Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

343. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to the British Ambassador (Ormsby Gore)⁰

Washington, October 19, 1963.

Dear David: I have your letter of October 15 conveying Alec Home’s views on the Yemen situation.¹ I am glad that Phillips Talbot’s talks in the Foreign Office on October 11² were useful and I hope we can continue our dialogue on Yemen on a regular basis.

I am entirely in agreement with the view that Nasser must do better on disengagement. His performance thus far, even bearing in mind certainextenuating circumstances, has been far from satisfactory. As you know, we have been pushing the Egyptians hard on this at both the Nasser and Sabri levels. I did the same with Foreign Minister Fawzi last week. During the recent visit of the UAR Minister of Economy to Washington we made it quite plain that further United States Government aid to the United Arab Republic is to a great extent dependent upon satisfactory performance in Yemen. We intend in other ways to use the carrot and stick in our forthcoming approaches to the United Arab Republic. Your two suggestions for a minimum United Arab Republic performance over the next two weeks are good ones. They are incorporated in the approach we are making to the United Arab Republic.

We believe firmly that there are no feasible alternatives to the course of action in the Yemen which we are now pursuing and that it would be dangerous to allow the situation to drift. We do not see any advantage to us or you in risking a major confrontation between the United Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia in which you and we might end up burning our bridges again with Nasser, not for some vital interest of ours or even Saudi Arabia, but over a backwater like Yemen. Thus we were particularly pleased to learn that your colleague in Jidda has been instructed to make representations to Saqqaf concerning the importance of continuation of UNYOM and to inform him that your government would be in no position to provide aircraft to patrol the Saudi borders. We deeply appreciate this support of our position as well as your urging the Canadians to retain their contingent in UNYOM.

As a further step in helping bring to fruition current Yemeni efforts to create a broader-based regime, I wonder whether it might not be possible at an early date for you to pass the word to the royalists that Her Majesty’s Government supports in principle Yemeni efforts to broaden the base of the Yemen Arab Republican regime and hopes the royalists will give serious consideration to eventual participation. It would also be very helpful if you could indicate privately to the royalists that your government would be prepared to recognize a reconstituted and representative Yemen Arab Republic regime.

I might add that we are now consulting the United Nations with regard to ways of endowing a coalition government with an economic base. We contemplate informing Nasser that United States Government assistance in mobilizing outside economic support for Yemen would be contingent on his acquiescence in a newly constituted republican regime, as well as on much better United Arab Republic performance on disengagement. Also at an appropriate time in the course of current Yemeni negotiations for a political settlement, Yemeni political factions might be apprised that outside economic assistance would be forthcoming if a suitable coalition government is formed. Hopefully, this would serve as an incentive to crystallizing current efforts toward reconciliation in Yemen.

I would be grateful for your passing on these views to Alec and your telling him we appreciate your support and hope that we can continue to keep in close touch on this matter.³

Sincerely,

Dean

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–10 YEMEN. Secret. Drafted by Seelye on October 18. The Department of State transmitted the text of this letter to the Embassy in London in telegram 2590, October 22. (Ibid., Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, UK Officials—Secy. Rusk, 1962–1964)
1. The text is in telegram 2516 to London, October 18. (Ibid., Central Files, POL 26 YEMEN)
2. The Embassy in London conveyed a summary of the main points made during a meeting between Talbot and Deputy Under Secretary of the British Foreign Office Sir Geoffrey Harrison in telegram 1810, October 11. (Ibid., POL 32–1 ADEN-YEMEN)
3. On October 23, the British Embassy in Washington passed to the Department of State verbatim extracts from a Foreign Office telegram that contained Foreign Secretary Home’s comments on Rusk’s October 19 letter. The telegram noted that the British Government could not go as far as Rusk proposed in his fourth paragraph, because the United Kingdom had “no preconceptions or prejudices about the form of government which the Yemenis may choose, and although we entirely sympathize with the aim of broadening the basis of such a government we could therefore not tell the Royalists that we support the concept of a specifically Republican regime. Nor could we limit our readiness to recognize a Republican regime, as the form of government is irrelevant to our criteria.” Otherwise, the British Government could do, or had already done, most of what Rusk proposed. (Ibid., Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, UK Officials—Secy. Rusk, 1962–1964)