Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

114. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, April 12, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Kashmir

PARTICIPANTS

• H.E. Aziz Ahmed, Ambassador, Embassy of Pakistan
• Sir Zafrulla Khan, Pakistan Permanent Representative to the United Nations
• Mr. Salman Ali, Political Counselor, Embassy of Pakistan
• The Secretary
• IO—Mr. Harlan Cleveland
• NEA—Mr. Phillips Talbot
• SOA—Mr. John N. Gatch, Jr.

Sir Zafrulla opened the conversation by saying that he had wanted to talk with the Secretary to explain Pakistan’s motives for bringing the Kashmir issue before the Security Council. He said that he had had a long talk the previous day with Ambassador Stevenson on the subject of Kashmir and had gone into it at more detail than usual since Ambassador Plimpton was his usual point of contact on Kashmir. The Secretary said he had seen a brief report of the talk but welcomed Sir Zafrulla’s willingness to come to Washington and give a full exposition of Pakistan’s position.

Sir Zafrulla said that Pakistan was not wedded to Security Council consideration, but it seemed that this offered the only way at present to get attention focused on the Kashmir issue. Nehru’s recent statements that the only thing that India could consider was an adjustment from the present situation, and, in fact, Nehru’s whole performance in the face of Ayub’s efforts since 1960 to negotiate on Kashmir had convinced Pakistan that India would not enter into meaningful discussions unless maximum pressure were brought to bear. The people of Kashmir itself were being denied the right of self-determination, and the President of Azad Kashmir, Mr. Khurshid, was full of plans to take unilateral action. Khurshid had pressed Minister for External Affairs Qadir to extend Pakistan’s recognition to Azad Kashmir, but Qadir had turned the request down. Qadir had said that the new Pakistan Government which would be formed in June would have a new Minister for External Affairs since he was stepping down. The new Minister might reconsider Khurshid’s request. Khurshid had also raised the possibility of seeking recognition from Communist China. Sir Zafrulla questioned the wisdom of all of these plans, but said they were evidence that the situation could develop into something that was more than local if the issue were not settled. For example, if Pakistan became militarily engaged in Kashmir, Afghanistan might be tempted to make a grab at the Northwest Frontier.

Sir Zafrulla then recounted and elaborated on a suggestion he had made to Ambassador Stevenson regarding possible practical Security Council action. India continued to claim that it could not comply with the UNCIP resolutions because Pakistan had not taken the first step by withdrawing its forces from Azad Kashmir. Sir Zafrulla wanted to revive a suggestion made by Swedish Ambassador Jarring in 1957 calling for a commission or an individual to be appointed by the Secretary General to draw up a list of defaults by both sides in non-compliance with the UNCIP resolutions and the several Graham reports. For example, the UNCIP resolutions did not call for unilateral Pakistan withdrawal from Azad Kashmir first without corresponding Indian action as Krishna Menon always claimed. Pakistan would welcome an impartial investigation of the whole issue. Sir Zafrulla had told Ambassador Stevenson that India would not agree to an individual from the West but might agree to a neutral. Sir Zafrulla had made no suggestions to Ambassador Stevenson but now would like personally to say that he would prefer to have the Secretary General himself undertake the task, but would welcome a man of integrity from any nation. He suggested that someone from the new unaligned nations of Africa might be appropriate. He specifically named Mr. Amachree of Nigeria who has virtue in Indian eyes of being a non-Muslim from a country which probably is more friendly to India than Pakistan. Ambassador Stevenson had asked what the United Kingdom’s reaction would be. Sir Zafrulla said that he was going to see both Sir Patrick Dean and the Secretary General in the next several days to discuss the proposal.

The Secretary asked whether Pakistan was raising the issue at this time purely on its own merits or whether internal pressures in Pakistan made it necessary. Sir Zafrulla said that he did not sense any more specific pressure than usual but knew that there was a strong official and popular feeling in Pakistan that somehow progress had to be made towards a settlement.

The Secretary then asked how Sir Zafrulla saw the U.S. role. He added that since the United States was trying to play an active part in both capitals in an effort to bring about a solution, Security Council action put us in an uncomfortable position. Sir Zafrulla recounted Pakistan’s efforts since last summer to get action on Kashmir, and said that the Indian seizure of Goa had made it even more urgent a necessity. Pakistan wondered whether the United States was being active enough. For example, had anything been done since India turned down the U.S. proposal regarding Eugene Black? The Secretary said we were continuing to examine the matter to see what we could do. He wondered whether negotiations could be carried on bilaterally. Sir Zafrulla said that Pakistan considered that a third party was necessary. In response to a question from Mr. Cleveland, Sir Zafrulla said that India did not want a third party in any possible negotiations. The Secretary asked whether a third party from a member of the Commonwealth would be acceptable to India and Pakistan. Sir Zafrulla said this proposal would be agreeable to Pakistan but probably not to India. He added that Pakistan would even accept Nkrumah.

