97. Memorandum From the Director of the Vietnam Working Group (Wood) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Hilsman)1
SUBJECT
- American Military Personnel in Viet-Nam
At the July meeting in Honolulu, Secretary McNamara requested a plan to reduce the American military in Viet-Nam to about 1500 by FY68. MACV made several plans which were rejected as being too expensive and finally submitted a Comprehensive Plan for SVN which was endorsed by Embassy Airgram A-417 and in later messages (enclosed).2 The objective was to “assure the capability of the GVN to exercise permanent and continued sovereignty over SVN at the end of CY 65 without the need for continued US special military assistance”. Reductions in military personnel would not start until FY 65. The cost of the Plan, which involved additional training for the Vietnamese forces so that they could take over more quickly, was estimated at $168 million above already planned expenditures for the period through FY 68. The additional cost for FY 64 alone was planned at $88 million. The plan also required additional expenditures by the Vietnamese of about 800 million piasters (the equivalent of $10.9 million at 73 to 1). This would require deficit financing by the GVN in [Page 244] addition to the deficit financing needed to pick up the costs of the strategic hamlet and counterinsurgency programs. All above figures subject to change without notice.
As you know Bob Thompson suggested while in Washington that if one or two provinces became genuinely “white” by July or August this year, and if the GVN continued to make good progress, the US should seriously consider pulling out a significant number of men, say 1,000, by the end of calendar 1963.
The Comprehensive Plan described above, which has been approved by Admiral Felt and JCS as well as by the Embassy, has been under study in Defense since early February. Quite clearly DOD will not be able to make the funds required by this plan available.
Politically, I recommend that a substantial number of American military should be pulled out of Viet-Nam by the end of this year, provided we make the progress suggested by Thompson. Diem’s discussions with the Ambassador show that this is a touchy subject with the Vietnamese. However, the Vietnamese would like these men taken out of the provinces. It is more likely that they will be taken out of Saigon where you report that 50% of the American military are now stationed. It is for our military to decide which jobs they can best eliminate. I understand very confidentially that McNamara will tell them to cut their forces by 1,000 at the end of this year and will also make it clear that large additional funds will not be available.
I believe the difficulty DOD has faced has been to try and meet McNamara’s July request that the cut be completed by FY 68, and secondly to assume that the rate of increasing GVN strength through FY 68 which had already been planned should be maintained in the face of a very substantial cut in our military. It would be more realistic to make a substantial cut now provided progress continues, and to then plan to reduce the rate at which the American military are cut back in the following years. Should the war go better than we expect in ‘66 and ‘67 we can always pull out still more men. This would be safer than pulling out too many men too soon.
You have asked that we first seek to reach agreement with the military on a ceiling and that we then ask them to cut by 1,000 at the end of the year provided good progress continues. When the Comprehensive Plan was made there were 12,200 U.S. military in Viet-Nam. The number is now over 13,000 and before your request was made State approved further increases which could bring the total to 15,600. Since DOD will have to ask State clearance for any further increases and since McNamara will almost certainly order them to make a cut of about 1,000 by the end of CY 63, the question of a ceiling has become somewhat academic. It adds one more emotional element to an already tight situation.
[Page 245]If we insist on it, and if the war should suddenly take a turn for the worse, we would then have to approve a break in the ceiling and DOD would have to rush in additional men.
Recommendation
That we see what happens at Honolulu. DOD is very conscious of our views and I think our relations would be less strained if we do not insist on them at this time. We should veto any further requests for increases which in effect would place a ceiling of 15,600 on our military and quietly support McNamara’s intention to achieve a significant reduction by the end of the year, provided things go well. Personally, I think 1,000 military could be pulled out of Saigon tomorrow and things would go better. During 1964 we should press for a further reduction of 1500 to 2000. You should also keep in mind that of the present 13,000 in Viet-Nam about 3,000 are advisers and 10,000 are troops. I would not want to see us cut 1,000 advisers at the end of this year, but the military could well cut some of their headquarters and backup troops.
- Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 67 D 54, Def 19/2 Advisory and Training Assist. Secret. Sent to Hilsman through Rice.↩
- Not found enclosed. A note on the source text indicates that the enclosures included the airgram cited, telegrams 856 and 857 to Saigon, and portions of telegram 844 from Saigon. Telegrams 844 from Saigon and 856 to Saigon are Documents 67 and 57. Regarding airgram A-417 to Saigon and telegram 857 to Saigon, see footnotes 2 and 5. Document 57.↩