361. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts0

908. There follow SITREP and Department’s tentative assessment current Iraqi crisis:

Present Situation

On November 13 long simmering dispute between moderate and extremist factions of Iraq’s Baath Government burst into open. Extremist leader, Deputy Prime Minister Ali Salih Saadi, and his chief supporters exiled to Spain. Apparent victory of moderates proved short-lived, however, when on following day moderate leaders Hazim Jawad, Interior Minister, and Talib Shabib, Foreign Minister, also exiled. Situation remains confused with indications Iraq will be governed by Baath Party National (international) Leadership until new Regional (Iraqi) Party elections can be held within four months.

Behind the Scenes

Factionalism within Iraq Baath Party, which seized power in coup last February, based on differences over (1) speed of implementing full socialization and (2) amount of power to be shared with non-Baath groups. Immediate crisis precipitated by moderates’ conviction that Saadi preparing power play of his own. Reaction of pro-Saadi faction to his exile demonstrated moderate faction could not control bulk of Party [Page 787] and National Guard (organization of armed young militants created by Baath). This led Prime Minister Bakr (and Defense Minister Ammash) to accede to extremist demands for exiling of moderate leaders.

Prime Minister Bakr appears be devoted to Baath and man of genuine moderation, placed in impossible dilemma. He might have mustered bulk of Iraq Army to crush National Guard, but this involved ordering slaughter of Baath youth in Baghdad; if Army had failed defeat National Guard, moderate leaders would have been executed as traitors; if Army succeeded, GOI would have found itself without Party support, at mercy predominantly non-Baath military.

The Future

Earlier indications that Saadi planned early return to Baghdad appear be incorrect. This appears fortunate as might have initiated more dangerous phase or even showdown between opposing factions. Eventual showdown between Saadi faction and moderates might pit augmented National Guard and other security elements against portion of Army with heavy equipment, with Air Force stand unknown.

Embassy Baghdad believes sincere cooperation between opposing factions out of question. One would sooner or later move against other. Embassy sees possibility establishment of Military regime, with or without Baath participation, or such a regime dominated by Baath. Long-term prospects of Baath to govern Iraq and create Syria-Iraq unity impaired by overt and violent intra-Party strife. Whatever the ultimate outcome of present crisis, mystique of Baath Party, as organization of disciplined and dedicated idealists able to deal with Arab World’s many problems, has suffered.

Rusk
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL-26 IRAQ. Secret. Drafted by Killgore, cleared by Davies, and approved by Jernegan. Sent to Baghdad, Amman, Jerusalem, Beirut, Tel Aviv, Cairo, Alexandria, Damascus, Aleppo, Jidda, Taiz, Dhahran, Athens, Nicosia, Tehran, Ankara, Istanbul, Bonn, London, Paris, Rome, Moscow, and Kuwait.