Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963

96. Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, April 18, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Chemical Defoliation and Crop Destruction in South Viet-Nam

1. Defoliation Activities

Defoliation trials have been carried out in thirteen localities, beginning in August of 1961 (see attached map²). About 87 miles of communication lines have been cleared plus a number of areas around military installations. The purpose of these operations is to increase visibility, thus providing better fields of fire and reducing the possibility of ambushes.

The military effectiveness of defoliation is difficult to assess. Some statistics suggest curtailed Viet Cong activity as a result of defoliation operations, but the evidence is inconclusive. Saigon reports that these trials appear to have a general impact in the security situation, but no statistical results can be isolated. While visibility is without question improved by defoliation, R.G.K. Thompson and some of our own military say the remaining tree trunks, limbs and twigs often provide quite adequate cover.

It is our understanding that ambushes generally make use of terrain features rather than foliage for cover in any event. Moreover, hand cutting would seem simpler, more effective, and probably less expensive in those areas where it is important to clear fields of fire. Thus defoliation appears to be a useful tactic only in those instances where very special terrain features justify it, and we anticipate that such situations are and will be rare.

Proposed plans for future defoliant operations include the clearing of the railroad right of way—according to our Embassy primarily for proper maintenance and only secondarily for security. In addition, COMUSMACV is now studying defoliant targets totaling 12,000 acres. The Vietnamese armed forces are also selecting and evaluating additional targets for the coming growing season, the major portion being in Central Viet-Nam.

2. Crop Destruction

To date two chemical crop destruction operations have been carried out in Viet-Nam, one by air in Phuoc Long Province in November of 1962 and one by hand in Thua Thien Province in February of this year (see attached map). In the Phuoc Long operation 300 hectares, primarily rice, were sprayed with the probable loss to the Viet Cong of 356,000 pounds of food or enough to support 1,000 men for six months.

In Thua Thien, because of difficult terrain and Viet Cong response, only 12 of the planned 120 hectares were actually sprayed, with an additional 20 hectares being destroyed by hand. Initial reports indicate about 56,000 pounds of food, primarily manioc, were destroyed by herbicides in the Thua Thien operation.

Total for both the Phuoc Long and Thua Thien operations was 312 hectares or about 412,000 pounds of food—enough to support 1,000 men for seven months.

As in the case of defoliation, the military effectiveness of crop destruction is difficult to measure. There is good evidence that the Viet Cong are short of food in many areas, however, and these trial operations almost certainly increased their food problem. These operations were carried out in food deficit areas where the Viet Cong have no ready alternative food sources. In such areas, notably in the central plateau and mountain regions, food denial tactics are clearly in order. In areas where food is plentiful, crop destruction is probably not useful and may be counterproductive.

In the case of the Phuoc Long operation, Saigon reports that U.S. advisory personnel believe the general area in which the operation was carried out is a major rice producing area for Zone D. At the present time, Zone D personnel are extremely short of rice; they reportedly require 300 tons per month and are only getting some 150 tons per month. According to information obtained from a recent VC prisoner captured in Zone D, the authorities in Zone D have instructed each man to grow enough rice to feed three people. The Vietnamese Central Intelligence Organization reported last December that twothirds of the Viet Cong in Zone D were to be used for crop protection; this information was derived from captured VC documents. It is the considered opinion of U.S. advisory personnel that the VC located in Zone D are absorbed almost full-time with the problem of survival. As evidence of this, our advisory personnel cite the fact that the defection rate in the area is increasing and that prisoners and defectors are almost invariably hungry and miserable.

Future crop destruction operations now under study include about 4,000 acres in Binh Dinh, Thua Thien, Phnoc Thanh, and Quang Tin provinces. For best results, these targets should be sprayed in April and May.

3. Political Effects

Inside Viet-Nam there is little evidence that either defoliation or crop destruction has generated any significant political reaction against the United States or the GVN. Hanoi propaganda likewise appears to have had little or no effect in South Viet-Nam. It is, of course, possible that the local populace in GVN-controlled areas would consider it unsafe and hence unwise to express adverse reactions to this program of the government.

