137. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1

555. For President only, pass White House directly, no other distribution whatever. Further to your CAP 63516.2

1.
Here is what I have done in compliance with your paragraph 3:
a.
I read pertinent parts to Chief of CAS and Chief of MAAG asking them to let me know of any programs which could be held up without impairing the war effort. I am not sure whether anything significant will be found in these two agencies.
b.
I requested Chief of USOM to notify me of any of his programs which could be held up and which would give concern to Diem and Nhu without disrupting the Vietnamese economy.
2.
Chief of USOM suggested holding up on technical assistance and dollar support for the communications program conducted by the Vietnamese Director of Information; and continue holding up for a very short time on support of the commercial import program. I stipulated that this last should not be held up so that it would in any way create inflation, panic, or injury to the standard of living of the masses.
3.
When Vietnamese officials call to inquire about these two programs, they are to be told that President Diem will have to speak to me about it. If he asks me to come and see him, I will, of course, go-which will be the first time that I will have been asked to do him a favor. There will then be several different ways for me to handle the matter. I am thinking now of listening to his request that the program be set in motion again and then doing to him in reverse the kind of thing which he does to me; that is, launch into a long statement on something that interests me, to wit, how urgent it is for him to take action so that it will appear in America that there has been some real improvement in GVN.
4.
Getting Diem and Nhu to bring about an improvement in the appearance of the GVN is a prime responsibility of mine, and I shall try to leave no stone unturned. I believed, however, that we might face a situation after the appropriation bill has been voted in which no coup d’etat has taken place and in which we are faced with the simple but unpleasant choice of pressing on vigorously with Diem and Nhu or else not pressing on at all. Under these circumstances, I think we should definitely press on and that my job will then be to develop as much influence with Diem and Nhu as possible, to advise and guide them, and, when expedient, to do favors for them. For this reason, I do not want to burn any bridges without your knowledge and approval.
Lodge
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 S VIET. Top Secret; Immediate; Eyes Only. Received at 4:13 a.m. and passed to the White House at 5:07 a.m. On another copy of this telegram, there is a marginal note indicating that the President saw it. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series, State Cables)
  2. Document 125.