310. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State1
845. Pass to White House. For Secretary and Under Secretary from McGhee. For Ambassador from McGhee. For Stevenson from McGhee. For Dean from McGhee. Following is preliminary evaluation promised in Elisabethville’s 4572 of what Tshombe’s agreement to take certain actions pursuant to the reconciliation plan really means. In past it has been consensus that Tshombe could not be relied upon—that he has usually either defaulted on his undertaking or slid out through some trick of interpretation. Often he has used as an excuse some extraneous, irrelevant factor such as a presumed threat or warlike move. On other hand he claims he is a “man of honor” and his principal complaint against outside world involves what he contends are false accusations against his honesty and good faith. Indeed, he seems to wish to regularize himself with the outside, especially with President Kennedy and USG.
The relationship between his promise and fulfillment is therefore probably not so much question of intent or good faith as whether he has the courage to fulfill undertakings in light of countervailing pressures upon him. His position in Katanga is to considerable extent result of his skill as a consummate politician in promising all things to all people. Almost any decision he takes in fulfillment of plan runs counter to strong forces on whom he must rely.
To understand these forces one must visualize his prosperous non-racial kingdom, the real workings of which are controlled by 15,000 or so Belgians who were once his colonial masters and who as a result of his successful secession are enjoying an unparalleled prosperity. Leaders of this group, the directors of some 30–50 companies most of which are associated with Societe Generale, represent powerful European economic interests with ability to exercise strong influence on Belgian and other European governments concerned. As individuals this group is interested only in making a killing while they can. If the end comes they will depart for Europe. They appear to attach little significance to any long-range prospects in Katanga. Moreover, as they see it, they stand only to lose from Katanga’s association with the Congo—by diversion of revenue and foreign exchange earnings, restriction in their ability remit foreign [Page 618] exchange, higher taxes, loss of freedom and erosion of government administrative efficiency.
Tshombe also is subject to pressures of his own people who have undergone a national transformation as result their conflict with outside world. To them he is a personal hero who is responsible for their economic and social gains under independence. They do not wish to be submerged in Congo with whom they share traditional rivalries and suspicions. He is also leader of group of young Katangan officers and administrators who represent an elite who need him and on whom he depends to carry out their relatively efficient administration of Katanga.
Although Tshombe’s dependence on these different elements limits his independence of action, he at the same time supplies the balance to these forces and is perhaps their one most indispensable element—the one who can hold it all together. There can be no question of his popular support, both among Katangans and Belgians. As I saw him cheered along the road, they were equally wholehearted. He has sufficient power for considerable independence of action if he has the courage to exercise it.
I believe he wants or will accept union with the Congo along the extremely loose federal lines he has always advocated. Perhaps this is in part to satisfy his own ambitions, in part because he sees it as being inevitable in the face of geography and the powerful forces in its favor. Each step he takes toward integration along lines of the plan, however, involves immediate or potential sacrifices for some element in the Katangan complex who will oppose it sharply.
His promise to take certain actions concerning which he has been dilatory stems at the moment largely I believe from a desire to make a good impression on President Kennedy and USG. Whether this is end in itself or only to conceal his delaying tactics, it is not possible to say. Perhaps he sees it essentially as a way to buy time. Perhaps it is not a strong compulsion. He has not asked us for anything specific in return. In any event it is quite clear that he will not take the hard decisions he has promised unless the alternatives are even more distasteful.
We must therefore, having provided the incentive and set the standards for his judgment, hold him to his undertakings at every turn, pointing out that the consequence is loss of faith in him personally and in the plan in which his compliance is a necessary part. Otherwise, he will find some circuitous line of reasoning for not doing what he has agreed to do. We will have an opportunity within the next few days to make some judgment as to whether or not we can count on his performance. I will send him a few messages to spur him on.
Our current tack does not involve a close balancing of the rights and wrongs as between Tshombe and Adoula. This is as impossible as it is [Page 619] perhaps irrelevant. We support the GOC because our purpose is to integrate the Congo. We expect Adoula to cooperate in making tolerable adjustments which may be required to enable Tshombe to cooperate, assuming he wants to. If Tshombe proves himself unwilling or unable because of his situation or personal characteristics to carry out the plan, we must face the reality that our present tactic has failed and move on to stronger measures—such as a fait accompli on the revenue payment plan—which will strike more directly at his vital interests.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/10–862. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Brussels, USUN, and Elisabethville.↩
- Telegram 556 from Elisabethville (Document 308) was repeated to Léopoldville as telegram 457.↩