280. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen)0
CK:
Badeau’s conversation with Ali Sabri (Cairo 2430)1 brings into focus the new phase of the Yemen exercise. Egyptians now admit that military situation [Page 604] may have deteriorated to a point where they can’t pull out large numbers of troops yet. Ball and Harriman are concerned that our forcing substantial UAR withdrawals would leave Yemen in chaos with Soviets waiting to fill the vacuum.
So State has three cables in the mill:
- 1.
- They’re describing dilemma to London, Cairo, and Taiz2 and seeking ideas for negotiated settlement among Yemeni parties to civil war. Approaches by some members of Sallal’s cabinet lead State to see an opening.
- 2.
- Harriman and Ball with AID opposition are even considering limited subsidy to keep Yemeni government going. They would tell Badeau to discuss with Egyptians how to make a republican regime viable once the civil war is settled.
- 3.
- They’re instructing USUN to brief U Thant on problems of present disengagement exercise and need to bring UAR into line.3 They’re suggesting UN press Nasser for his withdrawal timetable to keep Saudis on disengagement track.
Basic question now that we’ve hopefully staved off a UAR-Saudi clash is how to end the civil war in Yemen and make Yemen a stable state. As Sabri implies, Nasser can’t abandon the republican regime until the civil war ends. He’s committed to it, but it’s too weak to hold its own. So disengagement now depends on ending civil war because Faisal may break loose again if Nasser doesn’t begin withdrawing troops. State is tackling this next set of problems; I’ll keep you posted.