Sir Zafrulla then said that if Pakistan’s proposal did not work, Pakistan was faced with two alternatives: (1) to reconcile its people to Nehru’s position; or (2) to go along with whatever course Khurshid would take as President of Azad Kashmir. Pakistan did not want the second alternative, and the first alternative in effect provided for a partition without giving the Kashmiris any voice in their own destiny and constituted basically a military settlement of a political problem.

Mr. Talbot asked whether Pakistan’s proposed action might not appear vindictive. Sir Zafrulla disclaimed any desire of this nature, and said that Pakistan simply wanted to establish a reasonable procedure to determine the defaults on both sides and get on towards the implementation of the UNCIP resolutions.

The Secretary asked whether it was unfair to say that preliminary negotiation between Pakistan and India was necessary to insure a successful outcome in the Security Council and went on to ask what Pakistan’s reaction would be if there were no favorable result from the debate. Sir Zafrulla did not respond to the Secretary’s first query, and said that a real failure would increase Pakistan’s frustration to a great extent.

Sir Zafrulla then said that it appeared as if April 27 was the first available date. He added that he assumed Krishna Menon would lead India’s delegation. The Secretary said that we should all try to reach agreement before April 27 which would make the debate unnecessary. He asked Sir Zafrulla whether his government would postpone the debate if the Indians agreed to negotiations. Sir Zafrulla said he could not commit Pakistan, but thought a postponement could be arranged if the Indians appeared ready to enter constructive negotiations.

The Secretary asked how long it had been since there had been a thorough review of Indo-Pakistan relations by top level people. Sir Zafrulla said there had been none since the September 1960 meeting of Ayub and Nehru.

Ambassador Aziz Ahmed then said that the internal pressures in Pakistan were greater than Sir Zafrulla had indicated. He sketched the history of the Ayub-Kennedy meetings in July 1961 from which Pakistan had gained hope of real progress on Kashmir.¹ If there were further delays, the people of Pakistan would begin to wonder whether U.S. assurances meant anything.

The Secretary reiterated the difficulties of the U.S. position. Aziz Ahmed said he appreciated these difficulties but his government could not explain this position satisfactorily to the people of Pakistan in view of the popular understanding of the U.S. commitment. Sir Zafrulla said that US. approval of Pakistan’s proposal would not mean that the United States was clearly taking the side of Pakistan against India. The Secretary said that we would have to think urgently about whether that would or would not be the case.

Mr. Cleveland said that the Security Council should look forward to solutions rather than attempt to assess blame. Sir Zafrulla said that Pakistan did not want to assess blame but to find out what needed to be done.

Mr. Talbot wondered whether any useful purpose would be served by basing inquiry on outdated resolutions. Sir Zafrulla said that any other course would simply prove to the Indians that their foot-dragging policy was succeeding. He recalled various attempts in the past, notably by Sir Owen Dixon and Mohammed Ali Bogra, to get Nehru to take a new look. Each time Nehru had gone back on his word.

Mr. Talbot asked whether there was any special reason for bringing the matter up now. Sir Zafrulla said that Ayub had really not had time during the first two years of his regime, and last year had hoped that his efforts with President Kennedy would achieve progress. Mr. Talbot asked whether Zafrulla had canvassed the Security Council. Sir Zafrulla said that his canvassing really was circular because the other countries always asked what the US. position was going to be. His personal guess was that the United Kingdom, France, China and Ireland would vote for Pakistan. He was not sure about Ghana and the UAR. He said that really he believed if a reasonable proposal got the necessary majority and was then vetoed by the USSR, Pakistan could go to the UNGA with a resolution that might pass.

The Secretary asked whether there was anything to be done quietly before April 27. Sir Zafrulla said that the Indian offer as relayed by Dayal to Ayub was not sincere since it did not call for adequate preparation. Mr. Talbot said our understanding of the offer seemed different.

The Secretary asked whether there would be any merit in Pakistan’s holding secret, discursive, agenda-less talks with India much as we were with the Soviets on Berlin. Sir Zafrulla said that this would only allow India to procrastinate further. The Secretary then said that he would have to get into the matter promptly and Sir Zafrulla thanked him and said that he hoped the United States would give support to Pakistan’s proposal.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/4-1262. Secret. Drafted by Gatch and approved in S on April 18.
1. See Document 30.