299. Editorial Note
On July 20, 1963, the Minister of the British Embassy, Denis Greenhill, emphasized to Assistant Secretary Talbot British concern, including that of the public and Parliament, over the UAR’s failure to withdraw its troops from Yemen, particularly as they then appeared to be involved in an all-out military campaign. Greenhill asked what the United States considered should be done to “call the UAR to order.” Talbot responded that the United States shared British concern, was monitoring the situation, and thought the time had come for the United Nations to put pressure on Nasser. (Telegram 514 to London, July 20; Department of State, Central Files, POL 26 YEMEN)
On July 26, First Secretary of the British Embassy Wright, acting on instructions, conveyed to Davies a British request that the two countries jointly ask U Thant to send a special representative to the area to press the UAR and seek a political solution. Davies agreed that the dispatch of a high-level U.N. official should be pursued in the context of ensuring UAR compliance, but he said that the United States questioned whether the United Nations should be involved in a political solution of the Yemen problem. Rather, Davies maintained, the United States was in the best position to make discreet approaches to the UAR and Saudi Arabia and wished to withhold agreement to a joint U.S.-U.K. approach to U Thant, pending the results of a forthcoming quiet U.S. initiative. (Memorandum of conversation, July 26; ibid., POL 27 UAR-YEMEN; also telegram 666 to London, July 27; ibid., POL 26 YEMEN)
On July 28, the Department of State informed several Near Eastern posts of a proposal, brought forward by Hart and Badeau who had been conferring in Washington, that the United States seek to arrange secret direct talks between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic in a neutral capital. The purpose of the talks would be to produce further detente between the two countries and gain their agreement to a reconstitution of the Yemeni regime that would preserve the republican form of government, but draw in moderate elements, reduce tribal dissidence, and lead to eventual Saudi recognition. The Department instructed the Embassy in Beirut to approach Foreign Minister Takla about the possibility of serving as “honest broker” to arrange such talks. (Telegram 82 to Beirut, July 28; ibid.) An action plan, prepared by the Office of Near Eastern Affairs on July 24, which contained a description of this initiative and other measures being taken at this time, is ibid., NEA/NE Files: Lot 66 D 218, UAR. POL. UAR-YEMEN. For text, see the Supplement, the compilation on Yemen.
Takla, however, was reluctant to play such a role. (Telegram 100 from Beirut, July 30; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 YEMEN) On August 1, Deputy Foreign Minister Saqqaf conveyed Prince Faysal’s [Page 650] response that if contact were established, the UAR must make the first move and there could be no contact until the UAR executed the Bunker agreement and disengaged from Yemen. (Telegram 132 from Jidda, August 2; ibid.) On August 9, the UAR accepted the proposal for quiet talks with Saudi officials provided that the United States and not Lebanon played the third-party role. (Telegram 345 from Cairo; ibid., POL 27 SAUD-UAR)