Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

60. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, April 22, 1961, 1 a.m.

2968. Congo. SYG handed Yost today latest exchange of notes between Abbas and Kasavubu on Matadi. Texts being transmitted in separate telegram.²

Commenting on note from Kasavubu SYG expressed his appreciation for US support which he thought might have been responsible for improvement in Kasavubu’s attitude. Latest note is far from providing complete solution but recognizes right of UN to have military force at Matadi and represents significant step forward. He hopes that US will continue to help in reaching reasonable settlement. He points out USS Blatchford is due in Matadi April 28 and he believes it of great importance that there be “sizeable number” Nigerian police there by that time. When queried as to meaning of “sizeable number” he said that it must be more than simply symbolic and suggested “around 30.”

Encouraged by improved UN position in Congo generally SYG thinks it may be “over the hump.” He expects another battalion of Ethiopian troops, as well as battalion made up of units of 4 French Community states (he mentioned Senegal, Ivory Coast and Upper Volta). UN position in northern Katanga is firmer and there seemed to be signs mercenaries may melt away and Belgian officers follow suit. He hopes next begin implement Gardiner-Nwokedi agreement with Kasavubu³ concerning personnel and to reaffirm principle freedom of movement, primarily through Matadi settlement.

If developments along these lines continue to be favorable for another 2 or 3 weeks he hopes to be in position to take step which will be of interest to us, that is, to suggest to Nehru that Dayal’s mission has been accomplished and to ask that Nehru nominate another Indian to replace him. SYG believes that Nehru will approve only if Dayal’s replacement is an Indian. In the meantime he proposes following tentative time-table. Abbas must leave in approximately one week. Gardiner would thereafter be temporarily in charge with title of deputy. He would be assisted for the moment by Narasimhan⁴ who would maintain Indian presence during interim, but who is much more flexible and diplomatic than Dayal. Dayal’s return would be delayed to end first week May and would, if scenario SYG is working on is carried out, be very brief.

SYG concluded by urging fullest US support for UN desiderata with view to facilitating tactic explained above.

Yost also discussed with SYG briefly substance of Dept’s 2084.⁵ SYG said reports from Dumontet are much less alarming than those we have received. He agrees Munongo is worse than Tshombe, but UN so far has had little luck in dealing with Tshombe. Gardiner offered UN officers to replace Belgians but got no response. However, SYG feels course of events will oblige Tshombe to be more conciliatory and hopes he will come around to working with UN. SYG on his side would be entirely happy to do so.

He mentioned incidentally he understands Tshombe is meeting Kasavubu at Coquilhatville next Monday.⁶ He also mentioned “top secret” report from Stanleyville that move is underway to work toward new government with Adoula replacing Ileo and Gizenga as his deputy. SYG has high respect for Adoula and thinks this might be workable solution.

Comment: This is first sign of yielding on Dayal and we believe, though proposal for Indian successor may not be too satisfactory, we should welcome break in log jam and offer assist insofar as possible in facilitating SYG’s tactic. This, of course, would involve assisting him in strengthening UN position to point where he could plausibly make claim to Nehru that Dayal’s mandate had been successfully carried out.

Stevenson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/4–2261. Secret; Limited Distribution. Repeated to Léopoldville.
2. Telegram 2967, April 22. (Ibid.)
3. Signed at Léopoldville on April 17 by Kasavubu and Bomboko and two representatives of the Secretary-General, Robert Gardiner of Ghana and Francis Nwokedi of Nigeria. Under this agreement, the Congo accepted the February 21 Security Council resolution and the United Nations undertook to provide assistance in its implementation, particularly with regard to the repatriation of foreign personnel, the recruitment and training of technicians, and the reorganization of the Congolese army. (U.N. doc. S/4807, Annex I; also printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 809–810)
4. U.N. Under Secretary for Special Political Affairs C.V. Narasimhan.
5. Telegram 2084, April 20, expressed concern that Tshombe’s position in Katanga might be threatened by Munongo and others more xenophobic and separatist than Tshombe, thus eliminating any possibility of a rapprochement between Katanga and Léopoldville. It suggested an approach to Tshombe offering U.N. assistance in replacing Belgians in the Katanga forces and providing specialists for advisory roles. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/4–761) Telegram 736 from Elisabethville, April 17, had reported a growing internal political struggle in Katanga and the “entry on scene of lightly cloaked British and French interests seeking permanent footholds.” (Ibid., 770G.00/4–1761)
6. April 24. The Coquilhatville conference of Congolese leaders, convened by Kasavubu and including Ileo, Bomboko, and a number of provincial leaders, began on that date. Tshombe attended the opening of the conference; Gizenga did not attend.