Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

80. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

Washington, July 15, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Note from the British Ambassador regarding the Convening of Parliament in the Congo

The British Embassy has given us the attached note to you from the British Ambassador,² expressing the Foreign Secretary’s fear that a meeting of Parliament without Katanga’s participation or proper political preparation could result in a disaster. The Foreign Secretary refers to a report he has received from the British Ambassador in Léopoldville following a conversation with our Charge and the French Ambassador.

Mr. Godley, our Charge d’Affaires in Léopoldville, had a radio conversation with Mr. Vance, Director of the Office of Central African Affairs, on the night of July 14. Mr. Godley stated he had lunched with the British and French Ambassadors prior to the receipt of your telegram which had instructed him to assess, in collaboration with the French and British Ambassadors, the situation in the Congo, particularly whether or not Parliament should meet at this time.³ According to Godley, the conclusions of the luncheon meeting were inconclusive. Godley urged that the Department await the results of his more formal meeting with the two Ambassadors, scheduled for this morning.

Godley stated he regards the tactics which we have developed as the proper ones to follow. He believes that the present situation does not warrant the adoption of dilatory tactics at this time which would have their own dangers. He doubts Gizenga is strong enough to emerge as the dominant figure in the new government if the Léopoldville moderates adequately organize themselves. He therefore recommends that we permit the present situation to continue to develop and that we refrain from pushing the “panic button” too soon.

Godley is pressing the Léopoldville Congolese to agree, between themselves, on a strong formateur (such as Adoula) and a Cabinet slate according Gizengists only a minority position. He reports Kasavubu is consulting leaders with a view to an early designation of a formateur and that there is one report that he will designate Adoula early next week. Also, a steering committee has been organized by the moderates and they have agreed they could not serve under Gizenga as Prime Minister. Godley emphasizes all these arrangements could come apart and that he will watch for this possibility closely. If it becomes apparent that Gizenga is about to win control, Godley believes Kasavubu should then be urged to assume the role of pater familias, which he likes, and suspend activities until he can make another effort with Tshombe, to bring all his children into the meeting.

The arrival of Russian and Czech diplomats in Stanleyville makes clearer the danger the Communists will come to control a Gizenga enclave unless Gizenga can be brought into the Central Government. Nyerere told us last night he is persuaded Gizenga is the true nationalist in the Congo.⁴

The UN is pressing hard for Parliament and many parliamentarians have been brought into Léopoldville by UNOC. Godley believes we should not abandon hope the Léopoldville leaders will organize themselves and be able to defeat an effort to form a Gizenga Government. What we hope will be presented to Parliament is a Cabinet slate, previously agreed upon, controlled by the Léopoldville group but with a Gizengist minority. If we now talk of our fears of the consequences of Parliament with the Léopoldville group, Godley believes, it will distract them from organizing themselves. In fact, the UN’s pressure for Parliament is a goad to them. It is also a goad to Tshombe, who is being pressed by the UN and the West to cooperate.

The British Embassy also told us this morning that the British Ambassador will see Kasavubu today. He will emphasize the difficulties which Kasavubu’s friends can expect in the UNGA in September if no progress has been made towards overall settlement of the Congo political situation. The British Ambassador in Brussels is to see Spaak Monday to urge he bring all possible pressure to bear on Tshombe to cooperate.

Recommendation:

I recommend that we await the report of this morning’s more formal meeting between Godley and the British and French Ambassadors in Léopoldville.⁵ When we have received that report, we will review our tactics and I may recommend you talk again with the British and French Ambassadors.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7– 1561. Confidential. Drafted by Vance and Officer in Charge of United Nations Congo Affairs Jerome Lavallee, concurred in by Tron, and initialed by Williams.
2. Not attached to the source text. The note, dated July 15, is ibid., Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, UK Officials Correspondence with Secretary Rusk.
3. Telegram 54 to Léopoldville, July 13. (Ibid., Central Files, 770G.00/7–1361)
4. Prime Minister Nyerere of Tanganyika was visiting Washington. A memorandum of conversation between Nyerere and Rusk on July 14 is ibid., Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation. Documentation is scheduled for publication in volume XXI.
5. Telegram 111, July 15, transmitted the agreed assessment: 1) it was difficult for outsiders to assess or influence the political maneuvering then underway; 2) every reasonable effort should be made to induce the Conakats to attend Parliament; 3) the Congolese political leaders should agree on a governmental slate before Parliament opened; and 4) if Parliament failed to agree on a government or chose one which was not generally acceptable, there was danger of a military coup. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/ 7–1561)