Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

52. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, March 24, 1961, 10:13 p.m.

1825. For Stevenson from Bowles. Re Congo. Following my conversation with Hoffman² and your talk with Cleveland³ I have reviewed carefully with all interested offices what could most usefully be done to alleviate grave situation posed by continued impasse between UN and GOC on control of major Congolese facilities such as Matadi. We share your view that confrontation between UN and GOC, especially if it involves armed clash, would involve serious risk of UN withdrawal from Congo which would damage reputation of UN, US and GOC in eyes of most Afro-Asians and constitute victory for Soviets.

As you know, we have asked Timberlake do everything he can to comply with SYG request for assistance in developing cooperative GOC attitude,⁴ and he has consistently sought to do so. You may wish assure SYG US has on almost daily basis and at all levels been seeking impress on Congolese authorities crucial need they cooperate fully with UN. This message also serves as reaffirmation instructions to Emb Léopoldville to continue pursue its efforts vigorously to secure GOC cooperation with UN, in particular by working out acceptable agreement re use Matadi under joint arrangements.

We are encouraged by Léopoldville’s report of Ileo’s comment that he thought solution could be found to permit UN return to Matadi.⁵ We also gratified to note from USUN telegrams that Cordier has indicated UN planning move more slowly than originally indicated in seeking regain Matadi.⁶ In our view it would be most unwise if UN took precipitate action in moving troops to Matadi, and we believe SYG should be urged to seek solution of this problem through negotiations with GOC rather than through attempted troop movement, prior to reaching agreement.⁷

2. We recognize that continued presence of Belgian military and political advisors in Congo complicates problem. To extent you consider it helpful, you authorized tell SYG that we have repeatedly indicated to GOB through diplomatic channels both in Brussels and in Washington that we consider it imperative Belgium comply with Feb 21 resolution. You may also assure him we will continue our efforts to encourage Belgians to comply and to carry out faithfully any agreement reached with Sahbani.⁸

3. In examining major ingredients of Congo problem, it apparent to us that one of greatest deficiencies is lack of strong UN executive authority in Congo. SYG is aware we are convinced mutual contacts and confidence between UN and GOC is prerequisite to successful discharge UN mission in Congo. Atmosphere in Léopoldville has clearly improved with arrival of Abbas; this is good first step. However it now imperative this be capitalized on quickly by designating new permanent rep in Congo. Further suggestions as to candidates we would like to see considered made separately.

Bowles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/3–2461. Secret. Drafted by Buffum; cleared by Williams, Wallner (in draft), and Deputy Executive Secretary William H. Brubeck; and approved by Bowles. Also sent to Léopoldville.
2. Presumably Managing Director of the United Nations Special Fund Paul G. Hoffman; no record of the conversation has been found.
3. This may refer to their March 20 telephone conversation (see footnote 1, Document 51) or to a subsequent but unrecorded conversation.
4. Telegram 2022 to Léopoldville, March 22, made this request. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/3–2261)
5. Reported in telegram 2071 from Léopoldville, March 22. (Ibid.)
6. Telegram 2595 from USUN, March 23, reported conversations with Executive Assistant to the Secretary-General Andrew W. Cordier. (Ibid., 770G.00/3–2361)
7. Telegram 2625 from USUN, March 25, reported that Yost had accompanied French and British representatives in an informal approach to Hammarskjöld urging the restoration of a joint U.N.-Congolese presence at Matadi and arguing that a U.N. ultimatum or drastic action would be counterproductive in achieving this. (Ibid., 770G.00/3–2561) An earlier telegram to USUN advising against a tripartite approach had not been received in time. (Telegram 1802 to USUN, March 23; ibid., 770G.00/3–2261)
8. Taieb Sahbani of Tunisia went to Belgium on March 20 as Hammarskjöld’s representative to develop arrangements for the implementation of the February 21 Security Council resolution.