Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

70. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Congo¹

Washington, June 5, 1961, 7:55 p.m.

2248. Agree your tentative assessment² Gizenga will probably not attend parliament except on his own terms to which we agree GOC should not accede. Also agree your view GOC should press on with plans for parliament under Kasavubu auspices with fullest UN protection. This however leaves problem Gizenga-dominated separatist regime Orientale which we regard with increasing alarm view possibility Ghana shipment arms Stanleyville, arrival increasing number bloc and Casablanca Power ambassadors, continued viability Gizenga despite blockade and apparent reluctance Lundula break with Gizenga. We have given considerable thought to possibilities reducing Gizenga hold on Orientale and prospects this do not appear bright for near future.

Hence feel Gizenga membership in non-sensitive post in otherwise moderate cabinet with strong Prime Minister preferable continuance his present position in Orientale, and that Kasavubu should arrange offer him unspecified cabinet post. Implicit in condition would be authority central govt extended over Eastern provinces. Such offer would strengthen posture Kasavubu as conciliator and on assumption Gizenga will not attend Kasavubu parliament, gesture would be safe enough and at same time helpful GOC position internationally and internally.

Should this offer be made and accepted however, we feel Gizenga, lacking charisma Lumumba, would be less threat in non-sensitive cabinet job Léopoldville where he can be effectively watched and movements countered by other GOC leaders. Should he refuse offer, we believe GOC should press on with present plans and we will exert every effort strengthen GOC and reduce power Gizenga.

Press reports indicate GOC plans ask UN assistance draft constitution, and UN help supervise popular referendum. This to be encouraged. Reports also indicate Kasavubu may be thinking of enlarging Senate to ensure installation moderate government. Based your reporting would appear sufficient strength present parliament to ensure acceptance moderate government without change membership if more generally acceptable Prime Minister, such as Adoula, appointed, and support all Katanga elements can be swung behind him. Appears to us packing parliament would only weaken legal position Kasavubu and serve no useful purpose.

Request your comments on foregoing and suggest you also solicit views UK and French Ambassadors.³ Dept will also discuss matter with UK, French and Belgians here.

Bowles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/6–561. Secret. Drafted by Woodruff; cleared by Wallner, Deputy Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs Milton C. Rewinkel, and David Korn of the Executive Secretariat; and approved by Williams. Repeated to USUN and Brussels.
2. Timberlake sent this assessment in telegram 2363, May 24, which predicted that Gizenga would not make concessions and Léopoldville had nothing to lose by taking a hard line. If Gizenga did attend Parliament, Timberlake thought Léopoldville should not offer him a post in a moderate government. (Ibid., 770G.00/5–2461)
3. Timberlake sent a U.S.-U.K.-French assessment in telegram 2483, June 15, which concluded that Gizenga would probably attend the reconvened Parliament and would accept a position as Vice Prime Minister in an Adoula government but not a lesser position. If he did not attend, his position would be weakened and, in the long run, untenable unless he received massive foreign aid. (Ibid., 770G.00/6–1561)