375. Memorandum for the Record1
SUBJECT
- Daily White House Staff Meeting, 20 December 1962
[Here follows discussion of other matters.]
4. There then ensued a discussion of the Congo prompted by Bromley Smith’s remark that he thought it was most unfortunate that some of the newspaper accounts were beginning to compare the Congo situation with the pre-crisis situation in Cuba. Arthur Schlesinger wondered [Page 769] aloud who was doing the “backgrounding” on this subject for the press people, and Kaysen straightforwardly answered: John F. Kennedy. To depart from chronological order a little, I will mention here that several of those around the table, and most especially Mr. Ralph Dungan, continued expressing their doubts and even opposition concerning any US military venture or presence into the Congo. So it was necessary on at least two more occasions for Kaysen to explain patiently that, while he himself tended to share those misgivings, the decision— risks, logical gaps, and everything else—was a highest-level decision which everyone should now support (see paragraph 3 of my staff meeting memorandum of yesterday, Wednesday, 19 December).2 Kaysen did say that the mission departing for the Congo tonight would not be permitted to go into the field, but would be required to remain in Léopoldville; the people in the field whom the mission wishes to see will therefore have to come to Léopoldville. Kaysen expressed once again, mostly for Dungan’s benefit, that the primary purpose of the mission was to execute a military assessment of the situation, with emphasis on the easiest and safest way to intrude a small US presence for political reasons, if necessary. The final note on the Congo was the announcement from Kaysen that the Soviets had approached U Thant up at the United Nations yesterday with an offer to help him out if UN forces in the Congo needed any materiel assistance; this has apparently shaken up U Thant rather badly and he is therefore asking us Americans to go slowly in the development of our projected plans and actions. I think it is fair to say that at the end of this discussion, all the Doubting Thomases, whatever their personal misgivings, understood that the President had chosen to overrule or at least temporarily overlook the same general kinds of misgivings as expressed by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 25, Chairman’s Staff Group. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Colonel Legere for General Taylor.↩
- It reads as follows: “The subject shifted swiftly to the Congo. Kaysen, with Clifton supporting him, stated that the bald fact of the matter is that the President’s mind is definitely made up on making some kind of a U.S. military move in the Congo for the purposes of political demonstration only; he has certainly, however, not made up his mind on the wisdom of actual involvement of U.S. forces. I am aware of the logical gaps which this leaves, but there it is.” (Ibid.)↩