Viet Cong propaganda efforts are known to have produced popular demonstrations in one provincial capital. On February 8 and 10 Viet Cong were able to stage, in front of the Kien Hoa province headquarters, a demonstration against artillery, air strikes, and the use of chemicals to destroy their food. Since no herbicides have been used in Kien Hoa province, the demonstration was purely the result of Viet Cong propaganda. Saigon comments that the Kien Hoa demonstrations indicate that the Viet Cong can do exploit locally the use of chemicals to at least the temporary detriment of the GVN and the United States.

The demonstrations in Kien Hoa appear to be unique, however, and Saigon reports that they have no information suggesting that operations carried out to date have had any measurably adverse effects on the local population. It is perhaps significant that the only area in which Viet Cong propaganda has had any apparent effect is one where the population has had no first-hand experience of defoliant chemicals.

(a) PsyWar Efforts and Compensation Machinery in Support of Herbicide Operations

ARVNPsyWar activities in support of herbicide operations appear adequate. Ground and air leaflet distribution was employed, using persuasive themes. In most cases, loud speaker planes were also used to explain the program prior to using defoliants in the area. “Sprayed ARVN soldiers” were displayed to show that chemicals do not harm humans or animals. Sacrificial animals were donated by the government to Montagnard tribesmen to placate any spirits which might have been offended by herbicide operations.

The GVN has set up a mechanism for compensating peasants whose crops are inadvertently destroyed. We do not have much information on the results of the compensation program, but there are indications that it was not adequately carried out, in part because of security difficulties.

(b)Bloc Propaganda

Radio Hanoi has carried propaganda about the defoliant and crop destruction programs for more than a year, billing them as chemical warfare by the United States against the people of Viet-Nam. The Hanoi charges include the use of poison gas as well as noxious chemicals and allege the deaths of many people and animals as a result.

Hanoi output on this theme was stepped up sharply in mid-February and has increased steadily since. By mid-March roughly one quarter of the total DRV output was devoted to the subject. DRV propaganda recently featured a protest to the International Control Commission, reported a mass protest rally in Hanoi on April 7, and claimed that the NFLSVN has evidence of poison sprayings including “objects, photos, and witnesses.” Moscow, Peking and Havana have picked up the theme, but it still occupies a very small percentage of their total output.

Non-Communist playback has been negligible to date. On April 1, the New York Times printed a letter from British philosopher Bertrand Russell charging that the U.S. is using chemical warfare to destroy crops and livestock and starve the population. The Times editorial set the record straight in the same issue, however, strongly refuting Russell’s charges and pointing out that only common weed killers have been used. The Cambodian press has carried a few items, and Hanoi recently cited a statement by 11 African nationalist organizations condemning the U.S. However, the African statement in fact contained no specific reference to poison.

There is no evidence to date that the Bloc propaganda campaign has tended to undermine international support for our Viet-Nam policy or that it has damaged the image of the United States abroad.

(c)Countering Communist Propaganda

To counter Bloc propaganda, Saigon was instructed on March 11 to surface the entire crop destruction and defoliation programs, giving full details to the press.³ Accordingly, our Saigon mission persuaded the GVN to undertake a press conference on the subject which was held March 20. The presentation was very well done and followed closely an Embassy-prepared guidelines paper.⁴

About 80 newsmen attended and all seemed pleased by the briefing. Only two stories were filed, however, and neither story was to our knowledge carried in any U.S. newspaper. Nevertheless, the press conference probably served to place Communist charges in perspective for the Western press in Saigon, and by giving them the true facts, it should tend to prevent their being taken in by future Communist propaganda against the program.

All U.S. posts and missions abroad have been informed of the facts of the program. They are under instructions to report significant reactions to Communist propaganda and to counter such propaganda with the facts as appropriate.

VOA played the March 20 press conference plus an exclusive interview with President Diem on the subject. USIA has also prepared additional material which will be used as required.

4. Conclusions

The Embassy has recommended that both defoliation and crop destruction be continued. They further recommend that they be given authority to approve all herbicide operations, including crop destruction; that crop destruction and defoliation be regarded as a single program, and that the recommendations of local commanders and advisers should henceforth carry more weight in the use of herbicides in order to relate herbicide operations more directly to the local military situation.

Reports from the field do not permit precise, statistical evaluation of the reactions of the people or the military effectiveness of these programs. In part this is due to the limited scale on which herbicides have so far been employed. It is also due, in larger part, to the inherent difficulties of measuring popular sentiment in Viet Nam and to the continuing problem of defining progress in guerrilla conflict.

