japan’s best Ambassadors. The Secretary commented that Mr. Okazaki had given a good demonstration of his qualifications as a negotiator during the negotiations for the Administrative Agreement in 1951.²

The Prime Minister remarked ruefully that he seemed to be achieving considerable success in the foreign policy field, where he was a rank amateur, but encountering difficulties in the economic field, where he considered himself an expert.

0. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Confidential. Drafted by David L. Osborn, Political Officer and First Secretary of Embassy and approved by S on November 27. The meeting was held at the Kansui Inn.
1. No memorandum of this conversation has been found.
2. Rusk and Kazuo Okazaki negotiated the original Administrative Agreement (operative until 1960) in January and February 1952. It was signed at Tokyo on February 28, 1952, and entered into force that same day; for text, see 3 UST (pt.3) 3341.