Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

84. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State¹

Léopoldville, July 20, 1961, 6 p.m.

143. Had 30 minute talk with Kasavubu today. Apologized for taking his time but said I had received instructions to express Department’s congratulations on strong leadership he had been giving country in solving current political crisis. Coquilhatville conference, June 19 agreement with Stanleyville were all gratifying developments. But now however Department was observing development which gave it serious concern for it might well place presidency itself in jeopardy. We saw in continued reluctance of Ileo to resign an indication that he might perhaps even seek vote of confidence, serious possibility that this would open way to parliamentarians from Stanleyville presenting exclusively Gizengist government. Without counter force such maneuver might well succeed. In this connection I told President we had most reliable information that one of first things Gizengist government would do would be to attack presidency and replace present incumbent. Such eventuality cause of great concern for President and we considered his continued presence in office essential to nation’s development, et cetera. I told him I had been instructed to bring this matter to his attention urgently and that Department would appreciate his comments and indication of how he viewed situation at present.

Kasavubu replied that he was fully aware of Gizengist ambitions and that it placed him in extremely difficult position for he could not oblige Ileo to resign and was waiting for this action on Ileo’s own initiative.

He was not optimistic that this would occur. He was however going Lovanium this afternoon to sound out political atmosphere personally and ascertain views various leaders now assembled there. In this connection he believed that first thing must be done was for suppliants to have their mandates validated and then proceed to election presidents of both chambers. I then drew upon Deptel 72² and pointed out that Struelens had told Department that Tshombe was willing to attend summit anywhere in Congo. I recognized that this was contrary to Munongo’s statement of yesterday but that I had been instructed to inform President of fact that we had received such information from Tshombe. He showed interest in this; said Tshombe now ill, and then volunteered that he knew Tshombe was considering visiting Stanleyville which was absolutely ridiculous for there was no identity of views between Communist Stanleyville and theoretically anti-Communist Elisabethville.

I then reverted to what he said about future developments in Parliament and expressed my personal view that it would appear to be unfortunate that Parliament would convene prior to designation of formateur. We here in Léopoldville were impressed by monolithic character of Stanleyville and way in which Gizenga had named Gbenye his man here with full powers to traffic in portfolios and to promise everything to anyone who might vote with Stanleyville. On contrary, I pointed out, moderates were without clear indication of President’s wishes and they were currently group of fine men but who were wallowing in indecision and who did not have leader designated by Chief State. This definitely reduced their negotiability and fact they did not have spokesman led them to be powerless before Stanleyville machinations. We knew, for example, that men like Sendwe and Bolikango had been promised moon by Gbenye whereas no one could speak with authority for moderates. Kasavubu said he agreed this was most unfortunate situation and wanted to do something about it but he was still faced with Ileo problem and could not demand his resignation. I then said I understood his problem but there were times in nations’ history when leaders such as himself had to lower themselves to negotiate with parliamentarians and had to take risks that were not pleasant and below dignity of Chief State.

Julien Kasongo³ joined us half way through conversation and was directed by Kasavubu to take notes on information about Tshombe. He stayed on with President for a few moments; shortly after I returned to office he asked me to see him immediately. Kasongo confirmed that Kasavubu is going to Lovanium this afternoon and that he, Kasongo, will accompany him. He said President was not miffed by our chat this morning and that he always welcomed frank talk from Americans. I emphasized to Kasongo the necessity for immediate appointment of formateur with which Kasongo wholeheartedly agreed and said he would again speak to Kasavubu on this point. He agreed that formateur must be settled as soon as possible to permit moderates to politick and took note of my suggestion that Ileo might publicly submit his resignation which Kasavubu would not accept but merely note. This would permit them to bring pressure on Gizenga also to resign and would clear field for naming of formateur. We discussed how Ileo resignation might be brought about and agreed that it might be hastened by Kasavubu naming Adoula as formateur. During my discussion with President I never mentioned Adoula by name, nor did he, but I told Kasongo that USG could work easily with Adoula and believed he was politician commanding more respect than anyone else in Congo today.

I would not describe my conversation with Kasavubu as forthright as that which Linner had yesterday⁴ but it was first time I had seen him. He nevertheless opened up after my initial monologue and seemed willing to talk politics and did not take offense.

When I left President I found Mobutu in outer office and congratulated him on birth of son. General said he had not even had chance to see baby for he returned late last night and had been summoned first thing this morning by President. This is not correct for we know he arrived here at 6 p.m. but I assume he was closeted with Bomboko, Adoula, et cetera, who were in large meeting of moderates until well after midnight when they took off for Lovanium.

Have informed Linner of foregoing and British and French Ambassadors are calling just before noon and I shall advise them. Will also consult with them re Deptel 72 to see if they have any further suggestions or views.

Godley

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7–2061. Secret. Repeated to Brussels, Elisabethville, USUN, London, Paris, and Brazzaville.
2. See footnote 1, Document 83. Telegram 82 to Léopoldville, July 19, authorized Godley to discuss Tshombe’s approach with the Léopoldville authorities. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7–1961)
3. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade Julien Kasongo.
4. Godley reported on Linner’s conversation with Kasavubu in telegram 142 from Léopoldville, July 20. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7–2061)