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  4. Document 56

56. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)1

JCSM-190-63
Washington, March 11, 1963 .

SUBJECT

  • Air Augmentation
1.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed two requests from CINCPAC, both of which recommend that the US air commitment in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) be augmented. The expanded air effort would be temporary in nature, required until the success of the forthcoming national effort is assured. In addition to recommending that [Page 146] the pilots and maintenance personnel strength of Farmgate be doubled, a requirement for 111 aircraft and about 1,200 personnel was established, consisting of:
  • 2 squadrons L-28 (or equivalent) aircraft (44 a/c)
  • 2 photo reconnaissance aircraft, RF-101
  • 1 squadron C-123 aircraft (16 a/c) with a second squadron to follow if need is confirmed by CINCPAC
  • 1 company CV-2B (Caribou) aircraft (16 a/c)
  • 1 platoon U-1A (Otter) aircraft (8 a/c)
  • 15 0-1 aircraft (L-19)
  • 10 UH-1B helicopters
2.
The additional liaison and photo reconnaissance units requested by CINCPAC are required to provide an improved forward air control and an increased air reconnaissance capability. This increased capability is essential to the success of the accelerated counterinsurgency operations in South Vietnam as a part of the national campaign. There are now four L-28 aircraft in Farmgate which are available for visual surveillance and tactical air control. Although programs such as the one for RT-28 pilot training are underway to increase the VNAF capability, effects will not be felt until the second quarter of FY 1964. Therefore, the additional air photo reconnaissance capability at this time must be provided by the US Air Force from resources not currently available in RVN. These commitments would be separate and apart from Farmgate.
3.
Further, the RVN National Campaign requires an increase in air transport. With the effectiveness of the national rail and highway systems limited by the security problem, seaport redistribution centers at Danang, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, and Can Tho are planned to facilitate the sea movement of supplies from Saigon to these coastal points for inland movement, predominantly by airlift. The total monthly air transport requirement is estimated to be 4,375,700 ton miles. Compared with the present air transport capability of 2,190,500 ton miles, a lift deficit of 2,185,200 ton miles is indicated. There are two C-123 squadrons and one CV-2B company in South Vietnam now. The proposed addition of one US Air Force C-123 squadron and one US Army CV-2B company would overcome the anticipated air transport deficit.
4.
The U-1A (Otter) aircraft would provide light cargo capability for the Civil Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) program and direct support for US Army advisers. Additional day to day support for the advisers and the CIDG program would be furnished by the 15 0-1 aircraft. Three 0-1 aircraft would be located with each of the five CH21 companies and would provide an estimated 302 sorties per month in support of small unit movement of supplies and personnel, movements of staff, detachment, and control personnel, mail and courier service, and light cargo emergency resupply.
5.
The ten UH-IB helicopters will provide the 52nd Aviation Battalion, authorized for deployment in March 1963, with a capability similar to that of the 45th Army Aviation Battalion now in RVN. This has been proved to be most effective in support of Vietnam Army commanders and corps advisers during tactical operations for medical evacuation, inspection visits, sector lift requirements, and other administrative functions. The U H-1B aircraft will also furnish support of US Special Forces in areas where limited or no fixed wing facilities exist, and can respond to tactical lift requirements within the adjacent CIDG protect areas.
6.
In addition to augmenting air resources in South Vietnam by the means outlined above, CINCPAC indicates that a 30-35 per cent increased sortie rate for Farmgate would result from doubling pilot and maintenance resources, with appropriate adjustment made to the flying hour program. The present combined monthly sortie rate for Farmgate and the Vietnam Air Force is 1,462. Compared with the estimated monthly sortie rate of 2,642 to support the national effort, a deficit of 1,180 sorties per month will exist. Present strength of Farmgate, including the recent augmentation, totals 42 aircraft and 277 personnel. Increasing the Farmgate sortie rate by the assignment of additional personnel would reduce the estimated sortie deficit established by the increased national effort.
7.
During the Joint Chiefs of Staff consideration of the requests by CINCPAC for air augmentation in Vietnam, agreement was reached regarding the additional air units and personnel augmentation as listed in paragraph 1, above. Agreement was not reached, however, on the US source of the two squadrons of L-28 (or equivalent) aircraft.
8.
In consonance with the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that the requests for air augmentation are necessary and timely, and therefore recommend that you authorize the deployment to RVN of the US Army and US Air Force units requested by CINCPAC. In addition, it is requested that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Staff, US Army, and the Chief of Staff, US Air Force, meet with you at an early date to discuss the divergence mentioned in paragraph 7, above.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Maxwell D. Taylor
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
  1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 69 A 3131, Vietnam 380 thru 381 1963. Secret.↩