411. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Congo.1
1095. We believe Tshombe letters to Adoula and to U Thant and governments of Belgium, US, UK, France2 can, if exploited properly, provide basis for decisive break-through on Katanga problem, bringing about early end of secession and prompt implementation Thant plan. We believe therefore it essential that both UN and Adoula interpret Tshombe letter as irrevocable acceptance by Tshombe of end of Katanga secession.
[Page 830]From UN point of view there can be no serious question re desirability interpreting Tshombe letter as acceptance and complete justification for beginning “technical discussions” referred to by Thant in December 31 statement. If Tshombe cooperates in these technical discussions UN will have achieved fulfillment of its mandate by peaceful means. By discussions we mean merely quick dialogue to make technical arrangements providing for entry of UN troops into Kolwezi and we do not mean that UN should engage in negotiations with Tshombe in which it would be expected to give any quid for this quo except an amnesty.
We note Tshombe makes two separable statements. He is ready, he says, (a) to give UN troops freedom of movement throughout Katanga and (b) to “return to Elizabethville” to arrange modalities for application of Thant Plan.
We suggest therefore that SYG despatch Noronha immediately to Kolwezi after reaffirmation of amnesty to make technical arrangements for exercise of freedom of movement by UN into Kolwezi within 48 hours.
SYG would also indicate as separate matter that UN prepared to assist GOC and Katanga in giving prompt effect to Thant Plan through discussions between GOC and provincial authorities wherever they decide to meet.
For Léopoldville:
In your talk with Adoula you should draw on the same rationale as above in describing the need for interpreting Tshombe’s message as capitulation. It seems to us that GOC interests best served in making arrangements for the immediate implementation of the balance of the U Thant Plan. We note that the only demand levied on the GOC is reiteration of amnesty which Kasavubu has already proclaimed. This should not be difficult to comply with.
Believe foregoing proposal can afford Adoula great opportunity and perhaps a few difficulties. Dept believes it would be useful for him to proceed immediately after UN entry in Kolwezi and accept Tshombe’s reintegration into Republic. Believe his entry into Elisabethville should be one appropriate for Prime Minister of Congo State, that he should be accorded all honors of such a personage and should be accompanied by symbolic detachment of Presidential Guard and ANC band.
If Adoula does not go to E’ville he could announce that Katangan officers will be received in Léopoldville soonest and guaranteed safe conduct for oathtaking. He could also designate a special representative in E’ville to engage in technical discussions with Katangans and UN representatives to work out remaining specific steps of integration. [Page 831] Once UN freedom of movement assured throughout Katanga, Tshombe’s ability to maintain secession will be eliminated and GOC should be able to call the tune in negotiations. Adoula should also realize that if freedom of movement can be obtained without bloodshed it will reduce potential insecurity that might be troublesome after UNOC troops withdrawn.
Letter from President to be delivered soonest follows:
“Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
I have just been shown copies of letters to you and to the Secretary General of the United Nations from Mr. Tshombe, in which he states his willingness to terminate his secession.
You stand at a critical moment in the history of your country. You have it within your hands to so manage Mr. Tshombe’s readiness to renounce secession, grant the United Nations freedom of movement throughout all Katanga and implement the U Thant Plan that you may restore your country to peace and tranquility without further loss of blood.
As the leader of your country, you have already indicated on more than one occasion your intention to act with understanding and magnanimity toward Mr. Tshombe and the Katangan people. I am confident that on the eve of the results that both you and we have been seeking that you will continue to exercise this kind of statesmanship which will win for you the respect not only of your own people but of the world.
Once you have ended the immediate problem of the political secession of Katanga, you can turn your efforts and those of your people to the peaceful tasks of reconstruction and development. In this both the United States and, I am sure, the United Nations, will continue to give you assistance within the limitations of our means and ability.
Sincerely, John F. Kennedy.”3
Re public affairs handling, we intend to delay public statement US reaction to Tshombe letters until Adoula and UN have first welcomed them.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/1–1463. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Cleveland and Sisco, cleared by Williams and Beaudry, and approved by McGhee. Also sent to USUN, Brussels, and Elisabethville and repeated to London.↩
- The messages were transmitted to the addressees by the Belgian Government. The letter to Adoula stated that Tshombe and his ministers had decided to end the Katangan secession, allow U.N. freedom of movement throughout Katanga, and return to Elisabethville to arrange “modalities” for the application of the Thant Plan. It asked Adoula to sign the amnesties envisaged by the Thant Plan and to meet Tshombe at Elisabethville to “confirm the national reconciliation and to put an end to the misery of the Congolese people.” (Telegram 1093 to Léopoldville, January 14; ibid.) For text of the message sent to Thant and the Belgian, U.S., U.K., and French Governments, see U.N. doc. S/5053/Add.15/Annex V; also printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, p. 650.↩
- Telegram 1812 from Léopoldville, January 15, reported that Gullion had delivered the letter. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/1–1563) For text of a January 15 letter from Adoula to Thant renewing the offer of amnesty for political offenses, see U.N. doc. S/5053/Add.15/Annex VII; also printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 650-651.↩