371. Telegram From the Embassy in Belgium to the Department of State1
878. Pass Nassau for White House and Under Secretary Ball. Eyes only for the Secretary. Congo. Embassy telegrams 8752 and 876.3 Following is summary of working luncheon meeting of McGhee, Ambassador and DCM with Spaak and his senior advisers:
Spaak arrived late and somewhat shaken by two-hour grilling to which he had just been subjected by foreign affairs committee in which there had been great emotionalism and charges that United States was sabotaging peaceful Congo conciliation then by sending military mission to Congo and was preparing actively to support UN in hostilities against Katanga. Spaak said he defended our right to send military survey mission in committee debate and took position that survey mission was natural response to UN request for military equipment assistance and changed neither Belgian nor US policy to seek peaceful solution to Congo problem.
In addition to emotional outburst of foreign affairs committee Foreign Office has been swamped this morning by telephone calls protesting our military mission. While Spaak believes he has taken edge off parliamentary outburst against us, fact that he was unable to say we had discussed military mission with him before it was announced by press increased his difficulties in trying to keep Belgian reaction within manageable proportions. For example, before McGhee meeting with Spaak this morning very influential evening newspaper “Le Soir” sought Foreign Office comment on US military mission. Since neither Spaak nor Foreign Office had any news about this, they were unable to speak authoritatively. Result was streamer headlines in afternoon edition “Congo: Washington intervenes officially” followed by very unhelpful four column article saying that while up until now Americans, although supporting UN, had not intervened openly, they had now decided to [Page 758] engage in military action. Without criticizing us Spaak made clear his ability to guide Belgian public and parliamentary opinion in right direction depends on our letting him know what we are doing and why before news breaks in press.
As to McGhee presentation this morning (Embtel 875), Spaak gave us paper (next following message)4 which he said represented his present but still tentative thinking. He orally expanded on some points in paper as follows:
1. Before reaching any conclusions about desirability sending air squadron to Congo we must first make every effort to implement UMHK change of payments plan. Tshombe and UMHK must be induced to send representatives to Léopoldville immediately to meet with Monetary Council so that talks can open and some progress be made in next several days. Since our meeting this morning, Spaak received letter from UMHK, which infuriated him. Letter took position that because of developments including A) Gardiner letter to Tshombe asking for only UMHK representative and not GOK representative to come to Léopoldville for talks with Monetary Council; B) American Military Mission to Congo which indicated that force would be used despite Tshombe’s conciliatory attitude; and C) Thant’s action in asking for a boycott on Katanga minerals. Circumstances had radically changed and UMHK did not feel able to send representatives to Léopoldville. Spaak said Gardiner had committed error in sending message to Tshombe which spoke of sending only UMHK and not GOK representatives to Léopoldville for discussions with Monetary Council since this had given UMHK pretext to decline to send representatives to Léopoldville. However this beside point since UMHK letter to Spaak inadmissible. Spaak will therefore tell Robiliart this afternoon that UMHK only legitimate concern is foreign exchange and local currency needed to carry on its operations. Three points UMHK raised in letter are political and none fits business. Spaak will stress that in view of UMHK’s protestations for last year that it could not intervene in politics, he finds particularly distasteful this blatant injection of political issues into UMHK position. He plans to tell UMHK that if it refuses to send someone immediately to Léopoldville for talks with Monetary Council, it will bear full responsibility for failure of reconciliation plan and perhaps eventual hostilities in Congo with all that implies. He believes UMHK will send someone but not before tomorrow in view of time element.
Spaak said several days would still be required to know whether progress on payments plan would be possible or whether plan had failed. He did not believe any final decision could or should be taken [Page 759] about sending US air squadron until we knew whether payments plan was moving forward or was dead. He was not in principle opposed to sending of US air squadron as means of further pressure on Tshombe but felt decision and how it should be handled could only be made in light of what happened to payments plan.
If decision reached to make air squadron proposal, Spaak inclined to favor actual introduction of squadron after obtaining commitments from Adoula rather than waiting to approach Tshombe and inform him that if he or his government did not move ahead in light of Adoula’s commitments with implementation of U Thant plan, air squadron would then be brought to Katanga. Actual presence of air squadron as fait accompli when approach made to Tshombe would act as pressure on him to play ball. On other hand, if Adoula failed to carry out his commitments, he should realize squadron would be withdrawn. To avoid very serious adverse Belgian reaction, it would be much better if squadron sent as technical assistance aspect of Greene plan under UN auspices and US operational control to assure against its use for aggressive purposes, rather than as unit contributed to UN.
Spaak said that no matter what tactics we and Belgians agree on, they can be sabotaged or made unworkable unless both Adoula and UN cooperate. Adoula must do some of things suggested in paper McGhee gave him this morning5 (see Embtel 875) and Thant cannot upset applecart by taking steps against Katanga such as boycott and embargo at precise moment when Tshombe induced to cooperate by our efforts. He believes that if we send air squadron to Congo, it be only on basis of A) previous definite commitment by Adoula and that we withdraw squadron if he reneges, and B) on firm understanding with UN that they will not take further steps without full consultation with us and that if they do otherwise or we not agree with their proposals we will withdraw squadron and withhold support. Only by so doing does Spaak believe we can get essential cooperation from Adoula and UN in carrying out conciliation plan. Spaak’s apprehensions stem from fact that unfortunately there are in both Adoula government and in UN those that only want to see Tshombe delivered bound and tied to Adoula and do not seek peaceful conciliation.
In any event Spaak feels strongly that US and Belgium should continue work together in closest cooperation and must consult further and in light of success or failure of payments plan before final decision reached on sending air squadron. He assumed there was agreement on this. He would also wish to give further considered thought to entire [Page 760] problem in light of new proposals which had been sprung on him this morning and would meet again with Ambassador tomorrow morning at 10 to bring him up to date on his further efforts with UMHK and at that time give him any additional thoughts he might feel as result of his further reflections.
Spaak concluded that in light of very adverse Belgian reaction to our military mission, any leak re possibility of sending air squadron would create difficult if not impossible public and Parliamentary relations problem for him and GOB to handle.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12–1962. Top Secret; Niact. Received at 2:54 p.m.↩
- Telegram 875, December 19, reported that McGhee had met that morning with Spaak, who had “displayed great equanimity” to McGhee’s presentation of the steps approved by the President on December 17. With respect to the proposed U.S. air squadron, he thought tentatively that a delay of a few days would be advisable to permit time for the UMHK payments plan to go into effect. (Ibid., 332.70G/12–1962)↩
- Sent to Elisabethville as telegram 193, December 19, it stated that Spaak felt it of utmost urgency that Tshombe send representatives to Léopoldville at once to meet with the Monetary Council concerning the payments plan. It passed on Spaak’s suggestion that Mathu offer to fly Katangan representatives to Léopoldville at once in a U.N. plane in order to force Tshombe to take action. (Ibid., 770G.00/12/1962) Eliud W. Mathu was the U.N. representative in Katanga.↩
- Dated December 19. (Ibid.)↩
- McGhee gave Spaak papers listing the points on which commitments should be sought from Adoula and Tshombe. Copies are attached to a memorandum of the conversation drafted by McKillop. (Ibid., 611.55/12–1962)↩