Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963

57. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

Washington, March 12, 1963, 3:44 p.m.

856. Joint State/DOD/AID. References: 1) Embassy Airgram A-417;²) Embtel 800.³ The Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended that the Comprehensive Plan for South Viet-Nam (CPSVN) be approved as the basis for refinement of the FY 64 MAP and development of the FY 65-69 Military Assistance Plan for Viet-Nam.⁴ Require ASAP specific Country Team recommendations concerning the CPSVN in view of following factors:

(1) Imminence presentation FY 64 MAP to Congress (estimated April). If State/DOD/AID decide accept CPSVN, presentation may be affected.

(2) Fact that most significant cost increase under CPSVN (approximately $75 million) over dollar guidelines occurs in FY 64.

(3) Fact that detailed review of 64 Program is scheduled at CINCPAC in April.

(4) Stated urgency some of the requirements for activations under the increased FY 64 force levels proposed in CPSVN.

(5) Likelihood that to attain objectives of the CPSVN requires parallel development of other mutually supporting national plans and programs. To enable State/DOD/AID expedite decision whether accept CPSVN for planning, request Country Team views or estimates concerning following:

1. GVN willingness make the required additional financial contribution. Realize that CT may judge that direct approaches to GVN now proposing additional GVN deficit or other fiscal measures might adversely affect current negotiations re GVN contribution counterinsurgency funds. If this is case, request CT judgment (without GVN consultation) what portion of additional required piaster financing GVN would accept. If this is less than total 846 million piasters, request general outline of the modification of the CPSVN that would be necessary and revision of total dollar costs for FY 64 that would result.

2. Para 3e of the CPSVN indicates CIDG personnel may be absorbed into National Police during “phase down”. Can we assume plans that must be developed as described Embtel 800 so provide?

3. Requirements for dollar purchase of piasters for construction indicated in CPSVN for FY 64 and subsequent years and feasibility construction with local currency not affecting gold outflow?

4. Is there provision in the CPSVN for a MAP/AID “maintenance” cost for villages and hamlets secured under CIDG program after they pass to the strategic hamlet program?

5. What revisions current political economic programs would be required if CPSVN approved?

6. What would be economic consequences if additional 846 million piasters provided through GVN deficit financing?⁵

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 S VIET Secret; Priority. Drafted by Wood and cleared by Barnett, in AID by Stoneman, and in DOD/ISA by Colonel Kent. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD.
2. Airgram A-417 from Saigon, February 8, enclosed three copies of the Comprehensive Plan for South Vietnam, and indicated that “the Ambassador has concurred in the Plan as a basis for MAP planning.” (Ibid.)
3. Document 53.
4. See Document 51.
5. In telegram 857 to Saigon, March 12, the Embassy was asked for additional comment on the Comprehensive Plan:

   “State requests frank TF/Saigon view on whether plan should be changed to extend phase out U.S. forces by one year (FY 65 through 68 rather than FY 65 through 67).

   “In requesting this view we have in mind that such stretch out would

   “a) require smaller increase in FY 64 training costs to U.S. and GVN;

   “b) lessen risk inability GVN take over in FY 67;

   “c) reduce political risk that GVN become unduly concerned that U.S. planning pull out.” (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 S VIET)