Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

277. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State⁰

Karachi, April 16, 1963, 6 p.m.

2007. In course of call by me on Foreign Minister Bhutto Karachi April 15, he raised Afghan question. He said he now had opportunity to study problem more fully and discuss it with President Ayub.

Ayub had given him green light to move ahead with normalization Afghan relations whenever concrete, tangible, affirmative gesture received from Afghans. Paks are ready to be forthcoming in doing their part to mend the rift, but Bhutto stressed GOP needs substantive sign of change in Afghan attitude not merely assessment that new government and its radio output will some time in future be more moderate.

Specifically Bhutto is prepared to go Tehran to meet with Afghans immediately after May 15 if stage is set for reconciliation by then. Pak-Indo talks, CENTO meeting Karachi and subsequent trip to Nepal with Ayub (May 9 to about May 14) will not permit earlier travel. Additionally, Bhutto in reply observations and queries by me indicated:

1. For present GOP prepared continue restraint and moderation Radio Pak broadcasts to Afghans, recognizing abatement of Afghan propaganda tone changed gradually. In this connection I mentioned recent reports from our Embassy Kabul on steps to moderate Afghan Radio.

2. GOP reconciled to continuation for some time of nominal Pushtunistan position of GOA as long as it played in low key and does not seek inflame tribal elements. Bhutto viewed GOA Pushtunistan campaign as defense mechanism and felt Afghan tribal policy not as enlightened as that of Pakistan. He believes theoretical GOA talk about Pushtunistan does not offer any real threat to GOP national interests, since all countries recognize and accept territorial integrity of Pakistan as now constituted, and no country takes Pushtunistan agitation seriously. GOP can therefore afford to be long suffering with Afghans, in his view. He favors intensification of GOP efforts to integrate tribal areas into normal flow of Pak life. Pushtunistan campaign would create difficulties only if Afghans used it in effort to incite Pak tribal groups.

3. Bhutto also thought GOP could seriously consider in right atmosphere some form of Afghan representation in Peshawar and Quetta. He indicated awareness of “New York formula” in this context.¹

Additionally, Bhutto expressed some uneasiness over the forthcoming state visit of President of India and entourage to Afghanistan. He seemed convinced that Indians intent on perpetuating rift between Pakistan and Afghanistan and would show their cleverness in stirring up Afghan distrust of Pakistan. When I took issue with this estimate, he argued that India saw merit in dividing her neighbors in South Asia and particularly in preserving an example of Pak inability to get along with a neighboring Muslim country. He thought Education Minister and others who would accompany President were carefully selected for their presumed ability to influence the Afghans.

McConaughy

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL AFG-PAK. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Kabul, Tehran, and New Delhi.
1. In telegram 1579 to Karachi, April 17, also sent to Kabul and Tehran, the Department indicated that Bhutto’s comments to McConaughy “provide guidelines over the next month or so for all concerned in seeking solution of Pak-Afghan transit impasse.” (Ibid.)