Office of the Historian

44. Letter From the Director of the Vietnam Working Group (Wood) to the Minister-Counselor of the Embassy in Vietnam (Trueheart)1

Washington, February 26, 1963.

Dear Bill: It would help my relations with the Governor if you could give me information on the following points concerning Task Force Saigon’s relations with U.S. press. The Embassy’s previous telegrams have been very useful.

I know that with about 12,000 military men in Viet-Nam, it is hopeless to expect that they will all see the overall picture and phrase their remarks accordingly when they talk to newsmen. Nonetheless, the impression persists here that the lack of perspective which has been characteristic of news reports from Viet Nam springs at least in part from inadequately informed American military sources. Could you give me a brief rundown on what is being done to insure that official Americans in Viet-Nam understand why we are in Viet-Nam, what our role there is, and how, in general, the war is going? How are they briefed? Is it possible to give MAAG advisers in the field a regular news picture of how the war is going (beyond their own bailiwick)? Any chance of increasing the coverage of the Armed Forces radio? We have survived guerrilla war between the GVN and the reporters, but public criticism between U.S. and ARVN brothers in arms can be more serious.

You will recall that in a recent letter to the Ambassador,2 the Governor suggested that since the Vietnamese appear unable or unwilling to give the newsmen adequate, accurate, and timely information on the war, we must do at least part of the job ourselves, perhaps on an unattributed basis. I believe that in fact you have been doing this discreetly for some time (e.g. Embtel 7583),3 but I don’t know how far you have gone. Are you still avoiding giving out news which does not have some connection with American personnel?

I believe the consensus here on this problem is that we should give the newsmen as complete a picture as possible without regard to the source of our information or the degree of US involvement. If the GVN complains, we can simply say that we have to be candid with [Page 126] our press in order to maintain our present Viet-Nam policy. I don’t think we have your full views on this idea or know exactly what you are now doing.

In the suggestion box we have a couple of ideas on the press problem which I pass along to you for whatever they may be worth. We are somewhat concerned that the plan originally called “explosion” which matured into the national offensive will be picked up by the newsmen and played as the last big push. To prevent this, perhaps we could make it clear in discussions with newsmen that the national offensive now getting under way is really only a gradual increase in activity rather than a sudden or climactic acceleration of the war effort.

Also, to improve the American image of the Vietnamese fighting man—which unhappily is not good at the moment because of unfavorable press reports of the Ap Bac affair—I wonder if we could not find ways of bringing individual acts of heroism and valor to the attention of the newsmen. Probably the best way to do this is through our advisers in the field who are most familiar with such stories and who see newsmen from time to time.

I will see John Mecklin here. So sorry he had to come back on a medical.

All best wishes,

Sincerely,

Chalmers B. Wood4
  1. Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 67 D 54, PR-11 Press Relations. Confidential; Official-Informal. Drafted by Heavner and Wood.↩
  2. Document 24.↩
  3. Dated February 16, telegram 758 reported that the Task Force planned expanded efforts to promote news about South Vietnamese social and economic progress. (Department of State, Central Files, PPV 7 S VIET-US)↩
  4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