Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume IV, Vietnam, August–December 1963

136. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Hilsman) to the Secretary of State ¹

Washington , September 19, 1963 .

SUBJECT

• Country Team Assessment—Viet-Nam Situation

The following represents the views of the Country Team² or the great majority thereof in response to our Deptel 353 to Saigon of September 7, 1963,³ asking for an assessment of attitudes of a wide cross section of the Vietnamese population toward top GVN political and military leadership, toward the Viet Cong and continuation of the war, and toward the United States.

1. Since May 8, and especially since August 21, discontent in Vietnamese society has been accompanied by a spread of fear, uncertainty and frustration regarding the future, and in some instances, transformed into disaffection. Morale has been badly hit, particularly among

a. the top echelons of the Vietnamese Government;

b. the civilian bureaucracy;

c. the urban professionals;

d. the intellectuals;

e. the students;

f. some levels of the police and security forces.

The military, thus far, have been the least affected.

2. There is overwhelming feeling among Vietnamese that

a. Ngo Dinh Nhu is the real power in the Vietnamese Government;

b. Mr. and Mrs. Nhu are mainly to blame for the disastrous course of events and must be ousted.

3. Diem and Nhu are generally considered “twins”, but considerable (nostalgic) hope remains that they may yet be separated and Diem retained thereafter as the head of a new government.

4. Discontent has in some cases become intense disaffection; but talk will be transformed into action only if the US encourages this and takes the lead.

5. The feeling is widespread that the US must provide stimulus and backing for the overthrow of the regime and construction of a new one. The US is regarded with hope, disappointment, and, more recently, with criticism and resentment. United States responsibility for the continued tenure of the Ngo family is repeatedly cited; similarly, the US is blamed for having enabled the regime to prevent the development of an alternative leadership.

6. Vice President Nguyen Ngoc Tho is considered a possible successor to Diem, but would require Vietnamese military backstopping. He is regarded as a good administrator, capable, honest, and a suitable titular head of state, but not as a strong man.

7. The generals are considered the group most likely to be able to bring about a change in the government; but even they will move only if the US prods them to do so.

8. The ideas of Buddhist leader Tri Quang do not go beyond overthrowing the present regime; he appears as a religious revolutionary with agitational ideas and potential, but without institutional or constructive ideas.

9. De Gaulle’s neutralist proposals have been received by the Vietnamese with little interest or support.

10. The Viet Cong is regarded with strong hostility. However, because the belief is growing that the US cannot be counted on, and the Viet Cong can, and that life under the DRV would be no worse than that under the Ngo regime, the Viet Cong are being mentioned as an undesirable, but possibly the only, alternative to the present government.

The Embassy adds, in its own overall commentary, that there is little question that continuation of the present situation will be increasingly exploited by the Viet Cong and will increasingly sap RVNAF capabilities.

11. The student uprisings are extremely serious, and have alarmed Vietnamese officials and military more than any other evidences of popular disaffection.

1. Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 67 D 54, POL 15 Gov’t. Secret. Drafted by Kattenburg and signed by Hilsman. A note on the source text indicates that Rusk saw it. Copies were sent to Ball, Harriman, Forrestal, Colby, William K. Bunce of USIA, Albert L. Whiting, Krulak, Heinz, U. Alexis Johnson, Rostow, and Manning.
2. These views were reported to Washington in telegrams 470 to 477 from Saigon, all September 1. (All ibid., Central Files, POL 15 S VIET, except telegram 472 from Saigon, ibid., POL 18 S VIET) MACV did not concur with the assessment of the rest of the Country Team and sent its own more optimistic views in telegram JOL 7384 from Saigon, September 11. (Ibid., POL S VIET)
3. Document 73.