Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

278. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, April 19, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Kashmir; Military Aid to India; Burma

In your memorandum of April 8 to Mr. Talbot¹ you asked four questions. The questions and our replies follow:

1. What progress are we making with the British in reconciling our position as set forth in our fifth round of talks with India and Pakistan?a

We and the British have agreed on approaches to be made to the Indians and Pakistanis prior to the fifth round of talks on Kashmir.

We have not reached agreement with the British on steps to be taken after the fifth round, whether there is marked progress toward a Kashmir settlement or whether there is not.

a. No decision has been made on U.S./U.K.-Commonwealth air defense assistance. The British position, as presented most recently by Duncan Sandys to Secretary McNamara, is to question seriously whether U.S./U.K. air squadrons should be sent to India to assist in defense against Chinese Communist attackers. Sandys views this with extreme caution, particularly since it would involve the possibility of actual engagement between Western interceptors and Chinese Communist bombers with far reaching consequences. He is worried about increasing the vulnerability of the British position in Hong Kong. We understand that a contrary view is being expressed within the British Government, notably by Lord Mountbatten with Foreign Office encouragement. If we are to be in a position to make a quick offer to India on commitment of air squadrons along the lines of our Air Defense Team’s recommendations, you may need to discuss the question directly with Macmillan. First, however, the United States Government’s position must be made firm.

b. On defense production, neither the British nor we have yet reached decisions on the recommendations of our respective survey teams nor on the much more elaborate Indian requests. The Bhoothalingam team² currently in Washington will press Indian requests, and Minister T.T. Krishnamachari will come early in May hoping for clearer indications of what the United States will do. We should by then have concerted our position with the British to the extent possible. Quite apart from insistence that any further aid to India be conditioned upon a Kashmir settlement, the British take a somewhat narrower point of view of defense production than we do. Their team addressed itself only to the question of assistance to the Indian munitions industry.

c. Neither the British nor we have yet made material progress on possible longer range military assistance to India, in part because of imprecision that verges on unreality in Indian military planning. The British have so far maintained a generally limited and resistant posture. However, both the British and ourselves have agreed to produce certain data leading to agreed positions by the beginning of May on basic elements of Indian defense planning, such as strategic concepts, acceptable force goals, and valid defense production needs. Even in the so-called “immediate” phase agreed to at Nassau, the British are encountering difficulties that may postpone some deliveries until 1965. They have done little yet to increase the efficiency of the Indian Air Force (one of the tasks allotted to them in the Nassau Agreement).

2. If these talks fail, what will our strategy and tactics be?

a. We believe that neither Pakistan nor India is ready to accept the onus for causing a breakdown of the Kashmir talks during the fifth round. Should the talks nevertheless fail, our tactics would depend upon our appraisal of the cause and responsibilities for the failure. Strategically, we would still need to be in a position to give India some assistance against Chinese Communist pressure, tailoring this as best we possibly can to maintain our security interests in Pakistan.

b. If there is no major progress on Kashmir at the fifth round, we anticipate that the British will be strongly resistant to further military assistance to India this summer. Even if there should be substantial progress, there are as yet few if any indications that the British would be prepared to move further with the U.S. on the Nassau 50-50 formula or anything approaching that. Reinforcing the desire of some elements of the British Government to be more forthcoming, however, are pressures related to the need to provide production contracts for distressed areas and the desire to avert U.S. pre-emption of traditional British relations with India.

3. Do the proposals of Walt Rostow have relevance?³

a. On the assumption that progress can be made in the fifth round to bring the positions of the two parties closer together, we see a developing need to enlarge the perspective in which further talks can take place. Our object is to assist both parties to create a climate in the two countries in which a Kashmir settlement can be sold.

b. Walt Rostow’s talks on the subcontinent have laid the groundwork for developing this wider perspective.

c. We plan to find ways to continue the process of educating both the Indians and the Pakistanis about the strategic problems of the subcontinent, perhaps helping both countries to define military, political, and economic policies to serve their strategic requirements.

[Here follow a question and response concerning Burma.]

DR

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Kashmir, 4/63. Secret.
1. A copy of this memorandum is ibid.
2. Shri Bhoothalingam, Secretary of the Indian Ministry of Economic and Defense Coordination, led a team of Indian defense experts that visited Washington April 17-26 to consult with officials of the Departments of State and Defense and the National Security Council. Documentation on this visit is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, General, 4/24/63-4/27/63, and Department of State, Central File POL 7 INDIA.
3. See Document 272.