Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

65. Telegram From the Embassy in Belgium to the Department of State¹

Brussels, May 16, 1961, 8 p.m.

1917. Congo. In my May 16 meeting with Spaak² he informed me he had received note from Foreign Minister Bomboko³ referring to agreement reached between UN and Kasavubu re withdrawal of Belgian mercenaries, political advisers, and military personnel. Bomboko note indicated that UN agreement applied to Katanga and that GOC desired withdrawal from Katanga of those Belgians in above categories who had assumed their positions after June 30, 1960.

Spaak said in line with policy of new Belgian Government to cooperate fully with both GOC and UN, he wished to give prompt and positive reply to Bomboko which would have effect of recognizing the right of Léopoldville to speak for Katanga in such matters. Accordingly, Spaak is drawing up an immediate list of such Belgians in Katanga who in GOB view could and should be withdrawn at once, and, after letting Katanga authorities see this list (a courtesy which Spaak considers important in order not alienate Katanga further from Léopoldville), he planned reply to Bomboko accepting the principles set forth in Bomboko’s note and enclosing the list of Belgians who would be immediately withdrawn as a first step in responding to Bomboko request. Spaak said that this move on part of GOB would create adverse reaction for him and Lefevre from certain vocal elements in Belgium who would raise hue and cry that new government was abandoning Katanga, etc. However, Spaak and Lefevre were quite prepared to accept domestic consequences of above course of action as they believed it imperative to convince UN, Congo, and world that they desired to cooperate sincerely and fully with Congo and UN.

I replied to Spaak that although I had not seen Bomboko’s note, course of action he had outlined seemed statesmanlike way to respond to GOC request. We recognize Spaak and Lefevre would be subject to criticism by certain Belgian elements and admired courage they showing in willingness to disregard such criticism. Spaak said he would be glad to have Foreign Office show Bomboko note to member Embassy staff [4 lines of source text not declassified].

Spaak then went on to say that after very careful study of the problem of Congo he was convinced that those Belgians who wanted to hang on in Congo and exercise predominant influence on the Congolese Government were following a path which was 100 percent wrong. [5 lines of source text not declassified] Spaak said he feels best way for Belgium to preserve her economic and other interests—“and she has some legitimate ones”—was for her to make clear to the Congolese Government that Belgium is not trying to control and fetter GOC freedom of action but wishes to see a free and independent Congo with which Belgium is willing to cooperate and be helpful on terms of equality and full recognition of Congolese sovereignty. Spaak said his philosophy would encounter heavy opposition from certain elements within Belgium who desired to hang on to their special position to bitter end. While he would have to act with skill and care he wished us to know these were principles which he had in mind as he tackled multiple and very complex aspects of Congo problem.

I said to Spaak I agreed wholeheartedly with his approach which I felt sure would be warmly welcomed by Washington.

[1 paragraph (2 lines of source text) not declassified]

MacArthur

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 855.0070G/5–1661. Confidential; Priority; Noforn. Repeated to Léopoldville, USUN, and Paris.
2. MacArthur reported in telegram 1914, May 16, that he had met with Spaak that day and discussed several subjects, reported in separate telegrams. (Ibid.)
3. Telegram 1925 from Brussels, May 16, summarized the note. It stated that the Congolese Government wished the withdrawal as soon as possible of all foreign mercenaries and political and military advisers and they should be replaced with personnel who were competent and acceptable to the Congolese Government. It asked that Belgian technicians and private businessmen remain in order to avoid further dislocations and stated that any disagreement as to which category applied to a particular individual should be resolved by negotiations between the two governments. (Ibid.)