Office of the Historian

333. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Belgium1

Washington, November 20, 1962, 8:21 p.m.

773. Eyes only Ambassadors. Talking points for approach to Adoula and U Thant.2

1.
The UN, USG, and GOB have agreed that the next step in giving effect to the U Thant Plan should be to reestablish control by the GOC of the receipt and distribution of foreign exchange and tax revenues from all the Congo and thus deprive Katanga of the means of maintaining secession. This should be effective in making it impossible for Tshombe to secure arms and mercenaries for use against the GOC.
2.
This approach should not be considered as in any way altering the Plan nor reducing the urgency of carrying out the Plan in its entirety.
3.
The UN, USG and GOB have taken account of the arrangements made by the GOC in re-acquiring control of the distribution of the revenues and foreign exchange receipts of South Kasai and have taken note of the agreements reached between the GOC and the diamond companies in this connection.
4.
Accordingly the GOB is prepared to recommend to (or preferably urge) the UMHK in the Katanga that they deposit in the Monetary Council the total of foreign exchange proceeds and to pay to the Central Government all customs duties, export-import taxes and royalties. The GOC would, for its part, undertake to transfer back to UMHK and other companies sufficient foreign exchange to satisfy its essential needs as determined by the IMF and would also return a just share of foreign exchange, tax and royalty proceeds to Katanga in accordance with IMF recommendations. Subject to findings of IMF, the amount of foreign exchange that will accrue to the Central Government from Katanga may be in the neighborhood of $3 million monthly.
5.
The GOC would at the same time accelerate the process of reintegration under the Plan by:
a)
Immediate promulgation of an amnesty applying to prosecution of political crimes and actions in connection with Katanga secession;
b)
Convening a conference of provincial presidents to consider amendments to the draft constitution, which could be given effect by action in the Parliament.
6.
Adoula would also carry out certain additional steps which he has already indicated willingness to do:
a)
Renewing an offer to the GOK for the inclusion of Katanga ministers in the GOC;
b)
Early arrangements for the restoration of communications and travel between the Katanga and all parts of the Congo.
7.
The UN, USG and GOB will at the same time urge Tshombe to proceed to carry out all of his obligations under the Plan in the military, monetary and foreign affairs fields and to cooperate with the UN. Priority will be given the following:
a)
Approval of the payment of foreign exchange proceeds to the Monetary Council and customs duties and royalties to the GOC as specified above;
b)
Since Adoula has already given assurances of safe conduct to gendarmerie officers who desire to go to Léopoldville to take the oath, Tshombe should send them;
c)
The GOC customs and immigration officials now in Elisabethville should be permitted to function immediately and should be assisted in this task.
8.
Both sides will forthwith:
a)
Faithfully carry out the SYG’s appeal for a standstill;
b)
Cooperate in putting into the field Tripartite Observation Teams to observe the standstill and accord such teams full freedom of movement;
c)
Afford the Military Commission full cooperation in its task of accomplishing as a matter of urgency full integration of military forces.
Rusk
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/11–2062. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London and USUN.↩
  2. Telegram 772 to Brussels, November 20, instructed MacArthur to discuss with Spaak the advisability of presenting the new initiative to Thant and Adoula in the broader framework given in telegram 773. According to telegram 772, the Department of State thought that Gardiner should make the initial approach to Adoula and that if Adoula agreed in principle, Belgian, Union Miniere, and U.S. representatives should go to the Congo to discuss modalities. The Department thought it was essential to relate the initiative to the U.N. plan in order to maximize U.N. support, facilitate Adoula’s acceptance, and avoid giving Tshombe the impression that the initiative was intended to replace the U.N. plan. (Ibid., 770G.00/11–1962)↩