Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

297. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran⁰

Washington, July 16, 1963, 5:44 p.m.

32. For the Ambassador. Embtel 40.¹ Please deliver the following message to the Shah:

“Your Imperial Majesty:

Thank you for your letter of June 1.² Events in the Middle East are moving rapidly and I value getting the benefit of your views. Secretary Rusk reported at length to me on your frank and wide-ranging exchange with him,³ as has Ambassador Holmes on your discussions with him.

Such exchanges have contributed to the forward movement we have witnessed in the Middle East since your visit to Washington.

We are gratified by your efforts to maintain peace and stability in your part of the world. I refer not only to your arduous and ultimately successful efforts to repair the Pakistan-Afghanistan breach, but also to Iran’s contributions to the last CENTO Ministerial Council meeting and to your remarks to the President of India urging an early Kashmir settlement. All these subjects represent areas in which we can continue to cooperate toward common objectives.

I can understand your concern over the effect which an Arab Federation under certain auspices might have on the national security of Iran. United States policy on the general question of Arab unity is clear; we neither oppose nor support the idea, and we believe that the problem is one for the Arabs to decide among themselves, free from duress. If a form of Arab unity should develop which is achieved without the use of force, reflects the will of the peoples concerned, and is not motivated by aggressive designs against others, it is difficult for us to see legitimate grounds for opposing it.

Developments in the Arab area since the date of your letter have no doubt convinced you, as they have convinced me, that there is no cause for undue apprehension over the currently projected Arab Federation. We do not foresee the Iraqi armed forces coming under the command of non-Iraqis, or the stationing of non-Iraqi Arab military forces in Iraq. In short, we do not believe that the current prospects for Arab unity present any increased military threat to Iran. Recent developments in the Arab nations indicate clearly that if any federation should actually come into being, it will require a considerable amount of time, and the energies of the Arab nations would of necessity be devoted to solving manifold intra-Arab problems rather than to sterile hostility toward neighboring states.

The hostilities now under way in northern Iraq are of concern to both of our countries, since the situation introduces an element of instability into the area with consequent dangers of meddling by forces inimical to the tranquility and independence of Iran and its neighbors. The USSR’s recent ridiculous public accusations of military interference by the CENTO powers clearly spotlight the source of this danger. I am happy to note that our countries are pursuing parallel policies with regard to Iraq—policies based on non-intervention and the utilization of any opportunities which may present themselves to encourage an end to the fighting and a negotiated solution. At the same time, both our countries are attempting to solve by mutual understanding and negotiations problems which may have arisen between us and the Iraqi Government.

I share the regret you must feel over the loss of life connected with the recent unfortunate attempts to block your reform programs. I am confident, however, that such manifestations will gradually disappear as your people realize the importance of the measures you are taking to establish social justice and equal opportunity for all Iranians. I also know you would agree that a vigorous and expanding economy would provide the best backstop for the basic reform program you are undertaking. We in the United States devote considerable time and energy to the problem of utilizing the resources of government to cushion and dampen economic cycles which tend often to swing between depression on the one hand and dangerous boom periods on the other. I recall that when I took office, Iran appeared to be in the throes of a classical inflation, with balance-of-payments problems already evident. The prompt and vigorous measures taken by your government, with the help of the International Monetary Fund, to arrest this trend were highly effective. Now you are faced with the all-too-familiar and even more difficult opposite situation—that of encouraging business activity and combating unemployment. I am confident that through the wise employment of government financial measures and through the initiation of economic development projects, you will be able to combat this aspect of the business cycle problem as you did its opposite two years ago. We Americans have had some experience in these matters, and I hope you will not hesitate to call on Ambassador Holmes and his staff for any advice which we may be able usefully to provide.

We share completely your desire that Iran achieve as rapidly as possible the strength necessary to preserve its stability, to solidify the social progress now under way, and to defend itself against any threats to its security. For this purpose Secretary McNamara and our military experts reviewed in detail with you last year Iran’s strategic defense requirements. The appraisal of mission and requirements reached at the time appears still to be valid. We both have every reason to expect that the improvements you are pushing, backed up by the advanced equipment we are supplying to your armed forces, will provide a continuously increasing image of Iranian strength to discourage aggression and the actual force to withstand it should this prove necessary.

You mentioned in your letter the prestockage of equipment for possible use in mutual defense. Considerable quantities of equipment appropriate to such use are now stocked in European areas, where they would be readily accessible to any United States forces which might be deployed to the Middle East. We have studies under way to determine whether, considering our logistics capabilities, stockages should also be established in the Middle East. As these studies develop, we will keep you informed of any conclusions we may reach.

As I write, the fast-moving events within the Sino-Soviet Bloc are commanding the attention of the whole world. Judging by the evidence reaching us from Moscow, the Sino-Soviet talks held there have thus far failed to compose the widely divergent views held by the two sides on a broad range of issues. At the same time, it would be rash to say whether the increasing openness of the dispute indicates that a formal disruption of relations between the Parties, or even conceivably between the States, is in prospect. Clearly the outcome of this confrontation will require the most careful evaluation. As our knowledge increases and our views develop, I shall look forward to further exchanges with you on this subject.

In conclusion, Your Majesty, allow me to express once again my high esteem for you and my gratification at the mutually beneficial state of relations between our two countries. Sincerely, John F. Kennedy.”

Department desires this message remain confidential.

Rusk

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Iran, 7/11/63–9/5/63. Confidential; Operational Immediate; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Grant, Bowling, Tiger, Killgore, and White (JCS) on July 15; cleared in draft by Cameron, Smith, Reynolds (AID/NESA), Stoddart (DOD/ISA), Anderson (EUR/SOV) (penultimate paragraph), and the President; and approved by Talbot and Rusk.
1. In telegram 40, July 13, Holmes asked if President Kennedy’s message would be ready for delivery by July 17. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 IRAN)
2. Not printed. (Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Countries, Iran, Security, 1961–1963)
3. See Document 229.