Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

316. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State¹

Léopoldville, October 18, 1962, 5 p.m.

955. For Secretary and Under Secretary from McGhee. Pass to White House. For Ambassador from McGhee. For Stevenson from McGhee. At meeting this morning with Adoula, Bomboko and Minister of Agriculture Tshiala Muana, who is newcomer and extremist element in political Cabinet, Ambassador Gullion, Fredericks and I were treated to repeat, although slightly more moderate, performance of that reported by Ambassador yesterday in Embtel 950.² Efforts yesterday of Ambassador, Gardiner and through my letter to Adoula (Embtel 944)³ did not dissuade Adoula from making radio speech last night reported Embtel 946.⁴ These efforts may, however, have helped blunt its content and prevent an open break with UN or plan.

In meeting Prime Minister reviewed complaints against UN for non-delivery of messages, pressures on GOK–GOC negotiator Ngalula, and intervention of Consuls. Ceasefire and foreign exchange documents initialed were not in accordance with GOC instructions and deviated from plan. He claimed to have received no report on negotiations and no indication of why his amendments had been rejected if indeed they had been delivered. In particular last minute minor changes suggested by Prime Minister in standstill (Embtel 916)⁵ were not reflected final draft.

At this meeting, strangely, no reference was made to restriction agreement to North Katanga, but emphasis was placed on fact it contained no provision for effective time and date. In commenting on provisional foreign exchange agreement initialed, Bomboko admitted that Katanga might of necessity have to be given more than 50 percent of foreign exchange earnings so as to preserve industry in Katanga. However amount was not principal point at issue but rather assurance that receipts would accrue initially to Central Government.

I attempted in my discussion separate the various issues which were troubling the Central Government. They were, of course, entitled to prompt and efficient communications with their representative in Elisabethville and every effort must be made to assure this in future. We did not consider that any breakdown in communications could be attributed to bad faith on part of UN officials, but to stress [apparent omission] imposed by recent events and limitations in communications frailties.

If GOC had not in fact agreed to documents but considered them as being initialed only ad referendum, they were free to seek any changes they wished in future negotiations. We hoped that they would in these negotiations concentrate on essential elements and be prepared to give and take in spirit of conciliation. Plan was not self-activating and negotiations were required in order give them practical effect. Only an agreement freely accepted by both sides would be a lasting one.

First task was to get standstill agreement signed. It was not in itself essential element but should be put into effect without delay so tripartite observation teams for which GOC has already sent personnel to Elisabethville could proceed to areas of reported fighting and assure cessation. Foreign exchange document initialed was merely preliminary step in work of Revenue and Foreign Exchange Commissions, which as Foreign Minister had indicated may result in adjustments in division. Agreement on number of points satisfactory to both sides had already been achieved.

I asked Prime Minister if I could assume negotiations would continue, on basis of whatever new instructions he chooses to give, and that I could report to President he still supporting plan and was prepared to make every effort to carry it out through negotiation and agreement.⁶

Prime Minister showed us his instructions to Ngalula which asked him to return (time unspecified) for consultation and said negotiator would be appointed to continue in his absence and discussions would continue. It was a question not of rupture but of a suspension. Prime Minister told us that while members of Financial and Monetary Commissions returned for consultation, Military Commission would remain. Moreover, he had sent yesterday to Katanga a number of officers to Staff Observer Missions as well as some potential Immigration officials. Adoula insisted that consideration be given to suggestions he had made.

He stated, moreover, that GOC must be put in strong position if negotiations are to be successful and that ANC must be strengthened. In this connection he would make new request to USG. I mentioned study conducted by Greene Mission which was already under consideration by our government.⁷

I urged effort be made in any future public statements by GOC to correct misimpression which might be given to the many countries which are supporting him and plan, that his declarations might constitute disavowal or lack intent carry out plan. In order inject more positive public note, I suggested to Prime Minister desirability brief communique covering our visit which would enable me give precise interpretation of his attitude in event I was queried by press. Communique finally agreed which he indicated he would probably read at his press conference scheduled 3 p.m. (Embtel 952)⁸

In this communique he expresses full support GOC for plan, states “the bridges are not cut”. Despite the difficulties which have been encountered in the Commission meetings in Elisabethville, the personnel of the delegation for the Central Government remain in Elisabethville (sur place).

Telegram has been sent Elisabethville requesting Dean convey orally message to Tshombe urging moderation his response to above actions.⁹

Gullion

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/10–1862. Confidential; Niact. Repeated to USUN and Brussels.
2. The reference should be to telegram 940, October 17, which reported that a dispute over U.N. initiatives to obtain a cease-fire agreement had “set aboil Congolese dissatisfaction” and that Adoula was “beset by rabid counsels in Cabinet (which Ambassador unintentionally witnessed)” for an immediate declaration repudiating the agreement, attacking the United Nations, or inviting its departure. (Ibid., 770G.00/10–1762) Telegram 950, October 18, concerned P.L. 480 assistance to the Congo. (Ibid., 411.70G41/10–1862)
3. Telegram 944, October 18, transmitted the text of a letter of that date from McGhee to Adoula. The letter urged patience and warned that if there were “premature, ill-considered reactions or declarations by either side, the momentum which has been so painfully created would be lost and a good prospect for integration would vanish.” (Ibid., 110.12–McG/10–1862)
4. Telegram 946, October 18, transmitted an informal translation of the speech, in which Adoula declared that the Congolese Government could not accept the cease-fire agreement signed on October 16 in Elisabethville. (Ibid., 770G.00/10–1862)
5. Document 314.
6. McGhee and Fredericks left Léopoldville on October 18. McGhee recommended in telegram 935 from Léopoldville, October 17, that he return to Washington, stating that his mandate had “rather run out” and his continued presence was “somewhat ambiguous.” He continued: “Having made impact at particular juncture which has helped set in motion various actions of indeterminate outcome, it would seem preferable await emergence of new set of issues before entering fray again which could be done most effectively directly out of Washington under fresh instructions from Sec. and Pres.” (Department of State, Central Files, 110.12–McG/10–1762) Rusk approved his return in telegram 616 to Léopoldville, October 17. (Ibid.)
7. Gullion reported in telegram 966 from Léopoldville, October 19, that at the close of the meeting, after the other Congolese participants had left, Adoula assured McGhee that he would “never” turn to the Soviet bloc for aid, but that “if U.S. let GOC drop, successors would apply to USSR.” (Ibid., 770G.00/10–1962)
8. Telegram 952, October 18, transmitted the text of the communique. (Ibid., 770G.00/10–1862) Telegram 961 from Léopoldville, October 18, reported on the press conference, at which Adoula said the Congolese Government had endeavored to carry out the U.N. plan and called for its “strict application” without delay. (Ibid.)
9. The message was transmitted in telegram 442 to Elisabethville, repeated to the Department as telegram 949, October 18. (Ibid., 770G.00/10–1862) Dean reported in telegram 660, October 18, that he had delivered the message, as well as McGhee’s October 16 letter (see Document 315 and footnote 3 thereto) to Kimba, since Tshombe was out of town. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/10–1862)