Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

113. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State⁰

Kabul, March 28, 1962, 7 p.m.

565. I was called by Foreign Minister Naim this morning at 11:30. In hour and quarter interview considerable serious ground covered. Will confine this message to subject of restitution normal relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan and more immediate aspects of transit crisis.

Naim said Prime Minister and Cabinet had given full consideration to my presentation and recommendations (Embtels 554¹ and 559² to Department). At outset he said he could not emphasize too strongly how much RGA appreciated US efforts bring about reconciliation. Our good offices activities vital and he trusted we would not abandon them. He reiterated this point at least three times during conversation.

As base for his response to me he said that all must understand that should Pakistan and Afghanistan fail in mending relations both would be ultimate losers. RGA fully recognized this; Pakistan must also understand. This view unassailable whether considered from historic, economic, ethnic or cultural viewpoint.

He then launched into careful and detailed reply which he said was final. Minimum upon which RGA willing re-establish relations with Pakistan and of course raise all restriction with respect to matters of transit was re-establishment of Consular and trade agency offices on basis status quo ante. He said firmly that there was no point in attempting begin on basis of trade commission in Karachi with possibilities of gradual expansion. A return of these offices was symbolic restitution their transit rights. These rights must be immune from political considerations. Further the restitution was only proper in view of fact that Pakistan had taken initiative in dosing these agencies and Consulates without due recourse to unilaterally recognized diplomatic usage. He said it was interesting to note that when Pakistan committed this discourteous and undiplomatic act it did not even inform the United States before doing it. If Pakistan were willing to restore these offices, Afghanistan willing reciprocate by allowing establishment similar Pakistani offices in Afghanistan. If such gesture forthcoming RGA would be willing act immediately to restore transit, allowing details in connection with re-establishment of relations to follow in train. (In subsequent telephone conversation with Hannah, Etemadi elaborated sequence of steps implicit in above sentences as follows: (1) Decision by GOP to restore offices existing before last August; (2) RGA immediate action to resume transit; (3) arrangement of details regarding restoration trade and Consular offices within reasonable time; (4) after actual restoration these offices resumption diplomatic relations.) He pointed out that trade commission in Karachi was no new idea as this had been suggested before even during Merchant visit. It would not accomplish what was required and was therefore unsatisfactory and unpromising.

With respect to entire Pushtunistan issue which was discussed at considerable length he insisted this question must be treated as subject by itself, and item for continuing negotiation with the Pakistanis (and by implication with tribal leaders themselves). But difference of opinion on this subject must bear no relationship to permanent transit rights and minimum facilities to maintain that right. He emphasized Afghanistan had no territorial ambitions and made it clear that in holding views they do with respect to welfare of Pushtuns, they did not claim that answer to this problem lay in direct or indirect affiliation with Afghanistan.

So far as closure of border is concerned it will become effective 6 p.m. Thursday March 29. No regular transit of goods will be allowed beyond that point. Diplomatic goods will be subject special permission on basis notification but he indicated that it would not extend to goods other than those considered as personal effects of diplomats. He further asked that no pipeline of supply be allowed to build up backlog in Pakistan until position clarifies. Other items raised during the conversation will be reported in subsequent messages.

Comment and recommendation: There is little doubt in my mind that this is firm decision of RGA and that Naim was speaking on Cabinet instruction.

Nur Ahmed Etemadi was present to be sure there was no misunderstanding in language and careful notes were kept of everything the Foreign Minister told me. It is my considered opinion that Daud government thinks it knows the risks involved and is quite willing to face consequences in pursuit of policy set forth by Naim today. At same time I believe there would be a great sigh of relief if Pakistan could see its way clear to move in this rather far reaching, rather dramatic and probably unexpected act of restoring permission for the establishment of these Consulates and trade agencies.

When I consider far-reaching possible results to free world interests in this area and especially to Pakistan I cannot do otherwise than recommend that we urge Pakistan muster necessary courage, imagination and far sighted self-interest to thus restore her influence in this area. As all concerned will of course know, I make this recommendation with no history of prejudice or lack of understanding of Pakistan’s position in our free world affiance and certainly with no disregard for its immediate self-interest. If this moment in history is allowed to pass and Afghanistan thus forced or encouraged to strengthen her orientation elsewhere the non-Communist neighbors in this area will lose far more than they possibly can [gain] through this relatively harmless concession.

I have been much impressed by my recent conversations with German Ambassador who is very strongly of opinion that some dramatic move is needed now to stop the drift in the inevitable direction it [Afghanistan] is taking and even the British Ambassador told me yesterday that while he thought Pakistan’s tough attitude had achieved something in the beginning, a continuation of it was counter-productive.

An imaginative move of this nature is the type of which only the free world and its members are capable. To do it in time would take much of the wind out of the Communist sails and would bring great relief to many elements in Afghanistan who only regard with horror the prospect of being forced more closely into the Soviet embrace. A gesture of this magnitude to begin the healing process would enhance Pakistan’s prestige as well as our own, placing us in an advantageous role in helping to guide Afghanistan policy through hazardous shoals during this critical period.³

Steeves

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 869.90D/3-2862. Secret; Niact. Repeated to Karachi, Tehran, and Jidda.
1. In telegram 554, March 24, Steeves reported that he had called on Naim that morning to review the transit impasse. He noted that during the 8-week period that the border had been open, some 26,000 tons of U.S. aid material had been transferred into Afghanistan from Pakistan. The border was scheduled to close again on March 29. Steeves stated that as much as 225,000 tons of additional material would have to be brought in to complete the currently committed development projects in Afghanistan. He argued that, while some of the supplies could be brought in through Iran, it was essential to continue to use the route through Pakistan in order to meet the goals of the projects. Steeves added that the United States was prepared to continue to exercise its good offices to try to facilitate a settlement of the impasse. (Ibid., 611.89/3-2462)
2. In telegram 559, March 26, Steeves reported on a conversation with Daud that morning. Steeves brought up the demarche he had made to Naim on March 24 concerning an extension of the opening of the border with Pakistan. Daud did not respond definitively to the demarche but, like Naim, he indicated that no progress in the dispute with Pakistan was possible until Pakistan took the initiative to reverse the decision that had caused the dispute. (Ibid., 689.90D/3-2662)
3. In telegram 1992 to Karachi, March 28, the Department instructed the Embassy to inform Ayub of the contents of telegram 565 from Kabul, and to ask him to consider an appropriate gesture to prevent the closure of the border on March 29. (Ibid., 689.90D/3-2862) The Embassy responded that, in light of Ayub’s repeated insistence that his government would not accept a return to the status quo ante, there was little point in asking him to agree to Naim’s request for reopening the Consulates and trade agencies. The Embassy added that to recommend acceptance of what the Pakistanis would regard as a surrender to Afghan intransigence might impact negatively on U.S. relations with Pakistan. (Telegram 1699 from Karachi, March 29; ibid., 989.7190D/3-2962)