Some factors are clear if not measurable. One such factor is the value of food denial tactics. The Viet Cong are short of food in some areas and food denial, by whatever means, increases their difficulties. If herbicides are not available, other means have been and will be used by the GVN to destroy VC crops. These alternate means may be more difficult, as hand destruction in remote areas, or more destructive of the soil and human life, as napalm.

Mr. R.G.K. Thompson, head of the British Advisory Mission in Saigon, believes that crop destruction should be used only in situations where it is clear that the Viet Cong have no alternate sources of supply. It is his view that crop destruction is a useful weapon only when the people and the Viet Cong are effectively separated. This appears to be a correct evaluation, and our use of defoliant chemicals may have been premature. However, since the programs have been initiated and have proved effective against Viet Cong crops in remote areas, and since there are distinct disadvantages to halting the program at this time, we believe they should be continued on at least a limited basis.

A prime consideration in this evaluation is that the Communist propaganda will almost certainly be continued regardless of whether or not the herbicide programs are continued. This propaganda has not so far had any significant and measurable effect either inside or outside Viet-Nam. There are signs, however, that the Bloc intends to redouble its efforts, and it is not impossible or even unlikely that this propaganda will become more effective in the future.

Regardless of the degree of effectiveness of future Bloc propaganda, halting herbicide operations now would tend to confirm Bloc charges and invite further such campaigns because of their proven effectiveness against us. (It is worth noting in this connection that the only place in Viet-Nam where the Communists have succeeded in generating a demonstration against herbicides is in an area where the people have had no first hand experience of either defoliation or crop destruction.)

We recognize as Thompson has pointed out, that feet and brains, not gimmicks, will win the war. We also recognize the dangers of herbicide operations. On balance, however, the following considerations appear ruling:

a) Defoliation is at best only partially effective militarily. Ambushes normally make use of terrain features rather than foliage for cover. In those cases where it is important to clear fields of fire, it would appear that hand cutting would normally be at least as easy and inexpensive as defoliation.

b) Although crop destruction might better have been postponed until a later stage in the war, it has proved to have an important potential for hurting the Viet Cong in food deficit areas. While a massive program should not be undertaken at this time, crop destruction should be continued in areas where the inhabitants are known to be solidly Viet Cong and where food denial tactics are certain to bring effective pressures on them.

c) Halting herbicide operations under Communist propaganda fire would not halt propaganda attacks. On the contrary, if we yield and halt operations, it would likely encourage further propaganda attacks.

5. Recommendations

We therefore recommend that herbicide operations be continued and that authority to approve all such operations be delegated to the Ambassador and COMUSMACV, provided:

(1) that all herbicide operations continue to be most closely controlled by the Ambassador and COMUSMACV;

(2) that crop destruction be undertaken only in areas where it is clear that the inhabitants are Viet Cong and have no ready alternative food sources;

(3) that defoliation operations be limited to those situations, which we assume will be rare, where special terrain features are such as to fully justify the use of chemical clearing;

(4) that all herbicide operations be undertaken only when it is clear that both PsyWar preparations and compensation and relief machinery are adequate; and

(5) that the Embassy provide by late summer a complete report and evaluation of all herbicide operations carried out during the 1963 growing season.

1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series, 4/63-5/63. Secret. Attached to a covering memorandum dated April 18 from William H. Brubeck, Executive Secretary of the Department of State, to McGeorge Bundy, which indicates that it was prepared in response to Document 58. Information on a draft of this paper found in Department of State files indicates that the paper was prepared in the Vietnam Working Group on April 17 by Heavner. (Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 67 D 54, Pol 27-10 Chemical Warfare, 1963) On April 17, Hilsman sent a copy of the paper to USIA Director Murrow for comment, with a covering memorandum that indicated the paper had been prepared in FE with the assistance of the USIA Vietnam desk. (Washington National Records Center, RG 306, USIA/TOP Files: FRC 67 A 222, IAF Defoliation-1963) Murrow responded on April 19 with a memorandum to Harriman in which he indicated that, while USIA felt that herbicide operations in South Vietnam were contributing to a potentially damaging propaganda campaign being orchestrated from Hanoi, “we concur—if reluctantly—in the recommendation that herbicide operations be continued.” (Ibid.)
2. Not found attached.
3. See Document 55.
4. Not found.